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Abstract
Lehman, Blair Allison. PhD. The University of Memphis. August 2014. Interventions to
Regulate Confusion during Learning. Major Professor: Arthur Graesser, PhD.
Confusion provides opportunities to learn at deeper levels. However, learners must put
forth the necessary effort to resolve their confusion to convert this opportunity into actual
learning gains. Learning occurs when learners engage in cognitive activities beneficial to
learning (e.g., reflection, deliberation, problem solving) during the process of confusion
resolution. Unfortunately, learners are not always able to resolve their confusion on their
own. The inability to resolve confusion can be due to a lack of knowledge, motivation, or
skills. The present dissertation explored methods to aid confusion resolution and
ultimately promote learning through a multi-pronged approach. First, a survey revealed
that learners prefer more information and feedback when confused and that they preferred
different interventions for confusion compared to boredom and frustration. Second,
expert human tutors were found to most frequently handle learner confusion by providing
direct instruction and responded differently to learner confusion compared to anxiety,
frustration, and happiness. Finally, two experiments were conducted to test the
effectiveness of pedagogical and motivational confusion regulation interventions. Both
types of interventions were investigated within a learning environment that
experimentally induced confusion via the presentation of contradictory information by
two animated agents (tutor and peer student agents). Results showed across both studies
that learner effort during the confusion regulation task impacted confusion resolution and
that learning occurred when the intervention provided the opportunity for learners to stop,
think, and deliberate about the concept being discussed. Implications for building more
effective affect-sensitive learning environments are discussed.
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Interventions to Regulate Confusion during Learning
Intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) are designed to increase learning through
adaptive, individualized instruction and scaffolding. Adaptive responses can range from
feedback about the quality of a learner’s response (e.g., “Yes, that’s correct.”) to miniconversations that break down the main problem down into smaller sub-problems (e.g.,
scaffolding). ITSs that respond to the cognitive states of learners (i.e., response quality)
have been found to be similar in effectiveness to human tutors (VanLehn, 2011).
Recently, ITSs have been developed that respond to both the cognitive and affective
states of learners (Arroyo et al., 2009; Burleson & Picard, 2007; Chaffar, Derbali, &
Frasson, 2009; Conati & Maclaren, 2009; D’Mello, Craig, Fike, & Graesser, 2009;
D’Mello & Graesser, 2012a; Forbes-Riley & Litman, 2009; Robison, McQuiggan, &
Lester, 2009). Although these affect-sensitive ITSs are also effective, there is still an
open question as to what the best method is to respond to learner affect to promote
engagement and learning.
ITS responses to learner cognitive states attempt to correct erroneous beliefs and
increase understanding of a concept. ITS responses to learner affective states, on the
other hand, attempt to manage learner affect to maintain or return to a state that is
conducive for learning. Engagement, for example, is a state that has been found to be
positively correlated with learning (Craig, Graesser, Sullins, & Gholson, 2004; Graesser
& D’Mello, 2012; Graesser et al., 2008). Thus, an affective-sensitive ITS could have the
goal to keep learners in a state of engagement or return learners to a state of engagement
when other affective states occur. In fact, when affective state transitions were
investigated in AutoTutor, a natural language mixed-initiative ITS (Graesser et al., 2004),
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a cycle of affect transitions was identified that consisted of oscillations between
engagement and confusion (see Figure 1, D’Mello & Graesser, 2012b). This productive
cycle involved learners detecting impasses (engagement → confusion) and then resolving
those impasses (confusion → engagement). However, another cycle was also identified
that consisted of transitions from confusion to frustration and then oscillations between
frustration and boredom. Based on these findings, an affect-sensitive ITS with the goal to
keep learners in a state of engagement could then focus on instances of confusion. The
ITS could intervene when confusion occurs to help learners transition to the productive
state of engagement as opposed to the unproductive state of frustration. This is one
example of how an affect-sensitive ITS could operate; however, there is not a consensus
as to which affective state is best for learning and what type of intervention is most
effective to achieve this goal for particular groups of learners.

Figure 1. Observed Model of Affect Dynamics, reprinted from D’Mello & Graesser
(2012b).
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Affect-sensitive ITSs must first determine which affective states will receive
adaptive responses. Research on shorter learning sessions (i.e., 30 min to 1.5 hr) have
found a set of learning-centered affective states that frequently occur in these learning
contexts (Arroyo et al., 2009; Baker, D’Mello, Rodrigo, & Graesser, 2010; Burleson &
Picard, 2007; Chaffar et al., 2009; Conati & Maclaren, 2009; D’Mello, 2013; D’Mello et
al., 2009; Forbes-Riley & Litman, 2011; Graesser & D’Mello, 2012; Lehman, Matthew,
D’Mello, & Person, 2008; Robison et al., 2009; Rodrigo & Baker, 2011b). The learningcentered affective states (i.e., anxiety, boredom, confusion, curiosity, engagement,
delight, frustration, surprise) (Calvo & D’Mello, 2011; D’Mello, 2013; Rodrigo & Baker,
2011a) can be contrasted with the universal, life experience set of basic emotions (i.e.,
anger, contempt, disgust, fear, happy, sad, surprise) (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972)
and the academic achievement emotions, which occur over longer time periods such as an
academic semester or year (Pekrun, 2010). These achievement emotions are associated
with (a) outcomes (achievement, e.g., contentment, anxiety, and frustration), (b) different
topics (topic, e.g., empathy for the protagonist in a novel), (c) interpersonal interactions
(social, e.g., pride, shame, and jealousy), and (d) new information (epistemic, e.g.,
surprise and confusion). Interactions with ITSs generally occur in the time frame of
shorter learning sessions and are focused on learning. Thus, the learning-centered
affective states seem to be the affective states to which ITSs should provide adaptive
responses. However, there is still the issue of how to respond to these affective states to
promote learning. Two ITSs that respond to learner affective states are discussed next.
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Affect-Sensitive Intelligent Tutoring Systems
Crystal Island is a narrative-centered ITS that immerses learners in a virtual world
to learn microbiology while solving a medical mystery (McQuiggan, Mott, & Lester,
2008; McQuiggan, Robison, & Lester, 2010). Empathetic agents then adaptively
responded to learners’ current affective states in one version of Crystal Island (Robison et
al., 2009). The agents responded either in parallel or reactively. Parallel responses
involved agents mirroring learners’ affective states (e.g., learner is frustrated and the
agent displays frustration), whereas reactive responses involved agents displaying the
desired affective state for learners (e.g., learner is frustrated and the agent displays
empathy). Agent emotions were displayed through text-based dialogue. This intervention
was found to influence transitions between affective states. However, this intervention
was not effective for all affective states, particularly confusion.
Affective AutoTutor is a version of the previously mentioned AutoTutor that
detects and responds to learner affective states (D’Mello, Lehman, & Graesser, 2011).
Responses to learner affective states involved three components: (1) content of agent
utterance, (2) agent facial expression, and (3) agent speech. The content of the agent’s
utterance was an affective statement based on attribution theory (Batson, Turk, Shaw, &
Klein, 1995; Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1986), cognitive disequilibrium theory (Festinger,
1957; Graesser, Lu, Olde, Cooper-Pye, & Whitten, 2005; Piaget, 1952), and pedagogical
experts. The affective statements consisted of an empathetic or motivational response and
attributed the learner’s emotion to either the material or the tutor. When confusion was
detected, for example, AutoTutor would say, “Some of this material can be confusing.
Just keep going and I’m sure you’ll get it.” Results showed that learning gains were
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greater for the Affective AutoTutor than the non-affective version, but only for a subset
of learners. Specifically, Affective AutoTutor was most effective for low prior
knowledge learners.
The interventions used in both Crystal Island and Affective AutoTutor attempted
to apply the same type of intervention to multiple affective states, although responses
were tailored to the individual affective state (e.g., boredom versus confusion). It may be
the case, however, that different types of interventions are needed for different affective
states. In other words, resolving confusion and overcoming boredom may not be achieved
by the same type of intervention. When developing interventions for specific affective
states, it would be advantageous to begin with an affective state that has the potential to
greatly impact learning. Confusion is one such affective state. Similar to boredom and
frustration, confusion is a negatively-valenced affective state. However, unlike boredom
and frustration, confusion has been found to be positively correlated with learning (Craig
et al., 2004; Graesser & D’Mello, 2012; Graesser et al., 2008). As previously mentioned,
confusion is involved in both the productive (engagement) and unproductive (frustration,
boredom) affective cycles. Confusion then has the potential to positively impact learning
if successfully resolved, but also the potential to lead to frustration and disengagement if
not properly addressed. Next, the characteristics of confusion during learning are
discussed.
Confusion and Learning
Confusion is an epistemic or knowledge affective state (Pekrun & Stephens, 2012;
Silvia, 2010) that is triggered by anomalies, breakdowns, contradictions, impasses, and
uncertainty about how to proceed (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; Caroll & Kay, 1988;
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D’Mello, Lehman, Pekrun, & Graesser, 2014; VanLehn, Siler, Murray, Yamauchi, &
Baggett, 2003). In short, confusion indicates that there is a problem with the current state
of one’s knowledge (Piaget, 1952). Confusion creates an opportunity for learning because
the problematic aspect of the learner’s knowledge has been highlighted and can then be
addressed and corrected. Cognitive activities that are beneficial for learning (e.g.,
reflection, deliberation, problem solving) can be triggered by experiences of confusion in
an effort to correct the problem in one’s knowledge. Confusion resolution occurs when
the problem in one’s knowledge has been corrected. It is this process of confusion
resolution that ultimately leads to learning, which is consistent with cognitive
disequilibrium (Festinger, 1957; Graesser et al., 2005; Piaget, 1952) and impasse-driven
theories of learning (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn et al., 2003). This type of
productive confusion should be contrasted with hopeless or unresolved confusion
(D’Mello & Graesser, 2012b). Hopeless confusion is an instance of confusion that the
learner cannot resolve either due to a lack of motivation or knowledge. These two types
of confusion can be seen in the affective transitions identified by D’Mello and Graesser
(2012b) (see Figure 1). These two types of confusion can be viewed as virtuous and
pathological outcomes. The mechanism that discriminates between the virtuous and
pathological outcomes of confusion is whether or not cognitive disequilibrium is
resolved. Thus, the mechanism-based intervention target becomes cognitive
disequilibrium or confusion resolution. Hopeless confusion could then be overcome if an
appropriate intervention is deployed to create opportunities for and promote confusion
resolution. For example, supports through more information and motivation as well as
scaffolding could help learners to persist through these struggles and clear up any
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uncertainties. Thus, it is important to determine which types of interventions will help
learners resolve their confusion when they are unable to resolve it on their own.
An intervention that places the responsibility of confusion resolution on the
learner is consistent with Piagetian theory (1952). Piagetian theory suggests that learners
must experience cognitive conflict for a sufficient amount of time before they adequately
deliberate and reflect via self-regulation. Based on the findings from over 100 hours of
one-to-one human tutoring, VanLehn et al. (2003) recommended a similar response to
learner impasses that involves three steps: (1) prompting the learner to reason and arrive
at a solution, (2) prompting the learner to explain their solution, and (3) providing the
solution with an explanation only if the learner fails to arrive at an answer. This research
suggests that learners can resolve their confusion, created by an impasse, through
continued reflection, deliberation, and problem solving.
Vygotskian theory (1978), on the other hand, suggests a more guided, direct
approach to addressing confusion solution. This perspective would suggest that it is not
productive to have struggling learners spend too much time in a state of confusion and
that ITSs should provide direct questions and explanations to aid confusion resolution.
This type of intervention could also be manifested in breaking down the original problem
into smaller, more manageable sub-problems for the learner. This strategy was found in a
corpus of 50 hr of one-to-one expert human tutoring sessions (Lehman et al., 2008).
Tutors were found to break down the original problem after instances of learner
confusion. A similar pattern was also derived from another corpus of one-to-one human
tutoring that investigated responses to learner uncertainty (Forbes-Riley & Litman, 2007).
The response involved three components: (1) drawing the learner’s attention to the
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impasse, (2) providing additional hints and questions to the learner, and (3) providing the
learner with additional information that is needed to resolve the impasse. The pattern
found by Forbes-Riley and Litman was then used to create an uncertainty-adaptive
version of ITSpoke (Forbes-Riley & Litman, 2011), which is discussed later.
Another type of intervention can be derived from attribution theory (Batson et al.,
1995; Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1986), which is similar to the approach used in the
previously described Affective AutoTutor. Attribution theory suggests that perceived
causes of outcomes (success, failure) will impact future behaviors. Two learners who
experience confusion can ascribe different causal attributions and this attribution will
impact whether a learner engages in effortful cognitive activities to resolve their
confusion or disengages from the task. Attributions vary on three factors: locus (internal,
external), stability (stable, unstable), and control (controllable, uncontrollable) (Weiner,
2010). When learners attribute the cause to their ability, for example, the attribution is
generally internal, stable, and uncontrollable; whereas an attribution to effort would be
internal, unstable, and controllable. Attributions to effort when failure occurs have been
found to be more beneficial than to ability in the case of academic achievement because
learners have the ability to change the amount of effort exerted in the future.
Misattribution training is one approach to alter learners’ attributions to encourage
persistence after failure (Reisenzein, 1983; Schachter & Singer, 1962). A self-attribution
of low ability after failure can cause a reduction in self-esteem and cause learners to
disengage from the task. However, an external attribution can avoid this threat to selfesteem through removing the control or responsibility of failure from the learner.
Affective AutoTutor utilizes this type of approach by placing the responsibility of
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confusion on the tutor agent or to the difficulty of the material when confusion occurs. In
other words, AutoTutor places the responsibility for confusion on either the difficulty of
the material or the prior explanations delivered by AutoTutor.
Previous research has also utilized attribution retraining to shift learners from
ability to effort (Anderson, 1983; Andrews & Debus, 1978; Medway & Venino, 1982;
Zoeller, Mahoney, & Weiner, 1983), stable to unstable (Wilson & Linville, 1982; 1985),
and uncontrollable to controllable causes for failure (Perry, Stupinsky, Hall, Chipperfield,
& Weiner, 2010). The attribution retraining to shift learners from ability attributions to
effort attributions is also very similar to approach adopted by Dweck (1999) that
encourages learners to adopt an incremental as opposed to fixed mindset. This attribution
retraining has been found to positively impact learning in both the short-term and longterm (e.g., next semester) by encouraging learners to persist after failure (Perry et al.,
2010; Wilson & Linville, 1982, 1985). This approach can be applied to experiences of
confusion, which are not the same as failure but do frequently involve a negative
attribution and require persistence and resilience to reach a successful resolution.
UNC-ITSpoke is the uncertainty adaptive version of ITSpoke, which is a spokendialogue ITS that tutors qualitative physics (Litman & Forbes-Riley, 2006). Adaptive
responding was based on uncertainty (present, absent) and the quality of learner
responses (correct, incorrect). The combination of uncertainty and response quality
resulted in four outcomes that differed based on the severity of the impasse experienced
by the learner: (1) correct + certain (least severe), (2) correct + uncertain, (3) incorrect +
uncertain, and (4) incorrect + certain (most severe). Greater learning gains were found for
learners who interacted with UNC-ITSpoke than those who interacted with the regular
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version of ITSpoke (Forbes-Riley & Litman, 2011). However, this pattern was only
found for those learners who experienced more uncertainty and received more support
from UNC-ITSpoke. This limitation raises an interesting issue about evaluating the
effectiveness of uncertainty and confusion regulation interventions.
The previously discussed affect-sensitive ITSs take a reactive approach by
responding after a particular affective state has naturally occurred. Affect-sensitive ITSs
could take a more proactive approach, however, by creating learning opportunities
through the induction of confusion in addition to reactions to confusion when affective
states naturally occur. This type of affect-sensitive ITS would aid learners by providing
support for confusion resolution, but also by creating opportunities for learners to reach a
deeper understanding. Three methods of confusion induction and their impact on learning
are discussed next.
Confusion Induction Learning Environments
In the first example, D’Mello and Graesser (in press) investigated the use of
device breakdowns as a method of confusion induction in two experiments. Participants
read illustrated texts of everyday devices and were then presented with the same
illustrated text plus an additional breakdown prompt (Breakdown Condition). The
cylinder lock, for example, had the following breakdown prompt: “A person puts the key
into the lock and turns the lock but the bolt doesn’t move.” Participants were then asked
to determine why the device was not functioning. In the control condition participants
either re-read the illustrated text (Experiment 1) or re-read the illustrated text with
instructions to focus on a key part of the device (Experiment 2). More confusion was
reported by participants when in the breakdown condition compared to the control
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condition in both experiments. Confusion over time was also investigated by having
participants complete a continuous rating of their confusion level via a retrospective
confusion judgment. Analyses revealed the occurrence of two main patterns of confusion:
partially-resolved and unresolved. Participants who were able to partially resolve their
confusion outperformed their counterparts who were unable to resolve their confusion on
a device comprehension task.
In the second example, three experiments investigated the presentation of
contradictory information as a method of confusion induction (D’Mello et al., 2014;
Lehman et al., 2013). Contradictory information was presented by animated pedagogical
agents in each of these experiments. Two agents (tutor and peer student agents) presented
their opinions while discussing the scientific merits of research case studies. For example,
one case study described a miraculous new diet pill that caused significant weight loss in
just one month. For this case study, the two agents and the human learner discussed
whether or not the control group used in this study was appropriate. Contradictory
information was presented via the agents’ opinions. Agents could agree and present
correct opinions (True-True), agree and present incorrect opinions (False-False), or
disagree with each other (True-False, False-True). In the True-False condition the tutor
agent presented a correct opinion and the student agent disagreed and with an incorrect
opinion, whereas it was the tutor agent who disagreed with an incorrect opinion and the
student agent who presented a correct opinion in the False-True condition. The human
learner was then invited to provide his or her opinion after the agents had each presented
their opinion. Confusion was successfully induced when contradictory information
conditions were compared to the no-contradiction control condition (True-True). In
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addition, learners who were successfully confused by the contradictory information
performed better on learning measures (Experiments 1-3), including a difficult transfer of
knowledge task (Experiment 3).
In the third example, false feedback was investigated as a method of confusion
induction (Lehman, D’Mello, & Graesser, in preparation). Learners diagnosed flaws in
research case studies with the guidance of an animated pedagogical tutor agent. After the
learner diagnosed the flaw in the case study via a forced-choice question, the tutor agent
then provided feedback on the quality of the diagnosis. The feedback could either be
accurate or inaccurate, regardless of actual response quality (correct, incorrect). Learners
reported more confusion when they were correct and received inaccurate, negative
feedback than when they received accurate, positive feedback. Learners performed best
on a difficult far transfer task when they received false feedback (positive or negative)
and were successfully confused based on on-line judgments than when they received
accurate feedback (positive or negative).
Although learning gains associated with confusion induction were found for all
three methods of confusion induction, it was not the case that all learners were able to
successfully resolve their confusion and learn the material. This was likely due to the fact
that most of these experiments did not provide any aid or scaffolding for confusion
resolution. Two experiments provided learners with an explanatory text to aid confusion
resolution (contradictory information: Experiment 3; false feedback experiment). The
explanatory text, however, may not have been sufficient to aid all learners in the effort to
resolve their confusion. This dissertation addresses this issue by exploring interventions
to regulate confusion during learning.
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Present Research Objectives
The present dissertation adopts a multi-prong approach to better understand what
interventions are effective to regulate confusion and promote learning. The remainder of
the proposal is organized into five sections. First, learner preferences for affective
interventions were investigated in a survey study. Second, the way in which expert
human tutors respond to learner confusion were investigated. In sections three and four,
interventions to regulate confusion were investigated within a learning environment that
experimentally induces confusion via the presentation of contradictory information from
two agents. Learners engaged in a trialogue (three-party conversation) with two animated
pedagogical agents (tutor and peer student agents) to evaluate the scientific merits of
research case studies. Interventions built on previous research by exploring two types of
interventions. Pedagogical and motivational interventions were investigated in two
experiments. The pedagogical interventions encouraged learners to engage in the
cognitive activities needed for confusion resolution (e.g., reflection, deliberation). The
motivational interventions were designed to motivate learners to persist through
experiences of confusion and to put in effort to resolve their confusion through changes
in their causal attributions. Finally in section five, the findings from all four studies,
limitations in the present research, and future work are discussed in a general discussion.
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2. Study 1: Learner Preferences for Confusion Regulation Interventions
Recent research has explored various theoretically- or empirically-derived
interventions for adaptively responding to affective states. However, there has been a
paucity of research exploring learner preferences for interventions. One exception is a
survey study that explored learner methods of self-regulation for affect while studying
academic material (Strain, Gross, & D’Mello, 2012). This study reported that some selfregulation strategies were viewed as more effective than others. In particular, learners
reported that quiet seeking, taking a break, positive rumination, engaging in a learning
strategy (e.g., taking notes, highlighting), and making a game out of studying were
helpful strategies. The current dissertation further explored learner preferences for affect
interventions in line with this previous study.
It is possible, however, that learner preferences may not be informative due to a
lack of meta-affect knowledge. This possibility stems from the extensive previous
research that has shown learners have poor metacognitive knowledge (Dunlosky &
Lipko, 2007; Glenberg & Epstein, 1985; Graesser, D’Mello, & Person, 2009; Hacker,
Dunlosky, & Graesser, 2009). In general, meta-comprehension ratings have been found
to correlate with actual learner performance very poorly (Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007;
Glenberg, Wilkinson, & Epstein, 1982; Maki, 1998). Learner awareness of affect and its
relation to current understanding could be similar to metacognitive awareness. If this is
the case, then learner preferences for confusion regulation interventions may not be
particularly informative for developing effective interventions. However, there is an
alternative position that affect is more salient for learners (Damasio, 1994; Izard, 1993;
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Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004; Scherer, 1993) and thus learner reflections could be
insightful.
Research in cognitive neuroscience has suggested that there are separate ‘hot’ and
‘cold’ paths for affect and cognition, respectively (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004;
Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; D’Esposito, Postle, & Rypma, 2000; Ochsner & Gross,
2005). In particular, increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex has been found
when there is conflict in information processing and negative outcomes in order to reduce
conflict and negative outcomes in the future through the action selection process
(Botvinick et al., 2004).
Survey and Data Collection
Participants. Participants were 105 undergraduate students and received course
credit for participation. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 56 years old (M = 21.4, SD
= 6.66). There were 97 females and 8 males. Thirty-two percent of participants were
African American, 53% were Caucasian, 8% were Asian, 1% were Hispanic, and 6%
were other.
Survey. The survey consisted of two phases: preferences on interventions for
emotion regulation during learning (see Appendix A) and individual difference measures
(see Appendices E-I). To determine preferences for interventions for confusion
regulation, participants were asked a series of self-report questions. Specifically,
participants were asked: When you are CONFUSED during learning, how helpful would
you find each of the following for overcoming your CONFUSION? Learning was defined
for participants as any experience in a classroom, working alone, or working with a tutor
in which you are attempting to learn some material (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Screenshot of Confusion Intervention Survey Questions.

Participants then rated each potential intervention on a 6-point scale with the
following anchors: 1 – Not at All Helpful and 6 – Very helpful, with all values anchored
(see Figure 2). The presentation of each response option was randomized for each
participant. The six confusion regulation interventions were: (1) additional information
about the concept being learned, (2) encouragement to persist with the task, (3)
presentation of a new (but related) task to solve, (4) feedback about the quality of your
responses (i.e., correct vs. incorrect), (5) correct answer, and (6) a short break to do an
unrelated task. Participants repeated this process for experiences of boredom and
frustration as well.
16

Next, participants completed several individual differences measures. Participants
completed the Academic Grit Scale (AGS, Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly,
2007, see Appendix E), School Failure Tolerance Scale (SFT, Clifford, 1984, see
Appendix F), Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ, Pintrich &
DeGroot, 1990, see Appendix G), Attributional Complexity Scale (ACS, Fletcher,
Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986, see Appendix H), and a demographics
questionnaire (i.e., gender, ACT score, year in school, etc., see Appendix I). These
measures were selected because they assess preferences for challenging material and
responses to academic challenges like those posed by confusion experiences.
Results and Discussion
The analyses were conducted in two phases. First, there was a comparison of each
type of intervention for confusion. This analysis was conducted to determine which type
of intervention participants most preferred when confused during learning. Second, there
was a comparison of each type of intervention for each affective state (boredom,
confusion, frustration). This analysis was conducted to determine which type of
intervention was viewed as uniquely effective for a specific affective state or was
beneficial to multiple affective states. The analyses were conducted with ANOVAs that
had intervention or intervention × affective state as the factors.
Within Confusion Comparison. A Repeated Measures ANOVA investigating
learner preferences for confusion regulation interventions was found to be significant,
F(5,105) = 29.6, p < .001, Mse = 1.35, η2 = .218. Table 1 shows learner ratings for
preference of each method of intervention. Post hoc analyses (least significant difference)
were conducted to investigate which intervention was preferred by learners. The general
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pattern for preference was: More Information > (Feedback = Correct Answer) >
Encouragement > (New Task = Break). The only exception to this general pattern was
that learners equally preferred being provided with the correct answer and
encouragement.
Learners appear to generally prefer interventions that involved staying on task
when confused. Specifically, learners felt that receiving more information, feedback, and
the correct answer would all help them overcome their confusion. In contrast, changing
the task (new related task or break) was least preferred. Encouragement was found to be
less preferred to the stay on task interventions, but more preferred than the change task
interventions.

Table 1
Mean (SD) of Learner Preferences for Interventions
Boredom
Confusion
M
SD
M
SD
More Information
3.50
1.67
5.15
1.16
Feedback
3.77
1.70
4.88
1.34
Correct Answer
3.05
1.59
4.82
1.17
Encouragement
3.98
1.66
4.64
1.41
Take a Break
4.79
1.61
3.64
1.75
New Related Task
4.55
1.51
3.85
1.52

Frustration
M
SD
4.94
1.32
4.86
1.34
4.62
1.41
4.67
1.45
4.71
1.49
4.13
1.66

Across Emotion Comparison. Next, a Repeated Measures ANOVA was
conducted to investigate the emotion (boredom, confusion, frustration) × intervention
interaction (see Table 1). The interaction was significant F(10,105) = 37.0, p < .001, Mse
= 1.15, η2 = .259. Post hoc analyses revealed that there were differences in learner
preferences for interventions based on the affective state being addressed. More
information and provide correct answer as interventions were most preferred for
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occurrences of confusion, followed by frustration, and least preferred for boredom
(Confusion > Frustration > Boredom). Encouragement and feedback were equally
preferred for confusion and frustration, but least preferred for boredom (Confusion =
Frustration > Boredom). Shifting to a new but related task was most preferred for
instances of boredom, followed by frustration, and least preferred for confusion
(Boredom > Frustration > Confusion). Finally, taking a break was equally preferred for
boredom and frustration, but least preferred for confusion (Boredom = Frustration >
Confusion).
Confusion differed from both boredom and frustration in terms of the
interventions that learners felt would be helpful. However, it was the case that confusion
was similar in some respects to frustration. In particular, feedback and encouragement
were viewed as equally helpful for overcoming confusion and frustration. This similarity
could be due to the fact that learners may perceive instances of confusion and frustration
as similar. In fact it has been proposed and found in interactions with AutoTutor that
when learners stay in confusion for too long and are unable to resolve their confusion,
they can transition into frustration (D’Mello & Graesser, 2012b). Thus, it may be that
some learners were referencing hopeless or unresolvable confusion when rating which
intervention would be most helpful. In future studies, it would be helpful to determine
how learners perceive confusion and frustration and what type of confusion and
frustration experience they are referencing when rating potential interventions.
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3. Study 2: Expert Human Tutor Responses to Learner Confusion
Expert Tutoring Corpus
The corpus consisted of 50 tutoring sessions between ten expert tutors and 39
learners (Cade, Copeland, Person, & D’Mello, 2008; Person, Lehman, & Ozbun, 2007).
Expert status was defined as: licensed to teach at the secondary level, five or more years
of ongoing tutoring experience, employed by a professional tutoring agency, and highly
recommended by local school personnel. The learners were all having difficulty in a
science or math course and were either recommended for tutoring by school personnel or
voluntarily sought professional tutoring help. All learner and tutor pairs were working
together prior to this study. Some learner and tutor pairs were recorded for two tutoring
sessions. Therefore, the unit of analysis was the tutor-learner dyad. The subjects studied
were algebra (28%), basic math (2%), biology (20%), chemistry (8%), geometry (26%),
physics (8%), and standardized test preparation (8%).
Fifty-five percent of learners were female and 45% were male. Sixty-nine percent
of learners were Caucasian, 28% were African American, and 3% were Asian American.
Learners varied in age from 13 to 25 years old with a median age of 16 years old, ranging
from middle school to an adult returning to get her general education diploma. Of the 39
learners, four were home schooled, 17 attended public schools, and 18 attended private
schools. Tutors reported the socio-economic status of their learners as 12 upper class, 12
upper-middle class, and 15 middle class.
Each session lasted approximately 1 hr. All sessions were videotaped with a
camera and positioned at a great enough distance to not disturb the tutoring session but
close enough to record audio and visual data. The researcher left the room during the
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tutoring session. The videos were digitized and then transcribed. Transcripts were then
coded with respect to tutor dialogue moves, learner dialogue moves, and learner affective
states (see below).
Tutor Dialogue Moves Coding Scheme. The 24-item tutor dialogue move
coding scheme (Person et al., 2007) was divided into groups based on similar functions
within the tutoring session: direct instruction (example, counterexample, preview,
summary, provide correct answer, direct instruction), question (new problem, simplified
problem, prompt, pump, hint, forced-choice), feedback (positive, neutral, negative),
motivational statement (humor, attribution, general motivation, solidarity),
conversational “Okay” (i.e., backchannel feedback), and off-topic.
Learner Dialogue Moves Coding Scheme. The 16-item learner dialogue coding
scheme was divided into eight groups based on the function of each move: answer
(correct, partially-correct, vague, error-ridden, none), question (common ground,
knowledge deficit), misconception (e.g., “I thought it was the other way around”),
metacomment (e.g., “I don’t know”,), work-related action (think aloud, read aloud, work
silently), socially motivated action (social coordination, acknowledge), gripe, and offtopic.
Learner Affective State Coding Scheme. The 12-item learner affective state
coding scheme (Lehman et al., 2008) consisted of both learning centered affective states
(anxiety, confusion, curiosity, eureka, frustration) and Ekman’s basic emotions (anger,
contempt, disgust, fear, happy, sad, surprise). The four most prominently occurring
affective states during the tutoring sessions were anxiety, confusion, frustration, and
happiness. They accounted for 93.0% of the affective states that learners experienced
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during the expert tutoring sessions. The present proposal will then focus on these four
affective states for the proposed analyses.
Data Treatment
A previous analysis investigated tutor responses to learner affective states
(Lehman et al., 2008). However, this previous analysis had two limitations. First, the
analysis only took into consideration a single tutor dialogue move in response to an
affective state. It is possible that tutor responses to affective states involve multi-move or
even multi-turn responses. For example, both VanLehn et al. (2003) and Forbes-Riley
and Litman (2007) reported that human tutor responses to impasses and uncertainty
involved multi-turn interactions between the tutor and the learner. Second, the prior
analysis considered all instances of an emotion to be equivalent. It is possible, for
example, that tutors respond differently to a learner who is confused and asks a question
and a learner who is confused and responds incorrectly. The analyses attempt to address
these two limitations.
Tutor responses to confusion were defined as 20 dialogue turns after the
confusion experience. Twenty dialogue turns were selected as the unit of analysis to
capture approximately 10 tutor and 10 learner dialogue turns following each instance of
confusion. In other words, when an instance of learner confusion was identified in
dialogue turn 5, for example, dialogue turns 6 through 26 were included in the present
analyses. To conduct the analyses, each instance of confusion was identified in the expert
tutoring corpus and the 20 subsequent dialogue turns were extracted. In addition, the
learner dialogue move associated with the instance of confusion was also recorded. This
was done to determine if tutor responses differ based on the combination of learner

22

affective and cognitive states. This process was also completed for instances of anxiety,
frustration, and happiness in order to compare tutor responses to the four most frequently
occurring affective states in the expert tutoring corpus. Finally, tutor responses to learner
answers (correct, partially-correct, vague, error-ridden, and none) were also collected to
determine if tutor responses differed based on the presence or absence of confusion.
Results and Discussion
The analyses were conducted in two phases. First, occurrences of tutor dialogue
moves were investigated for instances of confusion in general. Second, occurrences of
dialogue moves were investigated based on confusion and the co-occurring cognitive
state. Cognitive states were bounded by associated dialogue moves pertaining to answer
types (correct, partially-correct, vague, error-ridden, none), questions (common ground,
knowledge deficit), and metacognitive statements (metacomment, misconception). In
previous research on this expert tutoring corpus, confusion was found to significantly cooccur with all types of learner incorrect responses, questions, and metacomments, but not
misconceptions (Lehman, D’Mello, & Person, 2010). Hypotheses based on impassedriven theories of learning (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn et al., 2003) and
cognitive disequilibrium theory (Festinger, 1957; Graesser et al., 2005; Piaget, 1952)
would expect the tutors to encourage learners to resolve their confusion on their own with
only vague questions (e.g., pumps, hints) to trigger the learner to provide a response and
explanation for their response. In contrast, a hypothesis based on Vygotskian theory
(1978) would expect the tutors to break the original problem down into smaller subproblems and engage in more directly guided scaffolding. Finally, a hypothesis based on
the INSPIRE Model (Lepper & Woolverton, 2002) would expect the tutors to provide

23

supportive, motivational statements or be nurturing to the learners. The analyses allowed
for the investigation of each hypothesis.
The analyses included ANOVAs and paired-samples t-tests. When t-tests were
computed instead of ANOVAs it was due to the fact that every dialogue move (e.g.,
learner questions, learner answers), affective state, or confusion-cognitive state pair (e.g.,
confusion-vague answer) did not occur in every expert tutoring session. In order to
maintain a large enough N to conduct meaningful analyses t-tests were necessary.
Instances of Confusion Overall. Instances of confusion overall were investigated
in five contexts. First, the pattern of tutor dialogue moves following instances of
confusion was investigated (confusion only context). Next, the occurrence of dialogue
moves following instances of confusion were compared to dialogue move occurrences in
other contexts in the expert tutoring session: (2) overall, (3) other learner affective states
(anxiety, frustration, happiness), (4) learner questions, and (5) learner answers.
Within confusion comparison. A Repeated Measures ANOVA was conducted to
investigate the occurrence of tutor dialogue moves following instances of confusion
overall. Table 2 shows the proportional occurrence of all possible tutor dialogue moves.
Note that the dialogue moves in Table 2 do not add up to 1 because both tutor and learner
dialogue moves occurred, however, only tutor dialogue moves are included in the present
analyses. The ANOVA was significant, F(23, 49) = 139, p < .001, η2 = .743. The
following overall pattern was found when Bonferroni post hoc analyses were conducted:
direct instruction > (positive feedback = off-topic = conversational ok) > (simplified
problem = comprehension gauging question = prompt = repetition = hint = new problem
= provide correct answer = negative feedback = neutral feedback = humor = attributional
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acknowledgement = example) > (pump = general motivational statement = summary =
paraphrase = forced-choice question = preview = solidary statement = counter example).

Table 2
Mean (SD) of Dialogue Moves following Instances of Confusion Overall
New Problem
Simplified Problem
Pump
Hint
Prompt
Forced-Choice Question
Preview
Summary
Paraphrase
Example
Counter Example
Provide Correct Answer
Direct Instruction
Comprehension Gauging Question

Tutor Dialogue Moves
Ok
.013 (.015)
Positive Feedback
.036 (.021)
Neutral Feedback
.004 (.007)
Negative Feedback
.016 (.013)
Repetition
.020 (.024)
Attributional Acknowledgement
.002 (.004)
Solidarity Statement
.002 (.003)
Humor
.003 (.005)
General Motivational Statement
.003 (.004)
Off-Topic
.006 (.011)
.000 (.001)
.013 (.013)
.183 (.063)
.032 (.023)

.060 (.032)
.076 (.042)
.009 (.011)
.011 (.010)
.018 (.018)
.006 (.009)
.001 (.002)
.008 (.015)
.004 (.008)
.061 (.054)

Overall, tutors provided direct instruction, positive feedback, off-topic
conversation, and generally broke down the current problem into smaller, more
manageable sub-problems. This finding supports the hypothesis consistent with
Vygotskian theory (1978). Tutors were found to directly guide learners through problem
solving and provide more information to aid in problem solving. In addition, the
occurrence of off-topic conversation may support the more nurturing, motivational
hypothesis consistent with the INSPIRE Model (Lepper & Woolverton, 2002). Off-topic
conversation has previously been found to include rapport building dialogue as well as
guidance on more general study skills (Cade, Lehman, & Olney, 2010; Lehman, Cade, &
Olney, 2010). This off-topic conversation could be indicative of providing learners with a
short mental break when confusion is particularly strong.
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Confusion compared to overall dialogue move occurrences. Next, dialogue move
occurrences after instances of confusion were compared to dialogue move occurrences
overall in expert human tutoring sessions, after instances of other affective states
(anxiety, frustration, happiness), after learner questions (common ground, knowledge
deficit), and learner answers (correct, partially-correct, vague, error-ridden, and none),
with paired-sample t-tests. When compared to overall occurrence, there were only
differences for repetition (t(48) = 2.13, p = .039), hint (t(48) = 2.44, p = .018), new
problem (t(48) = 1.66, p = .104), preview (t(48) = 3.23, p = .002), counter example (t(48)
= 2.31, p = .025), and provide correct answer (t(48) = 1.64, p = .107). Repetition (M =
.016, SD = .016), hint (M = .013, SD = .009), and provide correct answer (M = .011, SD =
.008) all occurred more frequently after confusion than overall, whereas new problem (M
= .015, SD = .013), preview (M = .003, SD = .004), and counter example (M = .000, SD =
.001) all occurred less frequently after confusion (see Table 2 for after confusion
descriptives).
The comparison of dialogue moves after confusion to the overall occurrence of
dialogue moves shows that tutors generally continue with typical tutorial instruction after
instances of learner confusion. This finding supports systems like ITSpoke (Forbes-Riley
& Litman, 2011) that handle confusion similarly to incorrect answers. However, it is
important to note some of the differences. The increased occurrence of hints and
providing the correct answer provides some support for the approach proposed by
VanLehn et al. (2003). In the VanLehn et al. (2003) approach the tutor only provides
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the correct answer after the learner has made multiple attempts to solve the problem on
their own with only minimal guidance (e.g., hints) from the tutor. In addition, the less
frequent occurrence of confusion is notable. This suggests that tutors do not abandon a
problem because it is challenging for the learner, but instead tutors may allow learners to
remain in a state of confusion and work towards resolving their confusion.
Confusion compared to other affective states. Dialogue move occurrences (i.e.,
proportion of occurrence) after confusion were next compared to occurrences after the
three other most frequently occurring affective states. This analysis was conducted to
determine if tutors handled all emotions, particularly negatively-valenced emotions, in a
similar manner or if different strategies were adopted. Prompts were found to be the only
dialogue move occurrence that differed between confusion and anxiety, with confusion
having more prompts than anxiety (t(47) = 1.81, p = .077, M = .017, SD = .022). This
suggests that aside from follow-up questions with fairly simple desired responses (e.g.,
one or two words or a key phrase), tutors handled anxiety and confusion in a similar
manner. This could be due to the fact that learners’ uncertainty about how to proceed
could trigger anxiety in this real world context. In other words, being uncertain about
how to proceed with the current math problem, for example, could have negative real
world consequences such as failing a test or failing a course. Thus, in the present context,
instances of anxiety could be highly related to the same events that trigger confusion.
Prompts were also found to occur more after confusion than frustration (t(26) =
3.30, p = .003, M = .013, SD = .018) and happiness (t(46) = 1.79, p = .080, M = .016, SD
= .022). Neutral feedback (t(26) = 2.20, p = .037, M = .004, SD = .008) and counter
example (t(26) = 1.79, p = .086, M = .000, SD = .000) were also found to occur more
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after confusion than frustration, whereas solidarity statement (t(26) = 2.10, p = .045, M =
.004, SD = .008) and general motivational statement (t(26) = 2.02, p = .054, M = .010, SD
= .021) occurred more after frustration than confusion. Tutors appeared to deploy more
motivational and supportive statements after instances of frustration than confusion. It
may be the case then that the nurturing component of the INSPIRE model (Lepper &
Woolverton, 2002), may be more applicable to instances of frustration than confusion.
Tutors may find it more productive to provide tutorial instruction in line with the
strategies suggested by VanLehn et al. (2003) and Vygotsky (1978) after instances of
confusion.
Humor occurred more following happiness than confusion (t(46) = 3.01, p = .004,
M = .013, SD = .019) as well as tutor off-topic conversation (t(46) = 3.34, p = .002, M =
.096, SD = .076) and preview (t(46) = 2.48, p = .017, M = .003, SD = .007). On the other
hand, positive feedback (t(46) = 1.75, p = .086, M = .065, SD = .037), repetition (t(46) =
1.97, p = .055, M = .015, SD = .017), forced-choice questions (t(46) = 2.77, p = .008, M =
.001, SD = .003), simplified problem (t(46) = 1.78, p = .081, M = .031, SD = .024),
provide correct answer (t(46) = 2.80, p = .007, M = .008, SD = .008), and direct
instruction (t(46) = 2.10, p = .042, M = .159, SD = .063) all occurred more after
confusion than happiness. Confusion and happiness seem to contrast each other in terms
of tutor dialogue moves. Tutors continue with tutorial instruction on the current problem
after confusion, whereas they view happiness as an opportunity to build rapport (humor,
off-topic conversation), discuss larger learning strategies (off-topic conversation, Cade et
al., 2010; Lehman, Cade, et al., 2010), and move on to a new topic (preview).
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Confusion compared to learner questions. Confusion can be indicative of
uncertainty or a general lack of understanding about how to proceed, which could be a
similar state to when learners ask questions. The next set of analyses investigated
differences in how tutors responded to learner questions (common ground, knowledge
deficit) compared to instances of confusion with a series of paired-sample t-tests. Both
types of questions were found to differ in terms of tutor dialogue moves when compared
to confusion. First, the comparison to common ground questions is considered. Repetition
(t(47) = 1.85, p = .071, M = .016, SD = .017), pump (t(47) = 1.92, p = .061, M = .003, SD
= .004), and off-topic conversation (t(47) = 2.06, p = .045, M = .044, SD = .030) were all
found to occur more frequently after confusion than common ground questions. In
contrast, preview (t(47) = 1.75, p = .088, M = .003, SD = .007), counter example (t(47) =
2.19, p = .034, M = .001, SD = .001), and positive feedback (t(47) = 2.25, p = .029, M =
.083, SD = .042) all occurred more frequently after common ground questions than
confusion.
Next, the comparison to knowledge deficit questions is explored. There were
three similarities between the comparison of confusion to common ground questions and
the comparison to knowledge deficit questions. Repetition (t(44) = 3.53, p = .001, M =
.013, SD = .016) and pumps (t(44) = 3.04, p = .004, M = .003, SD = .004) occurred more
after confusion than knowledge deficit questions, whereas positive feedback (t(44) =
2.71, p = .010, M = .062, SD = .035) occurred more after knowledge deficit questions
than confusion. However, knowledge deficit questions also differed from common
ground questions when compared to confusion. Specifically, knowledge deficit questions
were less likely to be followed by hints (t(44) = 1.99, p = .053, M = .011, SD = .013) and
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providing the correct answer (t(44) = 1.71, p = .095, M = .009, SD = .011) than
confusion. The main difference between how tutors handled learner confusion and learner
questions, then, was that tutors continued to ask question and progress with the tutoring
session more after confusion than when a learner asked a question.
Confusion compared to learner answers. Finally, dialogue move occurrences after
confusion were compared to dialogue move occurrences after learner answers (correct,
partially-correct, vague, error-ridden, none). Learner correct answers and different types
of incorrect answers (partially-correct, vague, error-ridden, none) were all considered in
the present analyses. This analysis was performed in light of the UNC-ITSpoke
uncertainty intervention that treats instances of uncertainty as similar to incorrect
responses (Forbes-Riley & Litman, 2011). The next set of analyses investigated whether
dialogue move occurrences after learner answers (correct, partially-correct, vague, errorridden, none) differed from occurrences after confusion with paired-sample t-tests. There
were significant differences between all types of answers, with one exception, which
suggests that the approach to treat confusion and uncertainty as equivalent to incorrect
answers may not be entirely appropriate. Interestingly, there were no significant
differences in the way that tutors handled vague answers and the way in which they
handled confusion (p’s > .1). It may be the case then that confusion is only similar to
certain types of incorrect answers. Next, the significant differences between confusion
and each answer type are considered.
Overall, confusion was not handled in a similar manner to correct answers. This
finding is expected. Confusion paired with a correct answer may be evidence that the
learner does not fully understand why it is the correct answer or may have even merely
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guessed the correct answer. Tutor dialogue moves after confusion were more typical of
what would be expected for an incorrect answer. For example, negative feedback more
frequently followed confusion (t(48) = 2.05, p = .046, M = .008, SD = .006), whereas
positive feedback more frequently followed correct answers (t(48) = 3.97, p < .001, M =
.089, SD = .046). In addition, tutors more frequently used hints (t(48) = 1.77, p = .083, M
= .013, SD = .011) and provided the correct answer (t(48) = 1.66, p = .104, M = .011, SD
= .008) after confusion to seemingly work towards resolving misconceptions and gaps in
knowledge. In contrast, repetition of the learner’s answer (t(48) = 3.57, p = .001, M =
.022, SD = .019) and counter examples (t(48) = 1.84, p = .071, M = .001, SD = .001) were
used more after a correct answer than confusion, possibly in an effort to reinforce
learners’ accurate knowledge. It is interesting to note that off-topic conversation occurred
more frequently after confusion than correct answers (t(48) = 2.35, p = .023, M = .046,
SD = .029). This may indicate that tutors sometimes handle confusion by allowing
learners to take a quick mental break or to discuss larger learner strategies.
Both partially-correct answers and confusion were handled by tutors in ways that
imply that the learner has inaccurate knowledge; however, the two instances were still
handled differently. Overall, the difference involved follow-up questions to a partiallycorrect answer as opposed to more general information and motivation after confusion.
Specifically, prompts (t(48) = 2.01, p = .050, M = .026, SD = .034) and pumps (t(48) =
1.73, p = .091, M = .006, SD = .009) more frequently followed partially-correct answers
than confusion. In contrast, direct instruction (t(48) = 1.85, p = .071, M = .168, SD =
.068) and general motivational statements (t(48) = 1.80, p = .078, M = .003, SD = .004)
occurred more frequently after confusion. In addition, counter examples (t(48) = 1.85, p =
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.071, M = .001, SD = .002) and providing the correct answer (t(48) = 2.06, p = .045, M =
.016, SD = .012 occurred more frequently after partially-correct answers than confusion.
Both of these dialogue moves also differed when confusion was compared to correct
answers. However, providing the correct answer was more likely to occur after partiallycorrect answers, which differed from the pattern found for correct answers. It was once
again the case that off-topic conversation was more likely to occur following confusion
than a partially-correct answer (t(48) = 1.80, p = .078, M = .050, SD = .038). This finding
paired with the finding for general motivational statement may suggest that tutors feel
instances of confusion require more support than simply answering incorrectly, at least
when the response is partially-correct.
The pattern of findings for the comparison of confusion to error-ridden answers
was similar the comparison to partially-correct answers. Specifically, prompts (t(47) =
2.03, p = .048, M = .025, SD = .027), providing the correct answer (t(47) = 1.95, p = .057,
M = .018, SD = .017), and counter examples (t(47) = 1.71, p = .092, M = .001, SD = .006)
more frequently occurred after error-ridden answers, whereas off-topic conversation
occurred more frequently after confusion (t(47) = 3.23, p = .002, M = .036, SD = .028).
There were also two findings unique to the error-ridden answer comparison. Presenting a
new problem occurred more frequently occurred after confusion (t(47) = 2.20, p = .033,
M = .010, SD = .014), whereas negative feedback occurred more frequently after an
error-ridden answer than confusion (t(47) = 4.30, p < .001, M = .021, SD = .017). Overall,
the pattern of findings in this comparison once again suggests that instances of confusion
are not handled by tutors in the same manner as incorrect answers.
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Last, tutor dialogue move occurrences following no answers were compared to
those following confusion. Interestingly, the pattern of tutor dialogue moves generally
contrasted with the pattern found for correct answers. In this comparison, positive
feedback was found to occur more frequently after confusion (t(38) = 1.86, p = .070, M =
.063, SD = .043), while hints (t(38) = 2.08, p = .044, M = .025, SD = .022) and providing
the correct answer (t(38) = 3.34, p =.002, M = .022, SD = .018) occurred more after no
answer. In each instance the opposite pattern was found when confusion was compared to
correct answers. This pattern supports the notion that confusion is triggered by
contradictions between the learners’ current knowledge and the current information being
presented or anomalous information that does not fit with the general pattern, as proposed
by cognitive disequilibrium theory (Festinger, 1957; Graesser et al., 2005; Piaget, 1952).
This pattern supports cognitive disequilibrium theory because confusion is not being
treated as the absence of knowledge (i.e., no answer), but as inaccurate knowledge. In
other words, learners have to know some amount of information, accurate or inaccurate,
to be confused. In addition, off-topic conversation (t(38) = 2.26, p = .030, M = .045, SD =
.040) and attributional acknowledgements (t(38) = 2.08, p = .044, M = .003, SD = .007)
occurred more frequently after confusion than after no answer. Once again, it appears that
more motivational dialogue moves are employed after instances of confusion than
incorrect answers. This could suggest that tutors view that learners may need more
motivation to persist through instances of confusion than when they simply have
inaccurate knowledge.
Overall, it was not the case that instances of confusion were treated the same as
when learners gave incorrect answers as in UNC-ITSpoke (Forbes-Riley & Litman,
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2011). However, confusion was handled by tutors in the same manner as vague answers.
Confusion differed from wrong answers in that tutors provided more motivational
statements, presented new problems, and provided the correct answer more when learners
were confused. The use of more motivational statements provides support for the
nurturing component of the INSPIRE model (Lepper & Woolverton, 2002). When
learners answered incorrectly, on the other hand, tutors were more likely to continue
breaking down the problem (e.g., simplified problem, hints, prompts, etc.).
Confusion × Cognitive State. Instances of confusion were separated based on
the co-occurring cognitive state and differences were investigated between confusioncognitive state pairs with paired-sample t-tests. Confusion paired with answers,
questions, and metacomments were considered for the present analyses based on previous
research that showed confusion significantly co-occurred with these learner cognitive
states (Lehman et al., 2010). Tables 3-6 show the descriptive statistics for each significant
comparison of confusion-cognitive state pairs. Pair 1 and Pair 2 in Table 3 refer to each
confusion-cognitive state pair in the analysis. The first row of descriptive statistics in
Table 3, for example, shows the comparison of Confusion-Knowledge Deficit Question
(Pair 1) with Confusion-Error-Ridden Answer (Pair 2). There were not any significant
differences for positive feedback, solidarity statement, example, counter example, or
comprehension gauging question (p’s > .1).
The significant findings are organized by the tutorial dialogue moves that differed
significantly between confusion-cognitive state pairs. It is important to note the low
proportional occurrence of dialogue moves follow each confusion-cognitive state pair
(see Tables 3-6). The overall low proportional occurrence is due to the fact that there
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were many shared tutor dialogue moves following instances of confusion-cognitive state
pairs. In other words, tutors handled the different confusion-cognitive state pairs in an
overall similar manner. Thus, the present analysis was a fine-grained examination of the
differences in how expert human tutors handled learner confusion.
Tutor feedback dialogue moves. Tutor feedback was considered first (see Table 3
for significant differences). Confusion paired with error-ridden answers was more
frequently followed by negative feedback than when paired with knowledge deficit
questions (t(11) = 1.98, p = .074) and less frequently followed by neutral feedback than
when paired with both correct (t(11) = 1.95, p = .078) and partially-correct answers (t(11)
= 2.09, p = .061) as well as when paired with metacomments (t(12) = 1.98, p = .071).
This pattern suggests that the appropriate level of feedback was given to error-ridden
answers when confusion was also present. This is consistent with a previous finding that
the expert tutors in the present corpus provide discriminating feedback based on the
quality of learner responses (D’Mello, Lehman, & Person, 2010).
Confusion paired with metacomments was followed more frequently by negative
feedback than when paired with knowledge deficit questions (t(13) = 2.00, p = .067) and
partially-correct answers (t(11) = 1.93, p = .080). This finding was somewhat confusing
given that negative feedback would be unexpected following a metacomment (e.g., I
don’t know, I got it). One explanation could be that instances of comprehension (e.g., I
got it) weren’t separated from lack of comprehension (e.g., I don’t know) in the present
corpus. It is the case, however, that learners are generally inaccurate in their assessment
of their own comprehension (Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007; Glenberg & Epstein, 1985;
Graesser et al., 2009; Hacker et al., 2009). In other words, when learners said “I got it,”
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they most likely did not fully understand the current concept. Thus, it could be that tutors
presented a new or challenging problem after learners stated that they understand the
current concept and then received negative feedback when they were unable to correctly
solve the new problem.

Table 3
Mean (SD) of Feedback Dialogue Moves following Instances of Confusion Types
Feedback
Neutral
Negative
!
Pair 1
Pair 2
Pair 1
Pair 2
!
KD vs. ER
.005 (.015)
.021 (.023)
!
!
KD vs. MC
.005 (.014)
.020 (.027)
!
!
CA vs. ER
.016 (.019)
.003 (.007)
!
!
PC vs. ER
.017 (.023)
.003 (.007)
!
!
PC vs. MC
.005 (.012)
.024 (.027)
!
!
ER vs. MC
.001 (.003)
.013 (.022)
!!
!!
Notes. CG = Common Ground Question, KD = Knowledge Deficit Question, CA = Correct Answer, PC =
Partially-Correct Answer, VG = Vague Answer, ER = Error-Ridden Answer, MC = Metacomment.

Tutor motivational dialogue moves. Second, motivational dialogue move
comparisons were conducted for each confusion-cognitive state pair (see Table 4 for
significant differences). There were three main findings for tutor motivational dialogue
moves. First, tutors differed in the way they handled confusion paired with each type of
learner question. Tutors more frequently used general motivational statements when
confusion was paired with a common ground question (t(14) = 1.82, p = .090), whereas
off-topic conversation was used more after a knowledge deficit question (t(14) = 1.87, p
= .083). This pattern may indicate that tutors want to encourage learners to have more
confidence in their knowledge and not feel the need to confirm it with the tutor (i.e., in a
common ground question).
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Confusion paired with both correct and vague answers also differed from
confusion paired with common ground questions. When paired with a correct answer,
tutors more frequently followed with repetition compared to pairs with common ground
questions (t(13) = 2.62, p = .041) and vague answers (t(12) = 2.67, p = .020). Confusion
paired with partially-correct answers was also followed more by repetition than pairs with
metacomments (t(11) = 2.10, p = .060). Similar to the finding for common ground
question pairs, this may be indicative of tutors attempting to reinforce learners’ accurate
knowledge.

Table 4
Mean (SD) of Motivational Dialogue Moves following Instances of Confusion Types
Motivational Statements
Attributional
Acknowledge

!
!
CG vs. KD

CG vs. CA
CG vs. VA
CA vs. VA

PC vs. MC
VA vs. ER

Pair 1

!

Pair 2

!

Humor
Pair 1

!

Pair 2

General
Motivational
Statement

Repetition
Pair 1

Off-Topic

Pair 2

Pair 1

Pair 2

Pair 1

Pair 2

.000
(.000)

.059
(.050)

.033
(.031)

!

!

!

.004
(.009)

.039
(.047)

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

.015
(.016)

.010
(.018)

.002
(.008)

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

.047
(.046)

.020
(.022)

!

!

!

!

.007
(.018)

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

.021
(.032)

.000
(.000)

.006
(.011)

!

!

!

.006
.001
VA vs. MC
(.012) (.004)
Notes. CG = Common Ground Question, KD = Knowledge Deficit Question, CA = Correct Answer, PC =
Partially-Correct Answer, VG = Vague Answer, ER = Error-Ridden Answer, MC = Metacomment.
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Last, confusion paired with vague answers was less frequently followed by
attributional acknowledgments compared to pairs with error-ridden answers (t(12) = 1.98,
p = .072) and common ground questions (t(20) = 1.82, p = .084), but more frequently
followed by humor than metacomments (t(14) = 2.02, p = .063). Attributional
acknowledgments are a dialogue move that tutors can employ to remove responsibility
for confusion, struggles, and failures from learners’ knowledge and skills. In other words,
answering incorrectly (error-ridden answer) or being unsure about their knowledge
(common ground question) is due to the difficulty of the concept, for example, which is
consistent with strategies hypothesized by attribution theory (Batson et al., 1995; Heider,
1958; Weiner, 1986). However, it appears that tutors only employ this dialogue move
when learners have stated actual knowledge when confused, but not when learners make
a vague or incoherent response.
Tutor question dialogue moves. Tutor questions were investigated and three
significant patterns were found (see Table 5). First, confusion paired with learner
questions was followed by more direct questions than when confusion was paired with
incorrect answers. Specifically, common ground questions were followed more by
forced-choice questions (t(20) = 1.94, p = .066) and knowledge deficit questions were
followed more by prompts (t(11) = 2.84, p = .016) than vague answers. In contrast, hints,
pumps, simplified problems, and new problems less frequently occurred after learner
questions paired with confusion. For common ground question pairs, hints (t(15) = 2.33,
p = .034) and pumps (t(15) = 1.92, p = .074) occurred more after partially-correct answer
pairs, hints also occurred more following error-ridden answer pairs (t(16) = 1.74, p =
.101), and simplified problems occurred more after vague answer pairs (t(20) = 1.73, p =
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.099). For knowledge deficit question pairs, hints (t(13) = 2.85, p = .014) and new
problems (t(13) = 1.83, p = .091) occurred more after metacomments and new problems
were also posed more following error-ridden answer pairs (t(11) = 2.62, p = .024) and
common ground questions (t(14) = 2.07, p = .057). This pattern suggests that tutors may
employ strategies consistent with both the more direct guidance of Vygostskian theory
(1978) and the more hands-off guidance strategy proposed by VanLehn et al. (2003); they
just deploy these strategies in different contexts.
The second significant pattern was that confusion-metacomment pairs were more
frequently followed by prompts (Partially-Correct: t(11) = 2.71, p = .020) and simplified
problems (Error-Ridden: t(12) = 1.90, p = .082) compared to incorrect answers, but were
less frequently followed by posing a new problem (Partially-Correct: t(11) = 1.87, p =
.089). This pattern suggests that tutors stay on task when learners state that they do or do
not understand the current topic; however, they break down the current problem into
smaller sub-problems that will be more manageable for the learner. The third significant
pattern involved comparing learner response types paired with confusion to each other.
The significant differences all involved comparisons to vague answer pairs, with vague
answer pairs being followed less frequently by prompts and more frequently by
simplified problems. Specifically, correct (t(12) = 2.57, p = .024) and error-ridden answer
pairs (t(12) = 1.92, p = .079) were more frequently followed by prompts, whereas
partially-correct (t(16) = 2.31, p = .035) and error-ridden answer pairs (t(12) = 3.01, p =
.011) were less frequently followed by simplified problems.
The comparison of confusion-vague answer pairs to confusion error-ridden
answer pairs was particularly interesting. In both instances the learner has responded
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incorrectly and is visibly confused; however, tutors handled the situations differently. It
may be the case that when learners provide error-ridden answers the tutor can easily
diagnose the specific error or misconception and use a more direct question to correct the
error, whereas when learners provide a vague answer, tutors are unsure about the specific
error.

Table 5
Mean (SD) of Tutor Question Dialogue Moves following Instances of Confusion Types
Tutor Questions
ForcedChoice
P1
P2

Hint

Prompt

Pump

New
Problem
P1
P2
.01
.01
.02
.01

Simplified
Problem
P1
P2

P1
P2
P1
P2
P1
P2
M
CG vs. KD
SD
M
.01 .03
.00
.01
CG vs. PC
SD
.02 .03
.01
.02
M
.01 .00
.03
.05
CG vs. VG
SD
.02 .00
.03
.04
M
.02 .03
CG vs. ER
SD
.02 .02
M
.03 .01
KD vs. VG
SD
.03 .02
M
.01
.03
KD vs. ER
SD
.02
.03
M
.01 .03
.01
.02
KD vs. MC
SD
.01 .03
.01
.03
M
.04 .01
CA vs. VG
SD
.10 .02
M
.01 .03
CA vs. MC
SD
.02 .03
M
.04
.06
PC vs. VG
SD
.03
.04
M
.01 .02
.02
.01
PC vs. MC
SD
.02 .03
.04
.03
M
.01 .03
.06
.03
VG vs. ER
SD
.02 .05
.04
.02
M
.03
.04
ER vs. MC
SD
.02
.04
Notes. P1 = Pair 1, P2 = Pair 2, CG = Common Ground Question, KD = Knowledge Deficit Question, CA
= Correct Answer, PC = Partially-Correct Answer, VG = Vague Answer, ER = Error-Ridden Answer, MC
= Metacomment.
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Tutor instructional dialogue moves. Finally, tutor instructional dialogue move
differences were investigated (see Table 6 for significant differences). There were three
main patterns that emerged from these analyses. The first main pattern involved the use
of the preview and summary dialogue moves. Tutors more frequently used preview after
confusion paired with a vague answer than when paired with a partially-correct answer
(t(16) = 1.74, p = .100), whereas summary was more frequently used after metacomment
pairs compared to common ground question pairs (t(18) = 2.25, p = .037). The second
pattern revealed that confusion paired with knowledge deficit questions (t(13) = 1.81, p =
.093) and vague answers (t(14) = 2.92, p = .011) were more frequently followed by tutors
providing the correct answer than metacomment pairs. Both knowledge deficit questions
and vague answers represent a gap in learners’ knowledge, as opposed to inaccurate
knowledge. It seems then that tutors are likely to provide the correct answer to address
the knowledge gap, but do not provide the correct answer as a method to correct
inaccurate knowledge.

Table 6
Mean (SD) of Tutor Instruction Dialogue Moves following Instances of Confusion Types
Preview

Summary

Tutor Instruction
Provide Correct Answer

!
!

Pair 1

CG vs. PC

!
!

!
!

!
! .000

!
! .004

!
!

!

!

(.00)

(.01)

!

! .000

! .004

CG vs. KD
CG vs. MC
KD vs. MC
PC vs. VA

Pair 2

Pair 1

!

Pair 2

!

Pair 1

Direct Instruction

Pair 2

!
!
.026 (.03)

!

.009 (.02)

Pair 1

Pair 2

.158 (.06)

.204 (.08)

.151 (.05)

.126 (.07)

!

!

!

!

(.00)
(.01) !
!
!
!
!
!
VA vs. MC
.017 (.02)
.005 (.01)
Notes. CG = Common Ground Question, KD = Knowledge Deficit Question, CA = Correct Answer, PC =
Partially-Correct Answer, VG = Vague Answer, ER = Error-Ridden Answer, MC = Metacomment.
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The third pattern involved tutors’ use of the direct instruction dialogue move.
Direct instruction was less likely to follow common ground question pairs compared to
knowledge deficit question pairs (t(14) = 2.29, p = .038), but more likely to follow
common ground question pairs when compared to partially-correct answer pairs (t(15) =
2.02, p = .062). This pattern is interesting in that it can be viewed as three different levels
of understanding co-occurring with confusion. Learners can be confused and missing
knowledge (knowledge deficit question), confusion and partially accurate in their current
knowledge, or confused and unsure about their current knowledge (common ground
question). It appears then that as accurate learner knowledge is less present, tutors
become more likely to provide direct instruction to address both the learners cognitive
and affective state. This progression would be consistent with strategies recommended by
both Vygotskian theory (1978) and VanLehn et al. (2003) in that direct instruction is
deployed differentially based on the learner’s current ability to solve the problem
successfully on their own.
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4. Study 3: Pedagogical Confusion Interventions
Learning Activity
The central learning activity consisted of critiquing research case studies to
determine whether they exhibit sound scientific methodology or have particular
methodological flaws. Participants engaged in a trialogue (three-party conversation) with
two animated pedagogical agents (tutor and peer student) to evaluate the scientific merits
of the case studies. Note that student agent refers to an animated agent; the human learner
is referred to as participant or learner for the remainder of the paper. Critical evaluation
of case studies involves scientific reasoning skills such as stating hypotheses, identifying
dependent and independent variables, isolating potential confounds in designs, and
determining if data support predictions (Halpern, 2003; Roth et al., 2006). During the
evaluation of a case study, each agent presented its opinion on the scientific merits of the
case study and then invited the participant to intervene. For example, in one trialogue the
tutor agent asserted that the control group in a study was flawed whereas the student
agent disagreed and asserted that the study contains a flaw, but the control group was not
flawed. After both agents presented their respective opinions, the tutor agent then asked
the participant whether he or she believed that the particular element of the study was
flawed (e.g., control group). After the participant gave his or her opinion, the agents
presented a second task for the participant to complete. The second task was targeted at
helping the participant to learn the material at a deeper level (i.e., understand why the
particular element of the study was or was not flawed). The specific details of the
trialogues are discussed further below. Altogether, participants completed six trialogues
with the two agents.
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Method
Participants. Participants were 208 undergraduate students from a mid-south
university in the US who participated for course credit. There were 149 females and 59
males in the sample. Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 56 (M = 21.6, SD = 6.25). Fiftynine percent of participants were African American, 3% were Asian, 35% were
Caucasian, 2% were Hispanic, and 1% were other. Prior coursework in research methods
was not required for participation. Eighty-nine percent of participants had not taken a
research methods course and 78% had not taken a statistics course.
Confusion Induction Manipulation. Confusion was experimentally induced
with a contradictory information manipulation (D’Mello et al., 2014; Lehman et al.,
2013). Contradictions were introduced during trialogues that identified flaws in case
studies. This manipulation was achieved by having the tutor and student agents stage a
disagreement on a concept and eventually invite the participant to intervene. The
contradiction is expected to trigger conflict and force the participant to reflect, deliberate,
and decide which opinion has more scientific merit. When participants were invited to
intervene, they had to decide if they agreed with the tutor agent, the student agent, both
agents, or neither of the agents.
There were three contradictory information conditions. In the True-True
condition, the tutor agent presented a correct opinion and the student agent agreed with
the tutor; this was the no-contradiction control. In the True-False condition, the tutor
agent presented a correct opinion and the student agent disagreed by presenting an
incorrect opinion. In contrast, it was the student agent who provided the correct opinion
and the tutor agent who disagreed with an incorrect opinion in the False-True condition.
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It should be noted that all misleading information was corrected and participants were
fully debriefed at the end of the experiment.
Confusion Regulation Intervention Manipulation. The pedagogical
interventions were designed to help regulate confusion by triggering learners to stop,
reflect, and further deliberate over which agent’s opinion was correct and why that
opinion was correct. Interventions were introduced during trialogues that identified flaws
in case studies. The interventions occurred after the participant was asked to intervene
and decide which agent’s opinion has more scientific merit.
There were four intervention conditions. In the Convince Only condition,
participants were required to develop a convincing argument that their diagnosis of the
case study was correct. The person to be convinced was either one of the agents (TrueFalse, False-True), both agents when the learner disagrees with both agents (True-True),
or a hypothetical person when the learner agrees with both agents (True-True).
Constructing a convincing argument is expected to cause learners to stop, reflect, and
think more deeply about the case study and concept being discussed. In the Read Only
condition, participants were presented with an explanatory text to read. The explanatory
text may serve as an aid for confusion regulation by providing participants with more
information about the concept being discussed.
In the Convince then Read condition, participants were required to first construct
a convincing argument as in the Convince Only condition and then were presented with
the same explanatory text as in the Read Only condition. The Convince then Read
condition may help participants to regulate their confusion by highlighting their
confusion and potential gaps in their knowledge in the task of generating a convincing
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argument. Participants would then be expected to read the text more deeply in an effort to
resolve their confusion and fill in their knowledge gaps that were highlighted during
argument construction. In other words, the activity of constructing an argument would
cause participants to reach an impasse or be uncertain about how to the concept is applied
to the specific situation, both of which would elicit confusion (Brown & VanLehn, 1980;
Caroll & Kay, 1988; VanLehn et al., 2003) and would hopefully trigger beneficial
cognitive activities that are necessary for participants to return to a state of cognitive
equilibrium (Bjork & Linn, 2006; Festinger, 1957; Graesser et al., 2005; Piaget, 1952).
In the Convince while Read condition, participants were provided with the same
text as in the Read Only condition, but the text was available as a resource while they
constructed their convincing argument. Similar to the Convince then Read condition, the
Convince while Read condition may help participants regulate their confusion by both
drawing attention to and providing a resource to resolve any confusion and knowledge
gaps that emerge during argument construction. However, in the Convince while Read
condition participants were able to immediately use the text to resolve any confusion or
knowledge gaps that emerged during argument construction. It has been found that most
contradictions and anomalies are ignored, dismissed, or erroneously combined with prior
misconceptions (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). Thus, even a small time separation between
argument construction and reading the explanatory text could allow participants to not
address their confusion and gaps in their knowledge.
Design. There was a mixed-design with confusion induction as a within-subjects
factor (True-True, True-False, False-True) and confusion regulation intervention as a
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between-subjects factor (Convince Only, Read Only, Convince then Read, Convince
while Read).
Participants completed two trialogues in each of the three confusion induction
conditions with a different research methods concept discussed in each session (6 in all).
Figure 3 shows the overall order of events for the experiment as well as the order of
events within one trialogue. Participants completed all six trialogues in one of the
confusion intervention conditions. The six research methods concepts were construct
validity, control groups, experimenter bias, generalizability, random assignment, and
replication. Each concept had an associated research case study that was flawed in one
significant aspect (e.g., an inappropriate control group). Order of confusion induction
conditions and concepts and assignment of concepts to confusion induction conditions
was counterbalanced across participants with a Graeco-Latin Square. Confusion
intervention condition was randomly assigned to participants.
Trialogues. Each trialogue consisted of three phases that occurred in the
following order: (1) induction, (2) intervention, and (3) post-intervention.
Prior to the first trialogue, the tutor and student agents introduced themselves,
discussed their roles, discussed the importance of developing research methods
knowledge, and described the learning activity. Participants then began the first of six
trialogues (see Figure 3). In each trialogue, participants discussed the case study for one
of the research methods concepts with the tutor and student agents. The interface that was
used for the trialogues is shown in Figure 4. It consisted of (A) the tutor agent, (B) the
student agent, (C) a description of the case study, (D) presentation of explanatory text
(optional), (E) a text-transcript of the dialogue history, and (F) a text-box for participants
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to enter and submit their responses. The tutor and student agents delivered the content of
their utterances via synthesized speech, whereas the participant typed his or her
responses.

Begin&
Experiment&

&

&

Begin&
Trialogues&

Introductory&
Text&

Pretest&
&

&

Repeat&for&6&trialogues&

&

Read&Study&
&

Induc/on&
Condi/on&

&

Trial&1&

Interven/on&
Condi/on&

&

:&Agent&Opinions&
:&Forced:Choice&
&&QuesAon&
&

&

&

Trial&2&
&

:&Agent&Opinions&
:&Forced:Choice&
&&QuesAon&
&

&

&

Confusion&
Judgment&

&

Confusion&
IntervenAon&

&

Confusion&
Judgment&

&

&

&

Trial&3&
:&Forced:Choice&
&&QuesAon&
&

&

&

&

Near&Transfer&
PosFest&
&

&

Far&Transfer&
PosFest&
&

&

Design&A&Study&
PosFest&

End&
Experiment&

&

Figure 3. Order of Events for Studies 3 and 4.

Trialogues involved three multi-turn trials, with two trials occurring in the
induction phase (before first Confusion Judgment in Figure 3) and one trial occurring in
the post-intervention phase (after Confusion Intervention in Figure 3). Each trial involved
a tutor posed question to the learner and a learner response, with Trials 1 and 2 also
containing each agent stating their opinion about the scientific merits of the case study.
For example, in Table 7, turns 7 through 12 represent one-multi-turn trial. The excerpt in
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Table 7 is an example trialogue between the tutor agent (Dr. Williams), the student agent
(Chris), and the human learner (Bob) from the True-False condition. The agents and Bob
are discussing a case study that has an inappropriate control groups as its flaw.

A

B

D
C

E
F

Figure 4. Screenshot of Learning Environment.

The induction phase (turns 1-12) began with a description of the case study that
was discussed. The first multi-turn trial (Trial 1) began after the participant read the
study. In Trial 1 the trialogue discussed generally whether the study is or is not flawed
(turns 1-3). First, the agents asserted their opinion that the study is flawed (turn 1). In
Trial 1 the agents agreed and presented correct opinions. Second, the tutor agent asked
the participant for his or her opinion via a forced-choice question (turn 2). Third, the
participant provided his or her opinion (turn 3). The induction phase then continued with
a discussion between the tutor and student agents about a previously identified
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misconception when diagnosing the flaw in the case study (turns 4-5) (Lehman et al.,
2012).
The second multi-turn trial (Trial 2) in the induction phase began next (turns 712). In Trial 2 the trialogue discussed the specific problematic element in the study and
why it is problematic. The study in Table 7, for example, has an inappropriate control
group. First, the tutor agent provided an opinion and then the student agent either
concurred with that opinion or disagreed by providing an alternate opinion (turns 7-8).
This is where the confusion induction manipulation occurred in the trialogue (True-True,
True-False, False-True). Second, the tutor agent asked the participant for a confusion
judgment (turns 9-10). Participants were prompted to indicate whether a classmate would
be confused or not confused at this point in the trialogue. The confusion prompt was
phrased in this manner because previous research suggests that many learners believe that
being in a state of confusion is indicative of poor performance or failure (D’Mello et al.,
2014). This perception might reduce participants’ tendency to honestly report their level
of confusion due to social desirability effects that might be mitigated by asking
participants to judge a classmate’s level of confusion in the same situation. In addition,
previous research has shown that when confusion judgments were phrased in this
manner, learners who reported confusion also had longer processing times (Lehman et
al., in preparation). Third, the tutor agent asked the participant for his or her opinion via a
forced-choice question and the participant provided his or her opinion (turns 11-12).
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Table 7
Excerpt of Trialogue of Induction and Post-Intervention Phases from True-False
Condition
Turn

Speaker

Dialogue

There was a study where participants took this new diet pill called 'Pounds Off' and reported losing 10 pounds in the
first month. None of the participants exercised or ate super healthy or anything, they just acted normally while taking
the pill - some people exercised a few times a week, some did not exercise at all, some ate healthy, others did not.
The researchers even compared this to a group who didn’t take it and just acted how they normally do. This group
didn’t lose any weight over the course of a month. So Pounds Off works ten times as well as not doing anything.
<Research case study>
1
Dr. Williams
Well Chris and I talked it over and the two of us think that there's something problematic
[tutor agent]
about this study. <Trial 1 opinions>
2
Dr. Williams
Bob, do you think there might be a problem with this study? <Forced-choice question 1>
3
Bob [human
problem <Response 1>
learner]
4
Chris [student The real problem is that diet pills just don't work. Those commercials on television are all
agent]
made up. So there's no way that this study was done correctly. <Surface error assert>
5
Dr. Williams
You have a point, but I think what we need to do is look at the actual methodology of the
study to see if there is a problem. <Surface error correction>
6
Dr. Williams
Let's talk about the control and the experimental groups they used. <Advance dialogue>
7
Dr. Williams
The control and experimental groups were too different. The control group should do
something to make the two groups more similar. <Trial 2 opinion>
8
Chris
I don't agree with you at all, Dr. Williams. The control group was good. There weren't any
differences between the two groups besides the diet pill. <Trial 2 opinion>
9
Dr. Williams
Bob, do you think your classmates would be confused? <Confusion prompt>
10
Bob
confused <Confusion judgment>
11
Dr. Williams
Bob, do you think the control group was appropriate? <Forced-choice question 2>
A. The control group is appropriate because it represents the average person in the real world and what he
or she would do if they weren't taking the diet pill (i.e., acting normally). <Incorrect response>
B. The control group would be more appropriate if it were changed so that participants in the control group
also took a pill, a pill that wasn't diet related. <Correct response>
12
Bob
A <Response 2>

CONFUSION INTERVENTION
13
Dr. Williams
Bob, do you think one of your classmates would be confused? <Confusion prompt>
14
Bob
not confused <Confusion judgment>
15
Dr. Williams
Alright, Bob, let's consider control groups in another case. <Introduce new context>
If you wanted to design a study to test the effectiveness of a computer math tutor, which of the following would be
the most appropriate comparison groups. <Forced-choice question 3>
A. One group use the computer math tutor, a second group use a computer biology tutor, a third group do
nothing <Correct response>
B. One group use the computer math tutor and a second group do nothing <Incorrect response>
C. One group use the computer math tutor, a second group read the math textbook, and a third group do
nothing <Incorrect response>
D. None of the above <Incorrect response>
16
Bob
A <Response 3>
17
Dr. Williams
We’ve talked about this study for a while now. But we're not going to finish this
discussion yet. Ok, let's move on to the next one. <Closing>

The intervention phase then occurred after the induction phase was completed.
Participants were presented with one of the four confusion interventions in each trialogue
(Convince Only, Read Only, Convince then Read, Convince while Read). The
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interventions were pedagogical in the sense that they were designed to cause participants
to spend additional time reflecting and deliberating about the scientific merits of the case
study being discussed. Table 8 shows an example excerpt of the confusion intervention
conditions from the True-False condition. The human participant (Bob) agreed with the
student agent (Chris) and disagreed with the tutor agent (Dr. Williams) in Trial 2 from the
induction phase. The trialogue excerpts in Table 8 discuss the same study with an
inappropriate control group as in Table 7.
For the Convince Only and Convince then Read conditions, the first task that was
posed to participants was to construct a convincing argument (turn 1 in Convince Only
and Convince then Read). In the True-False and False-True conditions, the construct
argument prompt was delivered by the agent with which the participant disagreed. In the
excerpts in Table 7, for example, the construct argument prompt is delivered by the tutor
agent (Dr. Williams) because the participant (Bob) response in Trial 2 disagreed with the
tutor agent. In the True-True condition, however, the participant either agreed with both
or neither of the agents. In either case, the construct argument prompt was delivered by
the tutor agent. If the participant disagreed with both agents, then the participant was
required to convince both agents that his or her opinion was correct. In the other case,
when the participant agreed with both agents, the participant was required to convince a
hypothetical new person who disagreed with the participant. The construct argument
prompt was identical in the Convince while Read condition with an additional statement
to read the explanatory text while constructing the argument (turn 1 in Convince while
Read).
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Table 8
Excerpt of Trialogue of Intervention Phase from True-False Condition
Turn

Speaker

Dialogue

1

Dr. Williams

2

Dr. Williams

3

Bob

I disagree with you, Bob. You need to prove to me that you're right about this study. So
put together a convincing argument to get me on your side. <Construct argument prompt>
Bob, remember to think about how participants in the control and experimental groups
behaved during the study. <Hint>
The control group was appropriate because… <Convincing argument>

1
2

Dr. Williams
Dr. Williams

1

Dr. Williams

1

Dr. Williams

CONVINCE ONLY

READ ONLY
I disagree with you, Bob. Let's all read over this chapter. <Introduce explanatory text>
Bob, remember to think about how participants in the control and experimental groups
behaved during the study. <Hint>
To test this hypothesis, you need one or more comparison groups that are not exposed to the treatment…
<Explanatory text>
3
Bob
Done <Finished reading>

CONVINCE THEN READ
I disagree with you, Bob. You need to prove to me that you're right about this study. So
put together a convincing argument to get me on your side. <Construct argument prompt>
2
Dr. Williams
Bob, remember to think about how participants in the control and experimental groups
behaved during the study. <Hint>
3
Bob
The control group is better because… <Convincing argument>
4
Dr. Williams
Let's all read over this chapter. <Introduce explanatory text>
To test this hypothesis, you need one or more comparison groups that are not exposed to the treatment…
<Explanatory text>
5
Bob
Done <Finished reading>

CONVINCE WHILE READ
I disagree with you, Bob. You need to prove to me that you're right about this study. So
put together a convincing argument to get me on your side. Take a look at this chapter
while you put together your argument. <Construct argument prompt + Introduce
explanatory text>
2
Dr. Williams
Bob, remember to think about how participants in the control and experimental groups
behaved during the study. <Hint>
To test this hypothesis, you need one or more comparison groups that are not exposed to the treatment…
<Explanatory text>
3
Bob
The control group was appropriate because… <Convincing argument>

The first task for the Read Only condition and the second task for the Convince
then Read condition were to read the explanatory text (turn 1 in Read Only and turn 4 in
Convince then Read). The texts contained an average of 364 words (SD = 41.7) and were
adapted from the electronic textbook that accompanies the OperationARA! intelligent
tutoring system (Halpern et al., 2012). The explanatory text provides participants with
more information about the concept being discussed; however, the text did not directly
address the case study being evaluated. The tutor agent also presented a hint to
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participants in all four confusion intervention conditions (turn 2 in all conditions). The
hint was presented prior to the main intervention task (i.e., text read and/or argument
construction). The hint was provided to orient participants to the important element of the
study (e.g., the experimental and control groups).
Next, all participants began the post-intervention phase (Table 7 turns 13-17). The
post-intervention phase served as an assessment of whether confusion had been resolved
by the intervention activities for each condition. Participants were first prompted to make
a confusion judgment, which was phrased in the same manner as the confusion judgment
in Trial 2 (turns 13-14). Next, a forced-choice question was presented that required
participants to apply their knowledge of the concept to a new situation (turn 15-16).
Finally, the tutor agent wrapped up the current trialogue with a closing statement
and moved on to the next trialogue (turn 17). Misleading information that was delivered
in the form of contradictory information was not corrected at the end of each trialogue.
Instead, misleading information from all trialogues was corrected by the agents after the
posttests had been completed.
Knowledge Tests. Research methods knowledge was assessed with flawidentification and design-a-study tasks. The flaw-identification task consisted of a
description of a previously unseen research study and participants were asked to identify
flaw(s) in the study by selecting as many items as they wanted from a list of eight
research methods concepts. The list included six concepts that could potentially be
flawed (i.e., discussed in the trialogues) and two distractor concepts (i.e., not discussed in
the trialogues). Participants also had the option of selecting that there was no flaw in the
research study, although each study contained at least one flaw. The pretest involved
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identifying the flaws in six case studies in which that each contained one flaw that is
discussed in the trialogues (see Appendix N).
The posttest flaw-identification task involved near and far transfer studies. The
near transfer studies differed from the studies discussed in the trialogues on surface
features only (see Appendix O). Each near transfer study contained one flaw. Each
concept discussed during the trialogues had one near transfer study, resulting in six near
transfer studies. The far transfer studies differed from the studies discussed in the
trialogues on both surface and structural features (see Appendix P). For example, a
surface feature difference could be taking a diet pill (original study) versus an acne pill
(near transfer study), whereas structural feature differences could be experimental and
do-nothing control groups (original study) versus three or more comparison groups all
receiving some type of treatment (far transfer study). Each far transfer study contained
two flaws, resulting in three far transfer studies in all. Both the near and far transfer
studies were presented after all of the trialogues were completed.
The design-a-study task required participants to design a hypothetical research
study to test a claim (i.e., “Teachers always tell their students that it is better to study a
little but of the course material each day, rather than try to cram all of the studying into
the night before the exam.”) (see Appendix Q). Participants answered four-alternative,
forced-choice (4AFC) multiple-choice questions pertaining to each concept discussed in
the trialogues. Each question required participants to make a decision in order to avoid a
potential flaw in the study to test the claim about study habits. For example, participants
needed to decide how to avoid potential experimenter bias in data collection as well as
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the amount and nature of the comparison groups in the study. The design-a-study task
was only presented after all trialogues have been completed.
Procedure. Participants were individually tested over a two-hour session. The
order of events is shown in Figure 3. First, participants signed an informed consent and
data release agreement (see Appendices J and K) and then completed the pretest. Next,
participants read a short introductory text on research methods. The introductory text
provided participants with a broad overview of the research methods terminology that
was discussed during the trialogues.
Participants then began the first of six trialogues. In each trialogue, participants
discussed the case study for one research methods concept with the tutor and student
agents. Three streams of information were recorded as participants completed the
trialogues. First, a video of the participant’s face was captured using a webcam that was
integrated into the computer monitor. The webcam also recorded all audio generated
during the interaction. Second, a video of the participant’s screen was recorded using a
commercially available screen capture program called Camtasia Studio™. Third, a
variety of interaction parameters were automatically recorded in log files. These
parameters included the participant’s responses (typed responses and response times) and
the current state of the interaction (e.g., pretest vs. trialogue). After completing all six
trialogues, participants completed the flaw-identification and design-a-study posttests.
Participants then interacted with the agents again to have all misleading information
corrected. Participants were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment (see Appendix
L).

56

Results and Discussion
There were four sets of dependent measures in the analyses: confusion induction
(induction phase), confusion regulation process (intervention phase), confusion regulation
outcome (post-intervention phase), and learning outcome measures. A mixed-effects
modeling approach was adopted for all analyses due to the repeated measurements and
nested structure of the data (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). Mixed-effects models include a
combination of fixed and random effects and can be used to assess the influence of the
fixed effects on dependent variables after accounting for any extraneous random effects.
The lme4 package in R (Bates & Maechler, 2010) was used to perform the requisite
computations.
Linear or logistic models were constructed on the basis of whether the dependent
variable was continuous or binary, respectively. The random effects in all analyses were
participant and concept. In addition, all models included order as a fixed effect (order of
concept presentation) and time on task (for each trialogue) as a fixed effect. Time on task
was included because the confusion intervention conditions were not equivalent in time
on task. The random effects and fixed effects of order and time on task were consistent
across all models (control). Induction condition, intervention condition, and/or induction
× intervention were the categorical fixed effects. The comparisons reported for induction
condition differences focused on the a priori comparison of each experimental condition
to the no contradiction control, so the True-True condition was set as the reference group
in all of the models. The comparisons reported for intervention condition differences, on
the other hand, compared each intervention condition to all other intervention conditions.
One-tailed tests were used for significance testing when the hypothesis specified the
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direction of the effect. However, two-tailed tests were used when no a priori predications
were made. All significance testing was conducted with an alpha level of .05. The unit of
analysis was the case study (or individual trialogue) for all analyses. There were 1234
observations in the present analyses.
Confusion Induction. There were three dependent measures from the induction
phase of the trialogue that were used in the present analyses: confusion judgment, Trial 1
response quality, and Trial 2 response quality. Table 9 shows the coefficients for the
models along with the mean proportional occurrence of each dependent measure. Mixedeffect logistic regression models were constructed for each dependent measure. For
confusion induction, it was hypothesized that when participants were in the True-False
and False-True conditions, they would report more confusion than when in the True-True
condition based on cognitive disequilibrium theory (Festinger, 1957; Graesser et al.,
2005; Piaget, 1952). In other words, the presentation of contradictory information was
expected to induce greater levels of confusion (on average) than agreement. The model
was significant1 and supported the hypothesis with participants reporting more confusion
when in both experimental conditions than the no-contradiction control condition (χ2(2) =
17.4, p < .001).
Next, response quality on Trials 1 and 2 were investigated. For Trial 1, a
significant difference between the True-True condition and the experimental conditions
(True-False, False-True) was not expected because the agents agreed and provided a
correct opinion. Participants were expected to respond similarly when both agents agreed,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Significance of logistic mixed-effects models is generally evaluated by comparing the mixedmodel (fixed + random effects) to a random model (random effects only) with a likelihood ratio test. In the
present study, significance was evaluated by comparing the full model (fixed effects + control model) to the
control model only with a likelihood ratio test.
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which in this case is correct, based on previous research (D’Mello et al., 2014; Lehman et
al., 2013). The hypothesis for Trial 1 was also supported with a non-significant model
(χ2(2) = 3.15, p = .207) showing that the experimental conditions did not differ from the
no-contradiction control condition.
However, it was hypothesized that there would be a difference in response quality
for Trial 2. Participants were expected to perform less well (on average) when in the
True-False and False-True conditions than when in the True-True condition. The
assumption was that if participants were confused by the presentation of contradictory
information, they would be uncertain about which opinion was correct and would
respond incorrectly more frequently (on average) than when the agents agreed with each
other. The hypothesis for Trial 2 was also supported. The model was significant with
participants responding less accurately in the experimental conditions than in the no
contradiction control condition (χ2(2) = 9.18, p = .010). Overall the findings for the
confusion induction phase supported the hypothesis for each dependent variable and
showed that the presentation of contradictory information by animated pedagogical
agents can successfully induce confusion in the minds of learners.

Table 9
Proportional Occurrence of Induction Phase Dependent Measures
Induction Condition
Tr-Tr
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr
Confusion Judgment
.610
.700
.700

Coefficient (B)
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr
.578
.683

Trial 1

.710

.750

.750

.258

.255

Trial 2

.750

.660

.680

-.471

-.360

Notes. Tr: True, Fl: False; Tr-Tr was the reference group for each model, hence coefficients for this
condition are not shown in the table. Bolded cells refer to significant effects at p < .05.
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Confusion Regulation Process. The confusion regulation process analyses
involved dependent measures that occurred during the confusion intervention
manipulations. The dependent measures included explanatory text read time (seconds),
argument construction time (seconds), argument construction + text read time (seconds),
argument length (words), and argument quality (discussed below).
Argument quality assessment. Argument quality was assessed in two ways. First,
participant arguments were compared to prototypical correct responses that were created
by a content expert. Prototypical correct responses were unique to each of the six
research methods concepts discussed during the trialogues. Participant arguments were
compared to prototypical correct responses using an inverse word frequency weighted
overlap (IWFWO) algorithm. The IWFWO algorithm is a word-matching algorithm in
which each overlapped word is weighted on a scale from 0 to 1, relative to its inverse
frequency in the English language using the CELEX corpus (Baayen, Piepenbrock, &
Gulikers, 1995). The inverse frequency allows for higher weighting of lower frequency,
more contextually relevant words (e.g., replication, bias), while higher frequency words
(e.g., and, but) are given a lower weighting. Comparisons resulted in a match score
between 0 and 1 (1 = perfect similarity). This match score served as the semantic match
score dependent variable in subsequent analyses.
The second assessment of participant arguments was through coding by trained
judges. There are multiple methods to code scientific arguments (see Sampson & Clark,
2008); however, the most appropriate method for the present study was the scheme
presented by Zohar and Nemet (2002), which focuses more on the content quality than
the structure (see Appendix R). This coding scheme involved identifying instances of
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claims and evidence in the argument. The scheme has been adapted to include the rating
of claim and evidence quality (accurate, inaccurate), based on the suggestion of Sampson
and Clark (2008). Two human raters coded the arguments for the presence of claims,
evidence, the amount of evidence, and the quality of claims and evidence. A subset of the
corpus was first coded to compute reliability (kappa = .842). The corpus was then divided
evenly between the raters for coding. This coding scheme was then used for five
argument quality dependent measures: claim quality, evidence quality, amount of
evidence, overall presence score, and overall quality score. Claim quality, evidence
quality, and amount of evidence were taken directly from the coding scheme. The overall
presence score was derived from the coding scheme with scores of 0 (neither claim nor
evidence was present, N = 70), 1 (claim or evidence was present, N = 352), and 2 (claim
and evidence were present, N = 496). The overall presence score was dummy coded for
analyses, such that individual scores were predicted (i.e., 0, 1, or 2). The overall quality
score combined the overall presence score with information about the quality of the claim
and evidence that were present. This scored divided arguments into Low (N = 599) and
High (N = 377). Arguments score as Low were missing the claim, evidence, or both and
had an incorrect claim and/or evidence. On the other hand, arguments scored as High
included both claims and evidence with at least one being accurate.
Confusion regulation process analyses. There were nine dependent measures for
the confusion regulation process: explanatory text read time and argument response time,
number of words, semantic match score, claim quality, evidence quality, amount of
evidence, overall presence score (0, 1, 2), and overall quality score. Table 10 shows the
proportional occurrence for each regulation process dependent measure at the induction
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condition and intervention condition levels. Note that standard deviations are not
included in Table 10 because some measures are binary and mixed-effects models
involve analyses that include nested variables and adjustments based on the random
effects. So there is not one standard deviation in the present analyses.

Table 10
Proportional Occurrence of Confusion Regulation Process Dependent Measures
Tr-Tr
107
97.0
193
37.6
.610

Tr-Fl
100
102
201
39.5
.540

Fl-Tr
103
98.1
185
38.9
.440

Induction and Intervention Condition
Convince Only Read Only CtR
101
105
101
97.6

CwR
Convince RT
Text RT
Text + Convince RT
193
Convince Word Num
36.6
36.6
42.8
Claim Quality
.540
.520
.520
Evidence
Amount
1.28
1.23
1.22
1.22
1.28
1.22
Quality
.560
.450
.400
.460
.480
.470
Presence Score
Zero
.090
.060
.080
.070
.060
.110
One
.400
.360
.390
.410
.400
.330
Two
.510
.580
.530
.520
.540
.570
Quality Score
.460
.440
.340
.380
.430
.430
Semantic Match Score
.402
.385
.361
.389
.387
.370
Notes. Tr = True, Fl = False, CtR = Convince then Read, CwR = Convince while Read, RT = response or
read time

Three models were constructed for each dependent measure: induction main
effect, intervention main effect, and induction × intervention interaction. Cognitive
disequilibrium (Festinger, 1957; Graesser et al., 2005; Piaget, 1952) and impasse-driven
theories of learning (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn et al., 2003) would hypothesize
that learners would have increased processing time (i.e., text read time, argument
construction + text read time) when in the True-False and False-True conditions
compared to the True-True condition. This pattern was predicted because when learners
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were in the contradictory information conditions they would exert greater effort in order
to resolve their current confusion.
The confusion induction processing time hypothesis was not directly supported
because there was not a significant induction condition main effect (p > .1). However,
there was a significant main effect of confusion induction success (i.e., confusion
judgment in the Induction Phase). Participants who reported confusion in the induction
phase had longer argument response times (F(1,610) = 3.20, p = .074) and explanatory
text reading times (F(1,620) = 11.0, p = .001) than those who did not report confusion.
This finding is consistent with cognitive disequilibrium (Festinger, 1957; Graesser et al.,
2005; Piaget, 1952) and impasse-drive theories of learning (Brown & VanLehn, 1980;
VanLehn et al., 2003) in that confusion triggered increased processing time, although not
in the manner posed by the specific hypothesis. The absence of an induction condition
main effect may stem from the source of confusion for participants. Although participants
were not presented with contradictions when in the True-True condition, it is still
possible for confusion to occur. It may be the case that participants in the True-True
condition were confused because of the difficulty of or lack of familiarity with the
material being presented.
The confusion intervention condition was also expected to have an impact on the
amount of processing time during the confusion regulation process. There were two
primary comparisons conducted. First, the text read time was compared between the Read
Only and Convince then Read conditions. The Convince then Read condition was
expected to have greater reading times than the Read Only condition because the
construction of an argument would presumably highlight confusion and knowledge gaps
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that can be addressed by processing the text more deeply. This hypothesis was not
confirmed. The results showed that the Read Only and Convince then Read conditions
did not significantly differ on text read time (p > .1). In fact, the Read Only condition had
longer reading times than the Convince then Read condition, although it was only a small
difference in time (3.4 seconds). Second, argument construction time was compared
between the Convince Only and Convince then Read conditions. The Convince Only and
Convince then Read conditions were expected to be similar in processing time because
these two conditions are initially presented with the same task. This hypothesis was
confirmed. The Convince Only and Convince then Read conditions did not significantly
differ in the amount of time spent on argument construction. There was not a significant
induction × intervention interaction for processing time measures (p > .1).
Argument quality dependent measures were subsequently investigated with linear
and logistic regression models. There were no specific hypotheses for how induction
condition would impact argument quality. However, significant differences were found
between the experimental conditions and the no-contradiction control condition. Overall,
participants had lower quality arguments when in the False-True condition compared to
the True-True condition. Specifically, when in the False-True condition participants were
less likely to make a correct claim (χ2(2) = 11.1, p = .004, B = .712), present correct
evidence (F(2,936) = 5.23, p = .006, B = .139), and more likely to have an overall lower
score (χ2(2) = 11.5, p = .003, B = .603). When participants were in the True-False
condition they were also less likely to present correct evidence (B = .091), but they were
more likely to present both a claim and evidence (presence score of 2) compared to the
True-True condition (χ2(2) = 3.95, p = .069, B = 367).

64

It is interesting that the two experimental conditions differed on argument quality.
In particular, the False-True condition generally provided arguments of low quality. It
appears to be the case that confusion can trigger longer processing times, but does not
necessarily lead to higher quality arguments. In previous experiments it has been
suggested that the degree of confusion may be higher in the True-False condition
compared to the False-True condition (D’Mello et al., 2014; Lehman et al., 2013). This
pattern suggests that when participants are in the False-True condition they are spending
more time attempting to resolve their confusion. However, their efforts do not appear to
lead to successful confusion resolution.
Similar to argument construction time, the Convince Only and Convince then
Read conditions were expected to be similar in length and quality. This hypothesis was
confirmed. The Convince Only and Convince then Read conditions did not significantly
differ on any of the argument quality measures (p > .1). However, the Convince while
Read condition was expected to differ on both length and argument quality from both the
Convince Only and Convince then Read conditions. Specifically, the Convince while
Read condition was expected to have longer and higher quality arguments because of the
availability of the text to resolve confusion and knowledge gaps. This hypothesis was not
confirmed. The Convince while Read condition also did not significantly differ from the
Convince Only and Convince then Read conditions on any of the argument quality
measures (p > .1). When examining the proportional occurrence of argument quality
measures it was, however, the case that the Convince while Read had longer arguments
on average and was more likely to present both a claim and evidence (presence score of
2), but the Convince while Read condition was also more likely to present neither a claim
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nor evidence (presence score of 0) and had a lower semantic match score to the ideal
argument. It was not the case then that providing the explanatory text during argument
construction led to higher quality arguments. There was not a significant induction ×
intervention interaction for argument quality measures (p > .1).
The previous analyses showed that the experience of confusion during the
induction phase was related to increased processing time. It follows then that confusion
induction success may moderate the impact of induction and intervention condition on
argument quality. Cognitive disequilibrium (Festinger, 1957; Graesser et al., 2005;
Piaget, 1952) and impasse-driven theories of learning (Brown & VanLehn, 1980;
VanLehn et al., 2003) would also suggest that the amount of effort put into the confusion
regulation task would also impact the confusion resolution process, outcome, and
ultimately learning. Argument quality was further investigated by incorporating both
confusion induction success (i.e., confusion judgment from induction phase) and the
amount of effort put into the regulation task. Table 11 presents the proportional
occurrence of each argument quality measure for the induction × confusion (confused,
not confused) × intervention × regulation effort (high, low) interaction. Regulation effort
was defined as the amount of time (seconds) on the regulation task (i.e., text read,
argument construct, text read + argument construct).
The analysis proceeded by dividing the 1216 cases into low vs. high regulation
effort cases based on a median split of participants’ regulation time for each case study.
The median split was performed separately for each intervention condition. There were
608 low regulation effort cases and 608 high regulation effort cases. The interaction was
significant for claim quality (χ2(35) = 48.3, p = .066), presence score of one (χ2(35) =
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49.0, p = .059), semantic match score (F(4,936) = 2.76, p = .027), and overall score
(χ2(35) = 61.5, p = .004). The interactions were then examined by dividing cases based
on confusion induction success (confused, not confused), regulation effort (low, high),
and either induction condition or intervention condition. Induction condition or
intervention condition were then regressed onto each case separately. The findings for the
significant overall score interaction are discussed next. The discussion of findings for the
remaining significant interactions can be found in Appendix T.
The patterns for overall score revealed the circumstances under which the two
experimental conditions had higher or lower overall scores for argument quality
compared to the no-contradiction control condition. Participants were less likely to have a
high score when in the True-False condition compared to the True-True condition when
they were not confused, had low regulation effort, and were in the Convince Only
condition (χ2(2) = 6.09, p = .048, B = 2.06). When participants were confused and in the
Convince then Read condition, they were less likely to have an overall high score
whether they had low (χ2(2) = 6.99, p = .030, B = 1.99) or high regulation effort (χ2(2) =
14.4, p < .001, B = 2.17). These findings could be expected given that participants were
less likely to respond correctly in Trial 2 (see Confusion Induction) and had no additional
information provided to correct any erroneous claim or allow for accurate evidence to be
included in the argument.
However, there was one case in which participants had higher overall scores when
in both experimental conditions (χ2(2) = 15.5, p < .001). When participants were not
confused, had high regulation effort, and were in the Convince while Read condition,
they had a higher overall score when in both the True-False (B = 34.0) and False-True
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Table 11
Proportional Occurrence of Argument Quality Dependent Measures
True-True
True-False
False-True
CO
CtR
CwR
CO
CtR
CwR
CO
CtR
CwR
Claim Quality
NC-LR
.790
.370
.380
.330
.400
.170
.600
.360
.400
NC-HR
.710
.630
.530
.330
.670
.690
.250
.330
.440
C-LR
.440
.610
.560
.650
.540
.520
.470
.430
.500
C-HR
.700
.710
.770
.570
.620
.520
.570
.450
.470
Presence Score
Zero
NC-LR
.130
.140
.050
.000
.050
.230
.000
.170
.070
NC-HR
.000
.000
.100
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
C-LR
.070
.160
.250
.210
.080
.110
.160
.090
.230
C-HR
.030
.030
.110
.000
.000
.050
.030
.000
.050
One
NC-LR
.480
.450
.550
.570
.400
.310
.620
.440
.530
NC-HR
.500
.240
.250
.270
.210
.060
.220
.230
.270
C-LR
.550
.420
.360
.290
.530
.390
.560
.580
.390
C-HR
.430
.370
.210
.380
.320
.340
.260
.390
.260
Two
NC-LR
.390
.410
.400
.430
.550
.460
.380
.390
.400
NC-HR
.500
.760
.650
.730
.790
.940
.780
.770
.730
C-LR
.380
.420
.390
.500
.390
.500
.280
.330
.390
C-HR
.540
.600
.680
.620
.680
.610
.710
.610
.690
Quality Score
NC-LR
.390
.320
.300
.140
.400
.080
.460
.220
.330
NC-HR
.600
.670
.500
.450
.570
.820
.330
.460
.450
C-LR
.240
.420
.320
.360
.320
.320
.130
.180
.320
C-HR
.540
.540
.640
.490
.680
.470
.410
.390
.490
Semantic Match Score
NC-LR
.519
.350
.401
.541
.398
.368
.216
.359
.402
NC-HR
.377
.454
.598
.361
.388
.363
.439
.395
.244
C-LR
.414
.361
.371
.355
.275
.393
.334
.403
.207
C-HR
.288
.410
.380
.437
.443
.329
.389
.418
.436
Notes. CO = Convince Only, CtR = Convince then Read, CwR = Convince while Read, NC = not confused, C = confused, LR = low regulation effort, HR = high
regulation effort
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conditions (B = 18.9). It is interesting that the conditions under which this pattern
occurred was when participants were not confused and had high regulation effort. Given
that participants were not confused, it could be assumed that they would have less
motivation to engage in the confusion regulation task. This finding necessitates further
investigation to determine what motivated participants in these circumstances to engage
in the regulation task.
Overall, the findings from the argument quality dependent measures may suggest
that it is not necessary for the argument to be of good quality to resolve confusion and
help learning. It may simply be necessary to engage in the process of creating the
argument (e.g., comparing different perspectives). The outcome of confusion regulation
is investigated next to further explore this issue.
Confusion Regulation Outcome. Confusion resolution outcome analyses
involved dependent measures that occurred during the post-intervention phase of the
trialogues. The dependent measures were confusion resolution (discussed below) and
Trial 3 response quality. Table 12 shows the proportional occurrence of each confusion
resolution outcome and performance on the Trial 3 forced-choice question. Mixed-effects
logistic regressions were constructed for each dependent measure for induction main
effect, intervention main effect, and induction × intervention interaction. There were no
expected patterns for induction main effect or the induction × intervention interaction.
However, there were expected patterns for the intervention main effect. Overall,
participants in the most cognitively engaging condition (Convince while Read) were
expected to resolve their confusion and respond correctly to the Trial 3 forced-choice
question more than participants in the other conditions.
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To determine whether confusion was or was not resolved, it was necessary to
consider confusion both before and after the intervention. Confusion resolution was
defined as the change in confusion from Time 1 (T1, induction phase) to Time 2 (T2,
post-intervention phase). There were four possible outcomes: none (not confused at T1 or
T2, N = 332), resolved (confused at T1, not confused at T2, N = 422), unresolved
(confused at T1 and T2, N = 401), and created (not confused at T1, confused at T2, N =
77). Separate mixed-effect logistic regression models were constructed for each outcome
(dummy coded).
For the induction condition main effect, there were significant models for None
(χ2(2) = 11.2, p = .004) and Unresolved (χ2(2) = 6.71, p = .035), but the models for
Resolved and Created were not significant (p’s > .1). It was the case, however, that both
the True-False (.370) and False-True conditions (.343) had higher proportional
occurrences of resolved confusion than the True-True condition (.315). Both
experimental conditions were less likely to have no confusion than the no contradiction
control condition (True-False: B = -.482, False-True: B = -.585) and were more likely to
have unresolved confusion (True-False: B = .237, False-True: B = .459). These findings
suggest that participants were more likely to remain in a state of confusion when in the
experimental conditions, which according to cognitive disequilibrium (Festinger, 1957;
Graesser et al., 2005; Piaget, 1952) and impasse-driven theories of learning (Brown &
VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn et al., 2003) would suggest that they would not successfully
learn the material. However, recent research has shown some evidence that complete
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Table 12
Proportional Occurrence of Post-Intervention Phase Dependent Measures
Induction × Intervention Interaction
Read Only
Convince then Read

Convince Only

Convince while Read

Tr-Tr

Tr-Fl

Fl-Tr

Tr-Tr

Tr-Fl

Fl-Tr

Tr-Tr

Tr-Fl

Fl-Tr

Tr-Tr

Tr-Fl

Fl-Tr

Confusion Resolution
None
Resolved
Unresolved
Created

.290
.350
.310
.050

.310
.310
.350
.030

.280
.260
.430
.040

.330
.330
.290
.050

.210
.460
.320
.020

.260
.360
.320
.060

.270
.330
.280
.120

.240
.370
.310
.070

.200
.370
.340
.090

.390
.250
.290
.070

.240
.340
.330
.090

.220
.380
.350
.050

Low Regulation Effort
None
Resolved
Unresolved
Created

.380
.230
.330
.060

.410
.240
.330
.020

.270
.270
.440
.020

.430
.290
.200
.080

.200
.450
.320
.020

.250
.400
.340
.020

.300
.360
.230
.110

.290
.430
.220
.050

.270
.330
.310
.080

.410
.220
.300
.070

.280
.340
.300
.090

.250
.270
.400
.080

High Regulation Effort
None
Resolved
Unresolved
Created

.180
.470
.310
.040

.190
.370
.400
.040

.290
.250
.400
.060

.220
.380
.380
.020

.210
.460
.300
.020

.280
.320
.300
.110

.250
.300
.320
.130

.190
.310
.400
.100

.140
.400
.370
.090

.350
.290
.290
.060

.220
.330
.360
.090

.200
.480
.300
.020

.190

.170

.110

.230

.140

.190

.220

.110

.150

.130

.180

.120

Trial 3
Notes. Tr = True, Fl = False
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confusion resolution was not necessary for learning to occur (D’Mello & Graesser, in
press).
For the intervention main effect, all models were not significant (p’s > .1) except
for the Created model (χ2(3) = 6.96, p = .073). However, when the proportional
occurrence of resolved confusion was examined, the following overall pattern was found:
Convince Only (.307) < Convince while Read (.323) < Convince then Read (.357) <
Read Only (.383). Although not significant, it is still interesting to note that resolved
confusion occurred the most in the Read Only condition. Participants in the Convince
then Read condition were more likely to have created confusion than those in the
Convince Only (B = .898) and Read Only conditions (B = .990). Participants in the
Convince while Read condition were also more likely to have created confusion than
those in the Read Only condition (B = .620). This finding reveals that confusion was
created by the combination of the two regulation tasks. This suggests that neither
constructing an argument nor reading the explanatory text alone created confusion, but
the combination of the two created confusion for participants. However, it was not the
case that these two conditions had more unresolved confusion. Thus, it may have been
that some of the participants who reported no confusion in the induction phase were not
accurate in their judgment and subsequently became confused when they were asked to
apply their knowledge and presented with additional information about the concept.
The induction × intervention interaction was only significant for the None model
(χ2(11) = 19.0, p = .060). To investigate the interaction, models investigating the
induction main effect were conducted separately for each intervention condition. This
revealed a significant model only for the Convince while Read condition (χ2(2) = 10.4, p
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= .006) with participants in both experimental conditions (True-False: B = -.909, FalseTrue: B = -1.09) being less likely to have no confusion than the no-contradiction control
condition. This finding reveals that the overall induction condition main effect was
particularly attributable to the Convince while Read condition.
An important component to confusion resolution is whether or not the participant
put in the effort needed to resolve their confusion. Regardless of the method of confusion
induction or confusion intervention provided, if the participant does not put forth the
effort, then confusion resolution is unlikely to occur. To address this issue, the induction
× intervention × regulation effort interaction was investigated. Regulation effort was
defined in the same manner as in the analyses for the confusion regulation process
analyses. The interaction term was only significant for the None (χ2(23) = 38.6, p = .022)
and Resolved models (χ2(23) = 36.8, p = .034), but not the Unresolved and Created
models (p’s > .1).
The interaction was examined by regressing confusion resolution for the low and
high regulation effort cases separately for each intervention condition. There were two
significant models when no confusion occurred and in both models the no-contradiction
control condition had a higher occurrence than the experimental conditions. The two
models were the cases when participants had low regulation effort and were in the Read
Only condition (χ2(2) = 7.00, p = .030, True-False: B = -1.50, False-True: B = -1.13) and
when participants had high regulation effort and were in the Convince while Read
condition (χ2(2) = 8.08, p = .018; True-False: B = -1.29, False-True: B = -1.43). These
findings have once again narrowed the conditions under which the True-True condition
had a higher occurrence of no confusion.
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The significant models for the Resolved cases revealed the conditions under
which the False-True condition differed from the True-True condition. In both instances
participants had high regulation effort. Participants in the Convince Only condition had
less resolved confusion when in the False-True condition (χ2(2) = 4.86, p = .088, B =
-1.05), but those in the Convince while Read condition had more resolved confusion
when in the False-True condition (χ2(2) = 5.68, p = .058, B = 1.05). This finding is
consistent with the original hypothesis that participants would have more confusion in the
Convince while Read condition. The addition of regulation effort as a moderator causes
this finding to be even more consistent with cognitive disequilibrium (Festinger, 1957;
Graesser et al., 2005; Piaget, 1952) and impasse-driven theories of learning (Brown &
VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn et al., 2003). Participants had to put in effort to benefit from
the regulation task and resolve their confusion.
Mixed-effects logistic regression models were also constructed to investigate
response quality on Trial 3. There was not a hypothesis for the impact of induction
condition; however, the Convince while Read condition was expected to perform better
on the Trial 3 forced-choice question. This prediction was based on the same reasoning as
the prediction that the Convince while Read condition would have the most resolved
confusion. None of the models were significant for Trial 3 response quality (p’s > .1).
When proportional occurrence of correct responses was investigated, the following
pattern was found: Convince while Read (.143) < Convince Only (.157) = Convince then
Read (.157) < Read Only (.187). It is interesting to note that once again the Read Only
condition seems to have the most successful outcome from the confusion regulation task.
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Learning Outcomes. Learning outcome analyses included the three posttest
dependent measures: near transfer, far transfer, and design-a-study tasks. Performance on
the transfer tasks was assessed by hits (i.e., correctly identify flaw in a study), whereas
performance on the design-a-study task was assessed by selecting the correct multiplechoice answer option. Mixed-effects logistic regression models (1 = correct, 0 =
incorrect) were constructed for each posttest dependent measure. When a significant
model for hits was found on the near or far transfer tasks, mixed-effects linear regression
models were constructed to investigate false alarms (i.e., incorrectly identify flaw in a
study) to determine if performance was due to guessing. Learning outcome analyses
consisted of three phases: main effects (induction, intervention), induction × intervention
interaction, and the impact of confusion induction success and regulation effort.
Previous research has revealed that the presentation of contradictions alone has
not been sufficient to increase learning (D’Mello et al., 2014; Lehman et al., 2013).
Therefore, a significant induction condition main effect was not expected in the present
analyses. However, the confusion intervention conditions were expected to differentially
impact performance on the posttests. The expected pattern of performance was Convince
Only < Read Only < Convince then Read < Convince while Read. Participants in the
Convince while Read condition were expected to perform better than those in all other
intervention conditions because participants had the opportunity to reflect on the
scientific merits of the case study, deliberate over which opinion holds more merit, and
use the explanatory text to address confusion and knowledge gaps that emerge during
argument construction. In other words, participants in the Convince while Read condition
had the greatest opportunity to successfully resolve their confusion and thus learn the
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material more deeply (D’Mello & Graesser, in press; D’Mello et al., 2014; VanLehn et
al., 2003). The remainder of the pattern represents a reduction in the potential to
successfully resolve confusion and thus less of a potential to learn the material more
deeply. For the induction × intervention interaction, participants were expected to
perform particularly well in the Convince while Read condition when they were in either
of the contradictory information conditions (True-False, False-True). This was expected
because the presentation of contradictory opinions by the agents would further encourage
participants to reflect on the scientific merits of the case study.
The present analyses only included those trialogue interactions in which learners
engaged in the regulation task presented. Engagement in the regulation task was defined
as any effort to participate in the regulation task (i.e., construct an argument with
meaningful content and not a metacognitive or frozen response, open and view the
explanatory text). The selection of only trialogues in which learners engaged in the
regulation task was performed due to previous findings for the process and outcome of
confusion regulation in the present analyses. Both the process and outcome of confusion
regulation were found to be dependent upon confusion regulation effort. Thus, it was
assumed that those participants who actually engaged in the regulation task to some
degree would be likely to benefit from the regulation intervention. For the Convince then
Read and Convince while Read conditions, the learner had to perform both tasks
(construct argument, read text) to be included. Learner engagement was not predicted by
induction condition, post-induction confusion judgment, or intervention condition (p’s >
.1). This reduced the dataset to 1059 observations. Each learning outcome measure is
investigated next, followed by an investigation of the impact of confusion induction
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success and regulation effort, and then the overall pattern of results for learning outcomes
is discussed.
Near transfer task. Models revealed that there was not a significant induction
main effect (χ2(2) = .313, p = .855), but there was a significant intervention main effect
(χ2(3) = 7.44, p = .059) and significant induction × intervention interaction (χ2(11) =
17.6, p = .091) for the near transfer task. Table 13 shows the proportional occurrence of
correctly identified flaws for the near and far transfer tasks as well as correct answers for
the design-a-study task. For the intervention main effect, the Convince while Read
condition was found to outperform all other conditions (Convince Only: B = .673, Read
Only: B = .540, Convince then Read: B = .353). The Convince then Read condition was
also found to outperform the Convince Only Condition (B = .319). Both of the main
effect findings were consistent with the hypotheses for learning outcomes. The one
exception was that the Read Only condition did not significantly differ from the
Convince then Read condition or the Convince Only condition.

Table 13
Proportional Occurrence for Learning Outcome Dependent Measures
Induction × Intervention Interaction
Near
Transfer
Task
Far Transfer Task
Design A Study Task
Intervention
Condition
Tr-Tr
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr
Tr-Tr
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr
Tr-Tr
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr
.370
.310
.270
.250
.250
.330
.270
.290
.210
Convince Only
.330
.340
.350
.300
.400
.330
.330
.290
.360
Read Only
.340
.320
.470
.210
.290
.380
.220
.300
.220
Convince then Read
.500
.480
.400
.420
.400
.390
.430
.350
.320
Convince while Read
Notes. Tr = True, Fl = False

When the significant interaction was examined, only the Convince then Read
model was significant (χ2(2) = 5.29, p = .071), with participants performing better when
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in the False-True condition compared to the True-True condition (B = .596). This finding
is also consistent with hypothesized learning outcome patterns. Participants benefited
from the presentation of both regulation tasks after the presentation of contradictory
information. However, it was not the case that the presentation of contradictory
information was particularly helpful when both regulation tasks were presented
simultaneously.
False alarms were investigated for all significant models but there were no
significant effects (p’s > .1). Thus, the above results cannot be attributed to guessing.
Far transfer task. Models revealed that there was not a significant induction main
effect (χ2(2) = 4.27, p = .118), but there was a significant intervention main effect (χ2(3)
= 8.71, p = .033) and a significant induction × intervention interaction (χ2(11) = 20.8, p =
.036) for the far transfer task (see Table 13). Although the induction main effect was not
significant, it was approaching a marginally significant effect and showed that
participants performed better when in both experimental conditions (True-False: B =
.257, False-True: B = .348) compared to the no-contradiction control condition. Although
this finding is not consistent with the original predictions that the presentation of
contradictions alone would not increase learning, it does reveal some overall benefit to
learning by the presentation of contradictory information.
For the intervention main effect, the Read Only and Convince while Read
conditions performed better than the Convince Only (Read Only: B = .375, Convince
while Read: B = .315) and Convince then Read conditions (Read Only: B = .611,
Convince while Read: B = .551). The intervention main effect finding is both consistent
and inconsistent with the hypothesized pattern. The Convince while Read condition
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performed the best on the far transfer task, but the Read Only condition performed
second best. Although the Read Only condition was not predicted to perform this well on
the learning measures, this could be due to the positive confusion resolution outcomes
previously found. The Read Only condition was found to have more resolved confusion
and performed better on the Trial 3 forced-choice question than the other intervention
conditions (see Confusion Regulation Outcome).
The significant interaction was examined and three models were found to be
significant. The first significant model revealed the same pattern that was found for the
near transfer task. When in the Convince then Read condition, participants performed
better when in the False-True condition than the True-True condition (χ2(2) = 6.94, p =
.031, B = .963). This pattern suggests that the combination of the False-True and
Convince then Read conditions was particularly effective for increasing performance on
transfer tasks. The remaining significant models partially supported the hypothesis that
participants in the Convince while Read condition would particularly benefit from
combination with the two experimental confusion induction conditions. The Convince
while Read condition was found to outperform the Convince Only condition when
participants were in both the True-True (χ2(3) = 10.4, p = .016, B = .912) and True-False
conditions (χ2(3) = 7.74, p = .051, B = .744). When in the True-True condition,
participants in the Convince while Read condition also outperformed those in the
Convince then Read condition (B = 1.10). Participants in the Read Only condition
benefited from the presentation of contradictory information. When in the True-False
condition, participants in the Read Only condition also performed better than the
Convince Only condition (B = .744). False alarms were investigated for all significant
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models and the false alarm models were not significant (p’s > .1). Thus, the results cannot
be attributed to guessing.
Design-a-study task. Models revealed that there was not a significant induction
main effect (χ2(2) = 1.81, p = .404), but there was a significant intervention main effect
(χ2(3) = 11.4, p = .010) and a significant induction × intervention interaction (χ2(11) =
17.3, p = .100) for the design-a-study task (see Table 13). The intervention main effect
revealed that the Convince while Read condition outperformed all other conditions
(Convince Only: B = .730, Read Only: B = .458, Convince then Read: B = .645) and the
Read Only condition outperformed the Convince Only condition (B = .272). Once again,
the induction and intervention main effects supported the hypothesized pattern of results.
The significant interaction was examined and only the True-True model was found to be
significant (χ2(3) = 8.01, p = .046). The Convince while Read condition was found to
outperform the Convince Only condition (B = .752) and Convince then Read condition
(B = .966). This finding did not support the hypothesis that the Convince while Read
condition would particularly benefit from the two experimental induction conditions.
However, it is interesting to note that the Convince while Read condition did not
outperform the Read Only condition on the design-a-study task.
Impact of confusion induction and regulation effort. Finally, the success of
confusion induction and amount of regulation effort were also expected to impact
learning outcomes based on previous research (D’Mello et al., 2014; Lehman et al., in
preparation; Lehman et al., 2013) and the confusion resolution analyses in the present
study (see Confusion Regulation Outcome). Previous research on confusion induction
learning environments has shown that conditions presenting confusion-inducing stimuli
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(i.e., contradictory information, false feedback) only outperformed the control condition
(no-contradiction, accurate feedback) when participants were successfully confused by
the confusion-inducing stimuli. Thus, the induction × confusion × intervention ×
regulation effort interaction was investigated next.
The prediction for these analyses was that participants would perform better on
the learning measures when they were in one of the contradictory information conditions
(True-False, False-True), successfully confused by the contradictory information,
presented with an intervention condition that promoted engagement in the cognitive
activities beneficial for learning (Convince while Read), and engaged in effortful
confusion resolution. A mixed-effects logistic regression was conducted for each learning
measure. Significant models were found for the near transfer (χ2(47) = 78.0, p = .003)
and far transfer tasks (χ2(47) = 61.7, p = .073), but the design-a-study task was not
significant (p > .1). Table 14 shows the proportional occurrence for each case (e.g.,
confused, high regulation effort, Convince while Read condition) for the near and far
transfer tasks.
The overall pattern of results for the near transfer task were consistent with the
previous findings in that the Convince while Read condition performed well and that the
Convince then Read condition benefited from being paired with the False-True condition.
Specifically, when participants were confused, had high regulation effort, and were in the
True-True condition, those in the Convince while Read condition outperformed all other
conditions (χ2(3) = 13.4, p = .004; Convince Only: B = 4.62, Read Only: B = 4.63,
Convince then Read: B = 3.88). In addition, the Convince while Read condition
outperformed the Convince then Read condition when participants were not confused,
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had high regulation effort and were in the True-False condition (χ2(3) = 10.1, p = .018, B
= 4.08), as did the Convince Only (B = 3.85) and Read Only conditions (B = 4.00). For
the second main pattern, participants performed better when in the False-True condition
than the True-True condition in the Convince then Read condition when they were
confused and had low regulation effort (χ2(2) = 8.32, p = .016; B = 1.65). The same
pattern was found when participants were not confused, had low regulation effort, and in
the Read Only condition (χ2(2) = 8.05, p = .120.018; B = 2.67). These findings suggest
that for the near transfer task the Convince while Read condition generally did the best,
but the Convince then Read condition also performed well when paired with the FalseTrue condition.
The far transfer analyses revealed a pattern of results that was consistent with the
hypothesized pattern of results and also specified the circumstances under which different
conditions performed well. The patterns for induction condition differences are discussed
in Appendix U. The main finding was that the Convince while Read condition
outperformed the Convince Only (B = 1.33) and Convince then Read conditions (B =
1.14) when participants were confused, had high regulation effort, and were in the TrueFalse condition (χ2(3) = 6.32, p = .097). It is interesting to note that the Convince while
Read condition did not outperform the Read Only condition in this case and although it
was not a significant difference, the Read Only condition did outperform both the
Convince Only and Convince then Read conditions (see Table 14). This pattern was also
found when participants were confused, had high regulation effort, and were in the TrueTrue condition, except that the Convince while Read condition also outperformed the
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Read Only condition (χ2(3) = 8.44, p = .038; Convince Only: B = 2.13, Read Only: B =
1.69, Convince then Read: B = 1.67).
It was not the case, however, that all of the analyses revealed that the Convince
while Read condition outperformed the other intervention conditions. There were two
additional significant models that occurred when participants had low regulation effort
and were in the True-False condition. When participants were confused, the Read Only
condition outperformed the Convince then Read condition (χ2(3) = 6.37, p = .095; B =
1.83), whereas the Convince then Read condition outperformed all other conditions when
participants were not confused (χ2(3) = 18.0, p < .001; Convince Only: B = -7.12, Read
Only: B = -6.20, Convince while Read: B = -5.88). The distinction between when
participants are confused versus not confused makes the present findings particularly
interesting. Although regulation effort was low, the presence of confusion seems to have
given participants extra motivation to learn the material from the text alone. However,
participants who were not confused may need an additional task, such as argument
construction, to trigger deeper processing and facilitate learning.
False alarms were investigated for each significant model and were found to not
be significant. Therefore the findings cannot be attributed to guessing.
Discussion of learning outcome findings. As hypothesized, there were not
induction condition main effects for learning, but it was the case that learners in the
Convince while Read condition performed better on all three learning measures. This
pattern for intervention conditions was predicted because the Convince while Read
condition was expected to lead to more deliberation and problem solving as well as
providing a resource to immediately address confusion and knowledge gaps. One finding
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that was not expected was that the Read Only condition performed well on the far
transfer task. In previous experiments (D’Mello et al., 2014; Lehman et al., in
preparation; Lehman et al., 2013), simply providing an explanatory text has not been
particularly effective to aid in confusion resolution.
Next, the impact of confusion induction success and regulation effort were taken
into consideration. The findings for the near transfer task were not expected. In particular,
most of the significant findings were when learners were not confused and the only
significant finding when learners were confused occurred when learners had low
regulation effort. The findings for the far transfer task were more in line with the prior
predictions. In particular, the Convince while Read condition performed better than the
Convince Only and Convince then Read conditions when learners were confused, had
high regulation effort, and were in the True-False condition. However, it is interesting to
note that under these circumstances the Convince while Read condition did not
outperform the Read Only condition. Overall, the Convince while Read condition
appeared to be the best for learning, however, the Read Only condition performed
surprisingly well.
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Table 14
Proportional Occurrence of Transfer Task Performance

Near Transfer Task
Convince Only
Read Only
Convince then Read
Convince while Read
Far Transfer Task
Convince Only
Read Only
Convince then Read
Convince while Read
Notes. Tr = True, Fl = False

Not Confused
Low Reg. Effort
High Reg. Effort
Tr-Tr
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr
Tr-Tr
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr

Confused
Low Reg. Effort
High Reg. Effort
Tr-Tr
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr
Tr-Tr
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr

.380
.170
.400
.290

.320
.090
.560
.400

.130
.500
.460
.290

.500
.450
.370
.910

.200
.250
.180
.640

.250
.240
.250
.170

.310
.420
.210
.560

.320
.520
.230
.500

.310
.240
.540
.300

.380
.350
.430
.450

.340
.300
.350
.410

.300
.500
.520
.540

.260
.390
.270
.330

.190
.270
.500
.100

.400
.420
.460
.210

.400
.450
.140
.330

.300
.250
.220
.500

.310
.240
.420
.170

.240
.210
.180
.500

.210
.450
.230
.360

.200
.290
.320
.380

.180
.260
.250
.480

.290
.460
.270
.540

.420
.390
.380
.520

85

5. Study 4: Motivational Confusion Interventions
Method
Participants. Participants were 180 undergraduate students from a mid-south
university in the US who participated for course credit or monetary payment. Thirty-three
participants received monetary payment and 147 received course credit for participation.
Those who participated for monetary payment received $20 for participation. There were
112 females and 68 males in the sample. Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 52 (M =
22.2, SD = 6.34). Fifty-three percent of participants were African American, 2% were
Asian, 35% were Caucasian, 4% were Hispanic, and 6% were other. Prior coursework in
research methods was not required for participation. Eighty-seven percent of participants
had not taken a research methods course and 75% had not taken a statistics course.
Comparison to Study 3. Study 4 had an identical methodology to Study 3 with
one exception, which was the nature of the confusion regulation interventions. The
interventions used in Study 3 focused on pedagogical interventions, whereas the
interventions used in Study 4 focus on motivational interventions. The specifics of each
intervention condition are described further in the next section. After the motivational
intervention, participants in all conditions were presented with an explanatory text. In
addition, participants were asked to imagine that a new student had joined the
conversation and this new student disagreed with them. Participants were then asked to
construct an argument to convince this new student that their flaw diagnosis in the current
case study is correct (identical to the Convince while Read condition in Study 3).
Confusion Regulation Intervention Manipulation. The motivation-based
interventions were designed to help regulate confusion by motivating learners to persist
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when confusion occurs and continue working through the short-term failure that is
associated with confusion. Interventions were introduced during trialogues that identified
flaws in case studies. The interventions occurred after the participant was asked to
intervene (i.e., decide which agent’s opinion has more scientific merit) and had made a
confusion judgment (see turns 9-12 in Table 7). Table 15 shows examples of each
intervention condition. The intervention conditions in Table 15 discuss the same study
that was discussed in Table 7.
There were four intervention conditions. In the General Motivational Statement
condition, participants received a supportive, encouraging statement from the tutor agent.
This type of motivational intervention may help participants to regulate their confusion
by providing encouragement to persist in the learning task.
In the Material Attribute + Motivation and Tutor Attribute + Motivation
conditions, the tutor agent made a causal attribution statement about the source of
confusion and a general motivational statement. In the Material Attribute + Motivation
condition the tutor agent attributed any confusion to the difficulty of the material,
whereas in the Tutor Attribute + Motivation condition confusion was attributed to an
unclear explanation by the tutor agent. These two intervention conditions were similar to
the interventions used in the Affective AutoTutor (D’Mello et al., 2011). Shifting the
cause of confusion from the participant to an external source (tutor, material) was
expected to further encourage participants to persist because they would feel that any
confusion is not due to their own lack of knowledge or skills.
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Table 15
Excerpt of Trialogue of Intervention Phase from True-False Condition
Turn

Speaker

Dialogue

1

Dr. Williams

So we're getting closer, but we still haven't got this study down completely. But I know
you can get it if you keep working at it! <General motivation>

1

Dr. Williams

2

Dr. Williams

This stuff can be really challenging. I know a lot of other students have trouble with
control and experimental groups. <Attribute to material>
So we're getting closer, but we still haven't got this study down completely. But I know
you can get it if you keep working at it! <General motivation>

1

Dr. Williams

2

Dr. Williams

1

Dr. Williams

2

Dr. Williams

GENERAL MOTIVATIONAL STATEMENT
MATERIAL ATTRIBUTE + MOTIVATION

TUTOR ATTRIBUTE + MOTIVATION
I may have not explained this very well before. I'm not always very clear when I explain
control and experimental groups. <Attribute to tutor>
So we're getting closer, but we still haven't got this study down completely. But I know
you can get it if you keep working at it! <General motivation>

CONFUSION-SPECIFIC + MOTIVATION
You know, being confused is actually a good thing in learning. It means that you have an
opportunity to learn about control and experimental groups really well. The best way to
get past confusion is to keep trying to figure out this concept. <Confusion-specific>
So we're getting closer, but we still haven't got this study down completely. But I know
you can get it if you keep working at it! <General motivation>

ALL INTERVENTION CONDITIONS
3

Chris

You know what might help all of us get this stuff? Reading this chapter from my critical
thinking textbook. I really think it would help. <Introduce explanatory text>
4
Dr. Williams That's a great idea Chris. While we read, let's all imagine that a new person joined our
conversation. Bob, this new student disagrees with you about this study. You need to put
together a convincing argument to prove that you are right about the appropriateness of
the control group. <Reading purpose>
5
Dr. Williams Bob, type your argument to convince this new student and use the chapter to help put
together your argument.<Task instructions>
To test this hypothesis, you need one or more comparison groups that are not exposed to the treatment…
<Explanatory text>
6
Bob
I think that the control and experimental groups… <Convincing Argument>

Finally, in the Confusion-Specific + Motivation condition, the tutor agent told the
participant about the benefits of confusion during learning along with a general
motivational statement. Although many learners feel that confusion is not a desirable
state during learning (D’Mello et al., 2014), research has shown that confusion is an
opportunity for learning, particularly at deeper levels (Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello et al.,
2014; Graesser & D’Mello, 2012; Graesser et al., 2008; Lehman et al., in preparation;
Lehman et al., 2013). This intervention was designed to reframe participant perceptions
of confusion during learning. The intervention was expected to encourage participants to
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persist because confusion would no longer be viewed as a negative experience (i.e.,
indicative of a lack of knowledge or skills) and instead would be viewed as a positive
opportunity.
Design. This study had a mixed-design with confusion induction as a withinsubjects factor (True-True, True-False, False-True) and confusion regulation intervention
as a between-subjects factor, the same design as Study 3. The between-subjects factor
had four conditions: General Motivational Statement, Material Attribute + Motivation,
Tutor Attribute + Motivation, and Confusion-Specific + Motivation.
Participants completed two trialogues in each of the three confusion induction
conditions with a different research methods concept discussed in each session (6 in all).
Each participant completed one confusion regulation intervention condition in all six
trialogues. The six research methods concepts were construct validity, control groups,
experimenter bias, generalizability, random assignment, and replication. Each concept
had an associated research case study that was flawed in one significant aspect (e.g., an
inappropriate control group). Order of confusion induction conditions and concepts and
assignment of concepts to confusion induction conditions was counterbalanced across
participants with a Graeco-Latin Square. Confusion intervention condition was randomly
assigned to participants.
Results and Discussion
Similar to Study 3, there were four sets of dependent measures in the analyses:
confusion induction (induction phase), confusion regulation process (intervention phase),
confusion regulation outcome (post-intervention phase), and learning outcome measures.
A mixed-effects modeling approach was again adopted and the lme4 package in R (Bates

89

& Maechler, 2010) being used to perform the requisite computations. There was one set
of analyses that did not utilize a mixed-effects modeling approach (see Argument Quality
Classification in Confusion Regulation Process).
Linear or logistic models were constructed on the basis of whether the dependent
variable was continuous or binary, respectively. The random effects in all analyses were
participant, concept, and compensation (credit, monetary). In addition, all models
included order as a fixed effect (order of concept presentation). The random effects and
order fixed effect were consistent across all models (control). Induction condition,
intervention condition, and/or induction × intervention were the categorical fixed
effect(s). The unit of analysis was the case study (or individual trialogue) for all analyses.
There were 1080 observations in the present analyses.
Confusion Induction. Three mixed-effects logistic regression models were
constructed to investigate induction condition differences in the induction phase
dependent measures. Table 16 shows the proportional occurrence of each dependent
measures as well as the coefficients from each model. Similar to Study 3, it was predicted
that participants in the experimental conditions would report more confusion than the nocontradiction control condition and would respond less accurately to the forced-choice
question in Trial 2, but there would be no difference for Trial 1. The model for confusion
judgment was significant (χ2(2) = 4.79, p = .091) and revealed that participants reported
more confusion when they were in both experimental conditions compared to the nocontradiction control condition. The presentation of contradictory information was again
a successful method of confusion induction as in Study 3. The models for forced-choice
questions in Trial 1 (χ2(2) = 1.26, p = .533) and Trial 2 (χ2(2) = 2.97, p = .226) were not
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significant. The non-significant model for Trial 1 supported the hypothesized pattern and
was consistent with Study 3. However, the non-significant model for Trial 2 was
inconsistent with the hypothesized pattern and with Study 3, but it was the case that when
participants were in both the True-False and False-True conditions they responded less
accurately compared to the True-True condition.

Table 16
Proportional Occurrence of Induction Phase Dependent Measures
Induction Condition
Tr-Tr
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr
Confusion Judgment
.530
.590
.590

Coefficients (B)
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr
.310
.310

Trial 1

.700

.740

.710

.192

.045

Trial 2

.710

.660

.680

-.284

-.176

Notes. Tr: True, Fl: False; Tr-Tr was the reference group for each model, hence coefficients for this
condition are not shown in the table. Bolded cells refer to significant effects at p < .05.

Confusion Regulation Process. The confusion regulation process analyses
involved dependent measures that occurred during the confusion intervention
manipulations. The dependent measures included argument construction + text read time
(seconds), argument length (words), and argument quality. The analyses occurred over
two phases. First, the quality of arguments was assessed by developing and evaluating
classification models. Second, condition differences were investigated for each dependent
measure.
Argument quality classification. Seven models were tested to determine which
argument features were most diagnostic of argument quality. The participant arguments
from Study 3 were used to develop and evaluate the classification models. The Context
Model included the order of presentation, induction condition, and intervention condition.
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The Induction Model included measures from the induction phase (confusion judgment,
Trial 2 response time, Trial 2 response quality) and whether the participant opened the
case study to review while responding to the Trial 2 forced-choice question. The
Intervention Model included measures from the regulation phase (argument response
time, number of words in argument, IWFWO semantic match score) and whether the
participant opened the case study and the explanatory text (when applicable) to review
while constructing their argument. The remaining models involved combining the
features from the Context, Induction, and Intervention Models: Context + Induction,
Context + Intervention, Induction + Intervention, and Context + Induction + Intervention.
Four classification algorithns from WEKA (Hall, Frank, Holmes, Pfahringer,
Reutemannm & Witten, 2009) were used to build and evaluate the models: NaïveBayes,
IBk (nearest neighbor with k = 10), j48, and LogitBoost. The majority class algorithm
(ZeroR) that classifies all arguments to the most prevalent group was used as the baseline
comparison. Each algorithm was evaluated using 10-fold cross-validation. Three separate
classification tasks were performed. The first task consisted of making a simple correct
vs. incorrect discrimination on claim quality, while the second and third tasks performed
a discrimination of overall presence score (0, 1, 2) and overall quality score (high, low).
Arguments were separated into six groups based on the research methods concept.
There was an average of 156 responses per group (SD = .894, Range 155 to 157). The
algorithms were evaluated on each argument group for all three classification tasks. For
each argument group the best algorithm (i.e., one out of the four algorithms that yielded
the best performance) was selected. The best classification results were averaged across
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argument groups and constituted the models. Table 17 shows the results obtained for each
classification task averaged across the six groups.

Table 17
Mean (SD) of Classification Performance Across Groups
Model
Baseline
Context
Induction
Context + Induction
Intervention
Context + Intervention
Induction + Intervention
Context + Induction + Intervention

Claim Quality
Accuracy
Kappa
(%)
62.2
.000
(9.24)
(.000)
64.2
.083
(8.44)
(.100)
77.4
.507
(6.63)
(.100)
76.3
.480
(7.29)
(.115)
67.2
.226
(7.59)
(.130)
67.2
.213
(6.10)
(.113)
76.9
.492
(6.34)
(.096)
74.2
.427
(6.57)
(.111)

Presence Score
Accuracy
Kappa
(%)
53.0
.000
(4.88)
(.000)
54.9
.093
(3.64)
(.048)
52.7
.054
(4.06)
(.048)
54.1
.105
(2.87)
(.043)
70.3
.460
(1.93)
(.032)
70.3
.458
(1.93)
(.028)
68.0
.417
(2.22)
(.031)
68.6
.429
(1.44)
(.034)

Quality Score
Accuracy
Kappa
(%)
62.0
.000
(7.84)
(.000)
63.2
.073
(7.64)
(.095)
66.3
.262
(6.77)
(.125)
65.0
.193
(6.88)
(.109)
72.1
.378
(4.76)
(.093)
71.4
.345
(5.52)
(.113)
75.0
.444
(2.91)
(.065)
75.4
.454
(3.15)
(.079)

The Induction Model was most successful for discriminating between correct vs.
incorrect claims in the argument. The Induction Model performed significantly better
than the Baseline Model, t(5) = 5.98, p = .002; and performed significantly better than all
other models except for the Context + Induction Model, t(5) = 1.55, p = .181; and
Induction + Intervention Model, t(5) = .514, p = .629. The Intervention Model was most
successful for discriminating between presence scores of 0 (no claim or evidence), 1
(claim or evidence), and 2 (claim and evidence). The Regulation Model performed
significantly better than the Baseline Model, t(5) = 9.50, p < .001; and performed
significantly better than all other models except for the Context + Intervention Model,
t(5) = .006, p = .995; and Induction + Intervention Model, t(5) = 1.65, p = .159. Finally
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the full model of Context + Induction + Intervention performed the best at discriminating
between low and high overall quality scores. The Context + Induction + Intervention
performed significantly better than the Baseline Model, t(5) = 4.74, p = .005; and
outperformed all other models except for the Induction + Intervention Model, t(5) = .455,
p = .668. The Induction, Intervention, and Context + Induction + Intervention Models
were then used to classify participant arguments in Study 4 for claim quality, overall
presence score, and overall quality score, respectively.
Analyses. Three mixed-effects linear regressions were constructed for each
dependent measure: induction main effect, intervention main effect, and induction ×
intervention interaction. Similar to Study 3, the contradictory information conditions
were expected to trigger greater processing time than the no-contradiction control. This
hypothesis was not confirmed by the present analyses. The induction main effect models
were not significant for any of the dependent measures (p’s > .1). However, this
hypothesis was indirectly supported by the finding that confusion was a significant
predictor of the total time to read the explanatory text and construct an argument
(F(1,1080) = 8.48, p = .004). Confused participants had longer overall times than not
confused, similar to the finding in Study 3.
The following pattern was expected for all dependent measures for the
intervention conditions: General Motivational Statement < Material Attribute +
Motivation < Tutor Attribute + Motivation < Confusion-Specific + Motivation. This
pattern was expected because of the impact the intervention would have on participants’
causal attributions, based on attribution theory (Batson et al., 1995; Heider, 1958;
Weiner, 1986).
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The General Motivational Statement condition was expected to motivate
participants to persist and put forth effort to resolve their confusion the least because it
did not address the causal attribution for confusion. Both of the attribute + motivation
conditions (material, tutor) were expected to motivate participants more than the General
Motivational Statement condition because they addressed the causal attribution for
confusion and removed responsibility from the participant. The Material Attribute +
Motivation condition was expected to motivate participants less than the Tutor Attribute
+ Motivation condition because of the stability aspect of each type of attribution. Both
attributions were external and uncontrollable in that the participant cannot impact the
difficulty of the current concept or the quality of the tutor agent’s explanation. However,
the difficulty of the concept may be viewed as more stable than the unclear explanation.
In other words, if the concept was very difficult as the tutor agent asserted, then increased
effort on the part of the participant (i.e., reading the text more deeply) may not lead to a
change in outcome (i.e., confusion resolution). Alternatively, an increase in effort could
potentially overcome the tutor agent’s unclear explanation and lead to a change in
outcome.
Finally, the Confusion-Specific + Motivation condition was expected to motivate
participants the most to persist because it engaged in a form of attributional retraining.
The two attribute + motivation conditions shifted the attribution from an internal to an
external source, or reaffirmed an external source; however, confusion would still be
perceived as a negative experience in both of these conditions. In the Confusion-Specific
+ Motivation condition, on the other hand, confusion was reframed as a beneficial
experience for learning. This shift from a negative to a positive experience was expected
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to increase participants’ motivation to persist and put in the effort to resolve their
confusion.
The hypothesized pattern for the intervention condition main effect was also not
supported in the present analyses. The models for the intervention main effect and the
induction × intervention interaction were not significant for any of the dependent
measures (p’s > .1).
Argument quality was further examined by investigating the induction ×
confusion (confused, not confused) × intervention × regulation effort (high low) as was
done in Study 3. Table 18 shows the proportional occurrence for each argument quality
dependent measure. The interaction was significant for the presence score of 1 (χ2(47) =
80.9, p = .002) and 2 (χ2(47) = 82.2, p = .001), but not for the overall score (p > .1). A
presence score of 1 represented an argument that contained either a claim or evidence,
whereas a presence score of 2 represented an argument that contained both a claim and
evidence. It is important to note, however, that neither score is dependent upon the
quality of the claim or evidence.
The critical case in these analyses was when participants were confused, had low
regulation effort, and were in the Material Attribute + Motivation condition. Participants
were less likely to have a presence score of 1 when in the True-False condition compared
to the True-True condition (χ2(2) = 5.00, p = .082, B = 1.76), but more likely to have a
presence score of 2 (χ2(2) = 6.69, p = .035, B = 2.18). Participants were also more likely
to have a presence score of 2 when in the False-True condition (B = 1.69). This finding
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Table 18
Proportional Occurrence of Argument Quality Dependent Measures
True-True
True-False
False-True
GMS
MA
TA
CS
GMS
MA
TA
CS
GMS
MA
TA
CS
Presence Score
Zero
NC-LR
.000
.080
.000
.000
.030
.000
.000
.050
.000
.050
.070
.000
NC-HR
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.050
.000
.000
.070
C-LR
.030
.080
.000
.000
.040
.040
.080
.100
.000
.040
.000
.000
C-HR
.000
.040
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
One
NC-LR
.350
.540
.310
.350
.450
.400
.570
.530
.320
.320
.360
.330
NC-HR
.160
.130
.220
.280
.080
.210
.110
.310
.050
.180
.310
.070
C-LR
.470
.580
.500
.440
.360
.370
.310
.380
.480
.420
.330
.430
C-HR
.320
.110
.140
.140
.140
.180
.040
.150
.160
.160
.140
.290
Two
NC-LR
.650
.380
.690
.650
.520
.600
.430
.420
.680
.630
.570
.670
NC-HR
.840
.870
.780
.720
.920
.790
.890
.690
.900
.820
.690
.860
C-LR
.500
.350
.500
.560
.610
.590
.620
.520
.520
.540
.670
.570
C-HR
.680
.850
.860
.860
.860
.820
.960
.850
.840
.840
.860
.710
Claim Quality
NC-LR
.700
.540
.620
.600
.520
.400
.650
.530
.730
.580
.540
.670
NC-HR
.680
.710
.740
.800
.330
.430
.610
.560
.620
.550
.380
.710
C-LR
.690
.620
.610
.750
.540
.700
.620
.570
.560
.620
.670
.650
C-HR
.680
.480
.590
.620
.860
.710
.610
.740
.680
.710
.450
.630
Quality Score
NC-LR
.600
.150
.420
.300
.380
.330
.350
.260
.320
.320
.390
.400
NC-HR
.680
.750
.570
.520
.670
.430
.390
.500
.620
.450
.460
.430
C-LR
.280
.350
.280
.130
.290
.410
.420
.240
.480
.460
.330
.350
C-HR
.580
.520
.410
.480
.670
.590
.520
.620
.420
.650
.480
.390
Semantic Match Score
NC-LR
.301
.211
.405
.266
.319
.423
.262
.438
.375
.333
.394
.348
NC-HR
.287
.420
.466
.316
.476
.321
.415
.272
.319
.400
.391
.337
C-LR
.392
.312
.262
.281
.373
.345
.349
.280
.333
.357
.415
.255
C-HR
.410
.371
.510
.374
.300
.450
.322
.392
.395
.395
.430
.353
Notes. GMS = General Motivational Statement, MA = Material Attribute + Motivation, TA = Tutor Attribute + Motivation, CS = Confusion-Specific, NC = not
confused, C = confused, LR = low regulation, HR = high regulation
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neither supports nor refutes the proposed pattern of findings. Given the nature of the
interventions, it would be expected that high regulation effort would be a key component
to success at any point in the learning process (i.e., regulation process, regulation
outcome, learning outcome). The present findings, however, show that participants
generated higher quality arguments when in the experimental induction conditions when
they were successfully confused, but put in low regulation effort. There was an exception
to this pattern. When participants were confused, had high regulation effort, and were in
the General Motivational Statement condition, they were more likely to have a presence
score of 2 when in the True-False condition compared to the True-True condition (χ2(2) =
7.78, p = .022, B = 6.92). Although it was unexpected that the General Motivational
Statement condition would generate higher quality arguments, it seems plausible that it
could happen when participants are successfully confused and put in the effort to resolve
their confusion.
Confusion Regulation Outcome. The confusion regulation outcome dependent
measures consisted of confusion resolution outcome and response quality on the forcedchoice question in Trial 3. Confusion resolution was assessed in the same manner as in
Study 3: none (N = 368), resolved (N = 356), unresolved (N = 258), and created (N = 91).
Overall, participants in the most motivational condition (Confusion-Specific +
Motivation) were expected to resolve their confusion and respond correctly to the Trial 3
forced-choice question more than participants in the other conditions. Mixed-effects
logistic regressions were conducted and did not support this hypothesized pattern of
findings for the Trial 3 forced-choice question. There were no significant differences
found for performance on the Trial 3 forced-choice questions (p’s > .1). The induction ×
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intervention interaction was also not significant for the confusion regulation outcomes.
Table 19 shows the proportional occurrence for each dependent measure.

Table 19
Proportional Occurrence of Post-Regulation Phase Dependent Measures
Tr-Tr

Tr-Fl

Fl-Tr

Condition
GMS

MA

TA

CS

Confusion Resolution
None
Resolved
Unresolved
Created

.390
.300
.230
.080

.320
.350
.250
.080

.320
.350
.250
.090

.390
.300
.240
.070

.270
.340
.300
.090

.400
.320
.190
.090

.310
.370
.230
.090

Trial 3

.140

.140

.180

.170

.140

.150

.150

Low Regulation Effort
None
Resolved
Unresolved
Created

.400
.290
.250
.060

.370
.280
.270
.090

.420
.290
.240
.060

High Regulation Effort
None
.380
.270
.220
Resolved
.300
.420
.410
Unresolved
.210
.230
.260
Created
.110
.080
.120
Notes. Tr = True, Fl= False, GMS = General Motivational Statement, MA = Material Attribute +
Motivation, TA = Tutor Attribute + Motivation, CS = Confusion-Specific + Motivation

Confusion resolution was investigated and there were only significant models for
no confusion. The same pattern that was found in Study 3 was found again. Participants
in both experimental conditions were less likely to have no confusion than the nocontradiction control condition (χ2(2) = 6.10, p = .047, True-False: B = .365, False-True:
B = .395). Although the model was not significant, the proportional occurrence of
resolved confusion was investigated for each induction condition. It was the case that
both experimental conditions (True-False: .350, False-True: .350) were more likely to
have resolved confusion than the no-contradiction control (.300). It was also the case that
99

both experimental conditions had higher proportional occurrences of resolved confusion
than unresolved confusion (True-False: .250, False-True: .250). So it seems that there is a
general pattern revealing that participants were able to more successfully resolve their
confusion when in the contradictory information conditions.
There was also an intervention main effect for the no confusion outcome;
however, it did not support the current hypothesis (χ2(3) = 8.90, p = .031). The General
Motivational Statement (B = .712) and Tutor Attribute + Motivation conditions (B =
.766) were more likely to have no confusion than the Material Attribute + Motivation
condition. In addition, the Tutor Attribute + Motivation condition was also more likely to
have no confusion than the Confusion-Specific condition (B = .456). Once again, the
proportional occurrence of resolved confusion was investigated to determine the overall
pattern, which was General Motivational Statement (.300) < (Tutor Attribute +
Motivation (.320) = Material Attribute + Motivation (.340)) < Confusion-Specific +
Motivation (.370). Although the model was not significant, this general pattern follows
the prediction made based on attribution theory (Batson et al., 1995; Heider, 1958;
Weiner, 1986).
Next, the impact of regulation effort on confusion resolution was investigated as
in Study 3. The induction × intervention × regulation effort (high, low) interaction was
not significant for any of the confusion resolution outcomes (p’s > 1). However, the
induction × regulation effort interaction was significant for no confusion (χ2(5) = 18.4, p
= .002) and resolved confusion (χ2(5) = 14.1, p = .015). Table 19 shows the proportional
occurrence for each confusion resolution outcome when split by regulation effort. The
interactions were then examined and revealed that models for low regulation effort were
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not significant for no confusion or resolved confusion (p’s > .1), but the models for high
regulation effort were significant for both confusion resolution outcomes.
Similar to the induction condition main effect, participants were found to have
less none (i.e., no confusion at T1 or T2) when in both experimental conditions compared
to the no-contradiction control condition (χ2(2) = 12.4, p = .002, True-False: B = .575,
False-True: B = .879). However, it was also the case that participants were more likely to
have resolved confusion when in both experimental conditions compared to the no
contradiction control (χ2(2) = 7.71, p = .021, True-False: B = .612, False-True: B = .525).
It appears that the general but non-significant pattern found in the induction main effect
analyses has again occurred in the high regulation cases. This finding was similar to
Study 3 in that participants were more likely to resolve their confusion when they put in
the necessary effort.
Learning Outcomes. Performance on the near transfer, far transfer, and design-astudy tasks was next investigated. As in Study 3, performance on the transfer tasks was
assessed by hits (i.e., correctly identifying a flaw) and false alarms (i.e., incorrectly
identifying a flaw), whereas design-a-study task performance was assessed by selecting
the correct multiple-choice response. Three logistic regression models were constructed
to investigate differences based on induction and intervention condition for each learning
measure. Similar to Study 3, only those cases in which participants engaged in the
regulation task (i.e., opened the explanatory text and provided an argument with
meaningful content) were included in the present analyses. This reduced the dataset to
913 observations.
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Induction and intervention condition differences. The induction and intervention
condition main effects were investigated first. Table 20 shows the proportional
occurrence of correct responses for each posttest. The performance for each induction
and intervention condition are displayed. The induction main effect model was expected
to not be significant for all three posttests as in Study 3. This hypothesis was supported
for the transfer tasks, but not for the design-a-study tasks. The induction main effect
models were not significant for the transfer tasks (p’s > .1), but it was for the design-astudy task and revealed that when participants were in both experimental conditions they
performed worse than the no-contradiction control condition (χ2(2) = 11.9, p = .003,
True-False: B = .324, False-True: B = .640). This finding may suggest that the design-astudy task did not benefit from the process of inducing confusion and then resolving it.

Table 20
Proportional Occurrence of Learning Measures
Near Transfer Task

Tr-Tr
.360

Tr-Fl
.340

Fl-Tr
.350

Condition
GMS
.320

MA
.380

TA
.330

CS
.370

Far Transfer Task

.360

.340

.360

.390

.290

.340

.380

Design-A-Study Task
.350
.280
.240
.300
.300
.290
.270
Notes. Tr = True, Fl = False, GMS = General Motivational Statement, MA = Material Attribute +
Motivation, TA = Tutor Attribute + Motivation, CS = Confusion-Specific + Motivation

The expected pattern of performance was General Motivational Statement <
Material Attribute + Motivation < Tutor Attribute + Motivation < Confusion-Specific +
Motivation. Similar to Study 3, this pattern was expected because of the potential for
successful confusion resolution in each condition. As previously mentioned (see
Confusion Regulation Outcome), participants in the Confusion-Specific + Motivation
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condition were expected to perform better than those in all other intervention conditions
because they would be motivated to persist and put in the effort needed to successfully
resolve confusion through attributional retraining. The distinction between the Material
Attribute + Motivation and Tutor Attribute + Motivation conditions was due to
participant perceptions about the stability of each outcome. The unclear tutor explanation
attribution could be viewed as less stable than the difficult material attribution and thus
be more motivating for participants to change their outcome (i.e., confusion) through
effortful cognitive activities. Finally, participants in the General Motivational Statement
were not expected to perform well on the learning measures because the causal
attribution associated with the experience of confusion was not addressed.
The intervention main effect hypothesis was not supported by the current
analyses. The intervention main effect model was not significant for any of the posttests
(p’s > .1). Although the models were not significant, the proportional occurrence of
correct responses was still investigated for each posttest. The Confusion Specific
condition was found to be functionally equivalent to the top scoring condition (i.e., .01
difference in scores) in both transfer tasks. The general pattern then shows that the
Confusion-Specific intervention was somewhat effective at promoting learning through
attributional retraining. However, all other intervention conditions outperformed the
Confusion Specific + Motivation condition on the design-a-study task.
The expected pattern for the induction × intervention interaction was similar to
that in Study 3. When participants were in the contradictory information conditions
(True-False, False-True), they were expected to perform particularly well in the
Confusion-Specific + Motivation condition on the posttest. This was expected because
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the posed contradiction would also encourage participants to engage in the beneficial
cognitive activities needed for confusion resolution (e.g., reflection, deliberation). This
hypothesis was also not confirmed due to the fact that the induction × intervention
interaction was not significant for any of the posttests (p’s > .1). It was the case, however,
that participants performed better on all three learning measures when they had high
regulation effort (Near Transfer Task: χ2(1) = 3.37, p = .066; Far Transfer Task: χ2(1) =
4.86, p = .028; Design-A-Study Task: χ2(1) = 7.71, p = .005). This finding suggests that
when participants were properly motivated through whatever means (internal, external),
they were able to perform well on all of the posttests.
Impact of confusion induction and regulation effort. Next, the impact of confusion
induction success and regulation effort were investigated. The induction × confusion ×
intervention × regulation effort interaction was tested with a mixed-effects logistic
regression model for each learning measure and was significant for the near transfer
(χ2(47) = 69.3, p = .019) and design-a-study tasks (χ2(47) = 71.3, p = .013), but not for
the far transfer task (p > .1). The significant interactions were further examined by
dividing the data into separate groups for each case (e.g., not confused, low regulation
effort, general motivational statement condition). Table 21 shows the proportional
occurrence of correct responses for the near transfer and design-a-study tasks.
Intervention condition differences are discussed next and induction condition differences
can be found in Appendix V.
The experimental induction conditions were found to be the only significant
models when individual cases were investigated for the near transfer task. Overall, the
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Table 21
Proportional Occurrence of Near Transfer and Design-A-Study Tasks
Not Confused
Low Reg. Effort
High Reg. Effort
Tr-Tr
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr
Tr-Tr
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr

Confused
Low Reg. Effort
High Reg. Effort
Tr-Tr
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr
Tr-Tr
Tr-Fl
Fl-Tr

Near Transfer Task
GMS
.400
.100
.320
.370
.500
.330
.410
.250
.370
.320
.480
.160
MA
.380
.400
.260
.460
.570
.640
.230
.330
.380
.370
.320
.420
TA
.270
.220
.390
.350
.500
.230
.170
.230
.220
.450
.220
.520
CS
.250
.530
.200
.360
.440
.140
.310
.430
.220
.480
.380
.450
Design A Study Task
GMS
.500
.170
.320
.370
.250
.240
.280
.320
.300
.370
.290
.210
MA
.380
.130
.210
.290
.360
.270
.310
.330
.150
.590
.210
.350
TA
.380
.220
.360
.480
.330
.380
.170
.350
.220
.180
.350
.100
CS
.250
.160
.270
.520
.310
.140
.130
.240
.170
.340
.380
.180
Notes. Tr = True, Fl = False, GMS = General Motivational Statement, MA = Material Attribute + Motivation, TA = Tutor Attribute + Motivation, CS =
Confusion-Specific + Motivation
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models revealed that the Confusion-Specific + Motivation condition was not superior to
all conditions, but did outperform other conditions on the near transfer task. Specifically,
the Confusion-Specific + Motivation condition outperformed both the General
Motivational Statement (B = 2.41) and Tutor Attribute + Motivation conditions (B =
1.42) when participants were not confused, had low regulation effort, and were in the
True-False condition (χ2(3) = 11.7, p = .008). The Material Attribute + Motivation
condition was also found to outperform the General Motivational Statement condition in
this case (B = 1.83). Although this pattern supports the hypothesis that the Confusion
Specific + Motivation condition would perform the best on learning measures, it is
somewhat counterintuitive. Participants were not confused and did not put forth a great
amount of effort, most likely because they did not have any confusion to resolve, so it is
anomalous that an intervention specifically targeting confusion would be helpful in these
circumstances.
There was a more intuitive finding when participants were confused, had high
regulation effort, and were in the False-True condition. In this case the General
Motivational Statement condition was outperformed by all other intervention conditions
(χ2(3) = 7.85, p = .049, Material Attribute + Motivation: B = 1.53; Tutor Attribute +
Motivation: B = 1.93, Confusion Specific + Motivation: B = 1.51). This finding is more
intuitive because participants were confused, so interventions that targeted the causal
attributions for confusion was context appropriate. In addition, these participants put in
greater effort during the confusion regulation task. The end result of increased learning
on the near transfer task easily follows from the series of events. However, this finding is
not entirely consistent with the hypothesized pattern because the attributional retraining
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strategy employed in the Confusion Specific + Motivation condition did not facilitate
greater learning than the attributional shift strategy used in the Material Attribute +
Motivation and Tutor Attribute + Motivation conditions.
There was one instance in which the Confusion Specific + Motivation condition
was outperformed on the near transfer task. When participants were not confused, had
high regulation effort, and were in the False-True condition, those in the Material
Attribute + Motivation condition outperformed both the Confusion Specific + Motivation
(B = 2.46) and Tutor Attribute + Motivation conditions (B = 1.99, χ2(3) = 6.97, p = .073).
False alarms were investigated for each significant model and were found to not be
significant. Therefore the results cannot be attributed to guessing.
The significant models for the design-a-study task all involved the cases in which
participants were confused and had high regulation effort. When participants were in the
True-True condition, the Tutor Attribute + Motivation condition was outperformed by all
intervention conditions (GMS: B = 1.36, MA: B = 2.28, CS: B = 1.23, χ2(3) = 9.66, p =
.022). In addition, the Material Attribute + Motivation condition also outperformed the
Confusion Specific + Motivation condition (B = 1.05). This pattern may have occurred
because of the combination of the induction and intervention condition. In the True-True
condition the agents agree and present a correct opinion, but then the tutor agent states
that she does not explain this topic well in the Tutor Attribute + Motivation condition.
This juxtaposition of agreement which creates some degree of certainty with explanation
is due to the tutor agent explaining the concept poorly may cause participants to question
the correct response and believe that the incorrect response is correct during the trialogue.
The difference between the Material Attribute + Motivation and Confusion Specific +
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Motivation conditions is particularly interesting when considered in the context that the
opposite pattern was found when learners were in the True-False condition (χ2(3) = 4.63,
p = .100). Specifically, the Confusion Specific + Motivation condition outperformed the
Material Attribute + Motivation condition on the design-a-study task (B = 1.27). Based
on these findings it appears that the presentation of contradictory information was an
important factor in the effectiveness of the Confusion Specific + Motivation condition. It
may be the case that confusion triggered in the True-True condition is different from
confusion triggered by the presentation of contradictory information by the two agents.
For example, the True-True condition confusion could be more similar to hopeless
confusion since the participant is confused even when it would be possible to just adopt
the opinion being proposed by both of the agents.
Discussion of learning outcome findings. When learning outcomes were
investigated, there was not a significant induction main effect as predicted and as was
found in Study 3. The intervention condition hypothesis that the Confusion-Specific +
Motivation condition would perform the best on the learning measures was found for the
transfer tasks, although the models were not significant. However, there were significant
models revealing that learners who put in more regulation effort were able to perform
better on all three learning measures. The combination of regulation effort and confusion
induction success were then investigated and there was some evidence that addressing
attributions was more helpful than a general motivational statement. However, the
findings were not completely consistent with the hypothesized pattern. The only finding
that was consistent with the predicted patterns was that when learners were confused, had
high regulation effort, and were in the True-False condition those in the Confusion-
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Specific + Motivation condition performed better on the design-a-study task than those in
the Material Attribute + Motivation condition. Interestingly, it was also the instances in
which learners were confused, had high regulation effort, and were in the True-False
condition that the predicted pattern was found in Study 3. It may be that case that more
information about the learner is needed when attributions are being addressed by an
intervention. For example, if learners are making the attribution that confusion is due to
an internal source and is permanent, it may be more difficult to convince them that
confusion is a learning opportunity than learners who attribute confusion to a different
source.
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6. General Discussion
Overview of Research
The present dissertation adopted a multi-pronged approach to investigate
interventions to regulate confusion during learning. Confusion has been found to
frequently occur during learning (Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello & Graesser, 2011; Graesser
et al., 2007; Lehman et al., 2008) and can be beneficial for learning, particularly at deeper
levels (Craig et al., 2004; D’Mello & Graesser, 2011; D’Mello et al., 2014; Graesser et
al., 2007; Lehman et al., in preparation; Lehman et al., 2013). However, it is not the case
that all learners are able to resolve their confusion and reach a deeper level of
understanding (D’Mello & Graesser, 2012b). The inability to resolve confusion may be
due to a lack of knowledge, skill, or effort. Thus, it is important to investigate confusion
interventions that address these different factors that can contribute to hopeless
confusion. The present dissertation investigated confusion regulation interventions in
three contexts. First, learner preferences for confusion regulation interventions were
investigated (Study 1). Second, the way in which expert human tutors handled instances
of learner confusion were investigated (Study 2). Third, confusion regulation
interventions were directly evaluated in a learning environment that experimentally
induced confusion via the presentation of contradictory information. In this learning
environment, pedagogical (Study 3) and motivational interventions (Study 4) to aid
confusion resolution were investigated.
Learner preferences were investigated with an online survey study. Learners rated
which interventions they felt would help them overcome their confusion. Learners were
found to prefer an intervention that would help them solve their current confusion (e.g.,
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more information, feedback, correct answer) as opposed to supportive comments or a
change of task, related or unrelated. Interventions were also rated for how they would
help learners overcome boredom and frustration. The findings revealed that learners
preferred different interventions for boredom, confusion, and frustration. Thus, it does
not appear that learners perceive all negatively-valenced emotions during learning as
similar.
Next, expert human tutor responses to learner confusion were investigated by
analyzing the dialogue moves that occurred following instances of learner confusion.
Generally, tutors adopted a more pedagogical approach to handling learner confusion. In
particular, tutors provided direct instruction and explanation after learner confusion.
Interestingly, this response to learner confusion is consistent with learner preferences for
confusion interventions. In addition to learners preferring more information and tutors
providing direction instruction after confusion, tutors also provide the correct answer
frequently after learner confusion and learners rated receiving the correct answer as
helpful to resolve their confusion. The apparent approach adopted by tutors was most
consistent with the strategy proposed by Vygotskian theory (1978) in that tutors were
more directly helping learners to resolve their confusion and not posing questions to the
learners (VanLehn et al., 2003) or providing motivational support during this struggle
(Lepper & Woolverton, 2002). Tutors also handled confusion differently than other
emotions (i.e., anxiety, frustration, and happiness), which is another similarity with the
results from the learner preferences study. In addition, tutors did not handle confusion the
same as learner questions and incorrect answers. Incorrect answers, in particular, have
been used as a model to address impasses (VanLehn et al., 2003) and uncertainty
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(Forbes-Riley & Litman, 2011). Finally, tutors did not handle all instances of confusion
as the same. The cognitive state (e.g., incorrect answer, question, metacognitive
statement) that occurred with confusion influenced tutorial dialogue.
Finally, interventions to regulate confusion were investigated within a learning
environment that induced confusion. Previous research on interventions to regulate
confusion (D’Mello et al., 2010) and uncertainty (Forbes-Riley & Litman, 2011) have
used natural occurrences of confusion and uncertainty during interactions with an
intelligent tutoring system. In both studies, learning benefits from the affect intervention
were only beneficial for some learners. Learners with lower prior knowledge, who may
have been more likely to experience confusion during learning, benefited the most from
Affective AutoTutor (D’Mello et al., 2010) and learners who had more experiences of
uncertainty benefited the most from UNC-ITSpoke (Forbes-Riley & Litman, 2011).
Thus, it is difficult to determine the effectiveness of each intervention when some
learners may have received the intervention multiple times and other learners may have
never actually received the intervention. The present dissertation addressed this issue by
evaluating pedagogical and motivational interventions within an environment that
experimentally induced confusion. In both studies confusion was successfully induced by
having the two animated pedagogical agents present contradictory information while
discussing the scientific merits of research case studies.
Both pedagogical and motivational interventions were investigated with respect to
how they influenced confusion regulation (i.e., confusion resolution) and learning
outcomes. Table 22 shows the main results from Studies 3 (pedagogical) and 4
(motivational). For each result the hypothesized pattern is displayed for both the
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induction and intervention main effects, where applicable, as well as the pattern found in
each study. In addition, non-parametric tests (signed-rank test, Mann-Whitney U test,
Kruskal-Wallis test) were conducted to compare the induction and intervention
conditions without taking into consideration adjustments due to random effects.
The main findings from Studies 3 and 4 encompassed confusion induction,
confusion regulation process, confusion regulation outcome, and learning outcomes. For
confusion induction, the presentation of contradictory information successfully induced
confusion in both Studies 3 and 4. Although more confusion was reported in the two
experimental confusion induction conditions, it was not the case that these two conditions
had increased processing time during the confusion regulation process, as hypothesized.
However, this pattern was still “partially” supported due to the fact that overall when
learners reported confusion after the presentation of contradictory information they had
longer processing time than when they did not report confusion in both Studies 3 and 4.
The predicted patterns for intervention main effects for both regulation process time and
argument quality were not found for either study, with one exception (see Table 22).
Overall the findings for regulation process time and argument quality were mixed and did
not present clear and consistent effects.
The pattern for confusion resolution outcome was also somewhat unclear for both
Studies 3 and 4. However, it was the case that learners who put in more effort during the
regulation task were more likely to resolve their confusion. This is consistent with
impasse driven theories of learning that predict impasses will be resolved, and learning is
likely to occur, when learners engage in beneficial, effortful cognitive activities such as
deliberation, problem solving, and reflection (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn et al.,
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2003). Given this finding it was necessary to consider both regulation effort and
confusion induction success when investigating learning outcomes.
Finally, learning outcomes were investigated for both Studies 3 and 4. The
findings from the pedagogical intervention study were generally consistent with the
prediction that the condition that most encouraged learners to deliberate between the
competing perspectives and provided resources to address knowledge gaps would be the
most helpful (i.e., Convince while Read condition). In particular, the Convince while
Read condition was found to be effective when learners were confused, had high
regulation effort, and were in a condition that presented contradictory information.
Similar to the confusion resolution findings, the fact that the Convince while Read
condition was effective, and particularly when learners were confused and put in more
effort on the regulation task, is consistent with cognitive disequilibrium (Festinger, 1957;
Graesser et al., 2005; Piaget, 1952) and impasse-driven theories of learning (Brown &
VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn et al., 2003). There were two unexpected findings in terms of
learning outcomes. First, the Convince then Read condition was less effective than was
expected. However, the Convince then Read condition was effective when learners put in
low effort and were in a contradictory information condition. This finding is somewhat
perplexing because learners did not put in the effort to resolve their confusion, but were
still able to perform well on the posttest. Second, the Read Only condition had learning
outcomes similar to the Convince while Read condition in many instances. This may
have been due to the fact that the Read Only condition was found to have more successful
confusion resolution, which would also support cognitive disequilibrium (Festinger,
1957; Graesser et al., 2005; Piaget, 1952) and impasse-driven theories of learning
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Table 22
Summary of Main Findings from Studies 3 and 4
Study
Confusion Induction

Pattern
Predicted

Observed

S3 & S4

S3 & S4: TF, FT > TT

TF, FT > TT

S3 & S4

S3 & S4: TF, FT > TT

TF, FT = TT

S4

S3: CtR > RO
S3: CO = CtR
CS > (TA = MA) > GMS

CtR = RO
CO = CtR
CS = TA = MA = GMS

S3
S4
S3
S4

CwR > CO = CtR
CS > (TA = MA) > GMS
CwR > CtR > RO > CO
CS > (TA = MA) > GMS

S3
S4
S3
S4
S3
S4

CwR > CtR > RO > CO
CS > (TA = MA) > GMS
CwR > CtR > RO > CO
CS > (TA = MA) > GMS
CwR > CtR > RO > CO
CS > (TA = MA) > GMS

Test
p = .001, p = .003
p = .071, p = .057

Supported?
Yes
Yes

Regulation Process
Processing Time

Argument Quality
Confusion Resolution

S3

p's > .100, p's > .100
p = .803, p = .562
p = .805
p = .314
p = .182

Partially
Partially
No
Yes
No

CO = CtR = CwR
CS = TA = MA = GMS
RO > CtR > CwR > CO*
CS > (TA = MA) > GMS*

p = .546
p = .485
p = .398
p = .678

No
No
No
Partially

CwR > CO, RO, CtR | CtR > CO
CS = TA = MA = GMS
RO = CwR > CO = CtR
CS = TA = MA = GMS
CwR > CO, RO, CtR | RO > CO
CS = TA = MA = GMS

p = .059
p = .614
p = .026
p = .091
p = .016
p = .686

Yes
Partially
Partially
Partially
Partially
No

Learning Outcomes
Near Transfer Task
Far Transfer Task
Design-A-Study Task

Notes. * = general pattern was observed, but was not significant in previous analyses
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(Brown & VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn et al., 2003).
The findings from the motivational interventions study were overall less clear
than the pedagogical study. However, there was evidence that interventions that
addressed learner attributions were more effective than those only addressing general
motivation. It may be the case that a larger intervention is needed when attempting to
alter learner attributions. For example, Perry et al. (2010) used training sessions that
involved watch a short video and discussion to retrain learners to perceive effort as the
key component to academic success, as opposed to intelligence. Interventions to convince
learners that confusion is actually a beneficial state for learning may take more than a
couple of sentences stated by the tutor agent while learning is occurring. As noted before,
it may also be necessary to assess learners’ perceptions of confusion generally and their
current attribution for confusion in the specific trialogue. These two pieces of information
will undoubtedly aid in selecting an intervention that positively impacts attributions and
encourages persistence in the face of confusion and struggles.
Overall, the present dissertation investigated interventions to regulate confusion
during learning. In other words, how can interventions be deployed to keep learners in the
virtuous affective cycle and avoid the vicious cycle identified by D’Mello and Graesser
(2012b) (see Figure 1). Across the four studies that were discussed, there appears to be a
commonality in that more information is helpful when learners are confused. Learners
preferred more information when confused, expert tutors delivered more information
after learner confusion, and learners benefited most from interventions that supplied
additional information during interactions with animated pedagogical agents. However, it
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also appears that the way in which that information is presented is important to insure
that learners make use of that information.
The issue of how to present additional information is critical to developing
interventions that facilitate confusion resolution and deeper learning. Expert human tutors
provide direct instruction most frequently after learner confusion; however, they are also
breaking down problems into more manageable sub-problems, asking follow-up
questions, and employing motivational dialogue moves. This suggests that expert tutors
view it as necessary to couch the additional information provided in direct instruction
within a context that requires learners to persist with the current problem or with
motivational statements that encourage learners to persist through their confusion. This
finding is consistent with the uncertainty-adaptive UNC-ITSpoke (Forbes-Riley &
Litman, 2011) and the results from Studies 3 and 4 in the present dissertation. However,
it was not the case that any of the strategies deployed in conjunction with additional
information were effective for all learners.
The way in which expert human tutors responded to learner confusion may help
to explain why the strategies used in UNC-ITSpoke (Forbes-Riley & Litman, 2011) and
Studies 3 and 4 were not effective for all learners. The tutor-learner pairs in Study 2 were
already working together prior to the study in which this data was collected. The tutors
then had an understanding of not only the learner’s abilities but also his or her
perceptions of the topic being tutored and learning more generally as well as his or her
response to challenges and academic failures. In other words, expert tutors were likely
responding to both learners’ emotions and their individual characteristics. It could also be
the case that at different points in the tutoring session (e.g., beginning vs. end) tutors
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deploy different strategies or tutors may shift strategy depending on the topic or problem
currently being discussed (e.g., easy or difficult topic, topic a learner does or does not
like). The variety in expert tutor responses may reveal that the most effective method to
facilitate confusion resolution must adapt to both the learner and the current learning
context.
The issue of adapting to the individual learner’s characteristics and the individual
tutoring session characteristics is also relevant to the application of the present confusion
regulation interventions in other learning contexts. How would these interventions
function in a small group setting (computer-mediated or face-to-face) or in a classroom
setting? It may be the case that when it is not only one learner the appropriate method of
intervention may differ. Although the present findings show potential for improving the
adaptivity and effectiveness of intelligent tutoring systems and other learning
environments, there are still many questions about which intervention to deploy when in
the learning session and to whom.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although the present dissertation attempted to completely investigate
interventions to regulate confusion during learning, there are limitations to each of the
four studies that were conducted. Overall, each of the studies was only one investigation
into that particular aspect of confusion regulation interventions. Replications are needed
for each study to determine the reliability of these findings and also to determine the
conditions under which each of these findings occurs.
For the learner preferences study, there was one important limitation. The
limitation was that each emotion was not defined for the learners. Thus, it may have been
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the case that what one learner viewed as confusion was what another learner viewed as
frustration. This is particularly important given that persistent confusion that cannot be
resolved can transition into frustration (D’Mello & Graesser, 2012b). Thus, the less
intense experiences of confusion might be easily distinguished from frustration, whereas
more intense experiences of confusion may be highly similar to frustration. In addition to
defining emotions for learners, it would also be beneficial to assess how learners
generally perceive confusion (e.g., learning opportunity, indicates lack of skills, etc.).
For the expert tutor study, there was also one important limitation. The limitation
was that the tutors were not consulted to determine what strategies they were adopting
and what they were actually responding to during the tutoring session (e.g., cognitive
state only, affective state only, cognitive + affective state). In future studies, it would be
helpful to have tutors go through a session and prompt them to indicate what their
thought process was at critical points in the tutoring session. This would enable future
studies to determine if there were larger strategies being employed by the tutors, if tutors
were aware of and responding to learner emotions, and if there were other learner
characteristics that tutors were taking into consideration when providing tutorial
instruction.
For the pedagogical and motivational intervention studies, there were four
important limitations. First, critics might object to the confusion induction manipulation
on the grounds that learners were provided with intentionally misleading information and
contradictions and this is not in their best interest. This concern and similar reactions to
the manipulation are acknowledged, but the present dissertation takes the position that
these are less of a concern in the present research for the following reasons: (a) any
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misleading information presented was corrected at the end of the experiment, (b) all
research protocols were approved by the appropriate IRB board, (c) learners were
consenting research participants instead of actual students, and (d) learners were fully
debriefed at the end of the experiment.
The second limitation addresses the ability to apply the present techniques to a
broader range of domains. Both Studies 3 and 4 were conducted within the domain of
research methods and utilized discussions of research case studies to help learners reach a
better understanding of research methods concepts. It must be plausible to have
disagreements during a discussion in order to utilize this method of confusion induction.
However, the confusion regulation interventions may be applicable to a greater number
of domains. This may be the case due to the fact that constructing an argument to
convince a hypothetical new student was also found to be effective. Therefore, it is not
necessary for the agent(s) in the learning environment to pose disagreements in order to
make use of the confusion regulation interventions.
The third and fourth limitations consider the nature of the interventions to regulate
confusion. The interventions provided in the current experiments could be improved in a
number of ways. For the pedagogical interventions, for example, it may be the case that a
more interactive intervention (e.g., scaffolding to address specific misconceptions or
errors) may have been more effective. As mentioned previously, the motivational
interventions could be improved by devoting more time to retraining learner attributions
about confusion as well as assessing current learner attributions to tailor the intervention
more to the specific learner. Finally, there are other types of pedagogical and
motivational interventions that could have been used as well as other methods of
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intervention that could, and should, be explored. For example, the interventions that
learners rated during the learner preferences study could be investigated within the
confusion induction learning environment.
There are also other components of the learning interaction that need to be further
investigated in addition to other types of confusion regulation interventions. One
important area is to investigate learner characteristics that impact the effectiveness of
confusion induction methods and confusion regulation interventions. For example, in a
previous study that used false feedback to induce confusion, it was found that learners
with high prior knowledge and high cognitive drive (e.g., prefer difficult material, enjoy
challenging material, prefer complex explanations, etc.) were more likely to be
successfully confused by false feedback, spent more time in the confusion regulation task
(reading an explanatory text), and performed better on transfer tasks when they were in a
confusion regulation condition (Lehman et al., 2013). Thus, it is important to explore the
relationship between learner characteristics and the findings from the learner preferences
study and the two confusion regulation intervention studies. It could be, for example, that
the Read Only condition performed surprisingly well because there were many learners in
that condition that have higher self-motivation to work towards resolving their confusion.
It is also important to identify those learners that do not need an intervention. An
effective learning must be able to determine both when it is necessary to intervene and
when it is best to let the learner work through confusion on their own.
Conclusion
Overall the present dissertation has found evidence that confusion regulation
interventions can be helpful for learning. However, it does not seem to be that a simple
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one-size-fits-all approach can be adopted. Adaptive learning environments will need to
determine which confusion regulation intervention will be most effective based on the
learner’s characteristics and their current performance in the learning session. Another
aspect of confusion regulation that was not addressed in the present dissertation but is
important is approaches that can be used in the classroom. Tutors and adaptive learning
environments can provide one-to-one instruction that can be adapted to a particular
learner, but what does a teacher with thirty students in the classroom do? It is important
for future research to determine which strategies work for which learners, but also which
strategies work in which contexts. In order to promote deeper learning, teachers, tutors,
and adaptive learning environments will need to adapt to both learner cognitive and
affective states.
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Appendix A – Survey Research Questions (Study 1)
INSTRUCTIONS:
You will be asked several questions about different emotional experiences (boredom,
confusion, frustration) during learning. Learning refers to any experience in a classroom,
working alone, or working with a tutor in which you are attempting to learn some
material. There are not right or wrong answers. Please answer honestly and to the best of
your ability.
1. In general, what type of assistance or learning intervention do you think would
help you or other learners to overcome CONFUSION during learning?
2. In general, what type of assistance or learning intervention do you think would
help you or other learners to overcome BOREDOM during learning?
3. In general, what type of assistance or learning intervention do you think would
help you or other learners to overcome FRUSTRATION during learning?
Rate each question on the following scale:
1
Not at
All Helpful

2
Not
Helpful

3
Somewhat
Not Helpful

4
Somewhat
Helpful

5
Helpful

6
Very
Helpful

1. When you are CONFUSED during learning, how helpful would you find each of
the following for overcoming your CONFUSION?
a. Additional information about the concept being learned
b. Encouragement to persist with the task
c. Presentation of a new (but related) task to solve
d. Feedback about the quality of your progress/responses (i.e., correct vs.
incorrect)
e. Statement of the correct answer
f. A short break to do an unrelated task
2. When you are BORED during learning, how helpful would you find each of the
following for overcoming your BOREDOM?
a. Additional information about the concept being learned
b. Encouragement to persist with the task
c. Presentation of a new (but related) task to solve
d. Feedback about the quality of your progress/responses (i.e., correct vs.
incorrect)
e. Statement of the correct answer
f. A short break to do an unrelated task
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3. When you are FRUSTRATED during learning, how helpful would you find each
of the following for overcoming your FRUSTRATION?
a. Additional information about the concept being learned
b. Encouragement to persist with the task
c. Presentation of a new (but related) task to solve
d. Feedback about the quality of your progress/responses (i.e., correct vs.
incorrect)
e. Statement of the correct answer
f. A short break to do an unrelated task

137

Appendix B – Informed Consent Form (Study 1)
AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE
In this study, you will be asked to complete several surveys about your emotional
experiences during learning.
You will also be asked to complete several surveys about your learning experiences in
general and a demographics questionnaire.
The duration of the study is approximately 60 minutes. You will receive 1 credit for
taking part in the study.
Your participation is voluntary, and you are free to withdraw from the research at any
time. If you withdraw from the study, you will receive credit for the portion of the study
that you completed.
Participation in this study should not pose any risk.
To participate in this study and receive credit, you must sign this form.
By electronically signing below, you agree to participate in the proposed study and
confirm that you have read this agreement. If you have any further questions regarding
your participation or any other study-related questions, please contact Blair Lehman
(balehman@memphis.edu). If you have any questions regarding your rights as a subject
in this study, you may contact the chair of the Institutional Review Board for the
Protection of Human Subjects at 901-678-2533.
Electronic Signature (Name):
Date:
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Appendix C – Data Release Agreement Form (Study 1)
DATA RELEASE AGREEMENT
I agree to let my data (responses to survey questions) be used for presentation at
conferences, in journal publication, and book chapters. This information will only be
used as examples of data output.
I agree to let my data be used in future studies. This would involve a new set of
participants viewing parts of my data. These participants will sign a confidentiality
agreement to viewing my data.
I understand that my personal data will never be associated with my personal
identification information. I understand that agreement to this usage is completely
voluntary and I am able at any point to refuse my data be used in this way.
You do not have to sign this form to participate in this study and receive credit.
Electronic Signature (Name):
Date:
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Appendix D – Debriefing Form (Study 1)
DEBRIEFING
The purpose of this study was to learn more about how people interpret emotional
experiences during learning and how these experiences relate to their more general
emotional experiences. We focused on boredom, confusion, and frustration because these
are emotions that frequently occur during learning and often require some type of
instructional or motivational intervention to help learners succeed.
In future research, we hope to develop and test interventions that are adaptive to both
learners’ cognitive and affective states. The present survey will help us to determine how
these different emotional experiences make learners feel about themselves. This
information will then allow us to develop interventions that are more appropriate for
learners and hopefully more effective.
Your data will only be anonymously shared with credible researchers and all information
collected in this study will be kept confidential within the limits of law.
We thank you for your participation in this study. Your contribution was instrumental in
advancing our knowledge of how emotions impact deep learning gains. The results of this
study will be used to engineer a computer tutor that promotes, tracks, and helps regulate
emotions.
For more information on this project or if you have any questions and concerns, please
contact Blair Lehman (balehman@memphis.edu).
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Appendix E – Academic Grit Scale
There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your own perceptions. Please
answer each question as honestly and accurately as you can, but don’t spend too much
time thinking about each answer. Select an answer option based on how much each
statement applies to you (1 = Not At All Like Me, 5 = Very Much Like Me).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

I often set a goal but later choose to pursue a different one.
New ideas and new projects sometimes distract me from previous ones.
I become interested in new pursuits every few months.
My interests change from year to year.
I have been obsessed with a certain idea or project for a short time but later lost
interest.
6. I have difficulty maintaining my focus on projects that take more than a few
months to complete.
7. I have achieved a goal that took years of work.
8. I have overcome setbacks to conquer an important challenge.
9. I finish whatever I begin.
10. Setbacks don’t discourage me.
11. I am a hard worker.
12. I am diligent.
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Appendix F – School Failure Tolerance Scale
There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your own perceptions. Please
read over each statement carefully and think about how much it does or does not apply to
you. Select an option that best applies to you. (1 = Extremely Disagree, 3 = Somewhat
Disagree, 4 = Somewhat Agree, 6 = Extremely Agree)
1.
2.
3.
4.

I feel terrible when I make a mistake in school.
If I do poorly in my school work, I try not to let anyone know.
A low grade in my school work makes me feel very sad.
When I start something new in school, the first think I think about is that I might
fail.
5. I worry a lot about making errors in my school work.
6. I feel like hiding whenever I get a bad grade in school.
7. If I make lots of mistakes in school, I feel very moody or angry.
8. I don’t like to study with classmates because they may think I am dumb if I don’t
know something.
9. When I fail at something in school, I don’t like to eat, or play, or talk, or do
anything.
10. I get very discouraged if I make errors on a task I am trying to learn.
11. I really dislike school work on which I make mistakes.
12. If I give a wrong answer to a teacher’s question, I feel terrible.
13. I like to do school work that is difficult for me.
14. I would rather work problems I can do in a hurry that those that take much time
and thought.
15. I would do almost anything to get out of working difficult problems in school.
16. I like to try difficult assignments even if I get some wrong.
17. School work that really makes me think is fun.
18. School work that is difficult is more fun than work that is very easy.
19. I would rather study a difficult course than a very easy one.
20. If I could choose my math problems, I would pick hard ones rather than very easy
ones.
21. It is fun to try to answer questions that are difficult or challenging.
22. The easier school work is for me, the more I like it.
23. I like to study with classmates that enjoy working on difficult lessons.
24. I would rather make mistakes on a difficult task than get a perfect score on an
easy but boring task.
25. I like to ask questions in school because I learn by asking questions.
26. If I can’t succeed at a new school task, I give up quickly.
27. When I make mistakes in my school work, I just keep trying and trying.
28. I don’t like to set goals for my school work, because I might not reach them and
then I feel bad.
29. If a school task is difficult, I try to get by without doing it.
30. If I do not understand something, I ask the teacher to explain it.
31. I would rather guess at something and get it wrong than ask a question that may
sound silly.
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32. I almost always learn a lot from the mistakes I make in my school work.
33. If I get a low grade in my school work, I study my errors and rework the problems
I get wrong.
34. I usually study and correct the errors I make on school work, even if I don’t have
to.
35. I don’t like to set goals for my school work. I just do the work and forget about it.
36. If I get a low score, I usually make up my mind to buckle down and study hard.
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Appendix G – Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire
Read every question and select the option that suits you best. There are no correct or
incorrect answers. Choose one option per question. Work quickly.
Indicate the degree to which each statement is true of you. (1 = Not at All True of Me, 3
= Somewhat True of Me, 4 = Neither True nor Not True of Me, 5 = Somewhat True of
Me, 7 = Very True of Me)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Compared with other students in my classes I expect to do well.
I’m certain I can understand the ideas taught in my courses.
I expect to do very well in my classes.
Compared with others in my classes, I think I’m a good student.
I am sure I can do an excellent job on the problems and tasks assigned for my
classes.
6. I think I will receive good grades in my classes.
7. My study skills are excellent compared with others in my classes.
8. Compared with other students in my classes I think I know a great deal about the
subjects.
9. I know that I will be able to learn the material for my classes.
10. I prefer class work that is challenging so I can learn new things.
11. It is important for me to learn what is being taught in my classes.
12. I like what I am learning in my classes.
13. I think I will be able to use what I learn in my classes in other classes.
14. I often choose paper topics I will learn something from even if they require more
work.
15. Even when I do poorly on a test I try to learn from my mistakes.
16. I think that what I am learning in my classes is useful for me to know.
17. I think that what we are learning in my classes is interesting.
18. Understanding the subject taught in my classes is important to me.
19. I am so nervous during a test that I cannot remember facts I have learned.
20. I have an uneasy, upset feeling when I take a test.
21. I worry a great deal about tests.
22. When I take a test I think about how poorly I am doing.
23. When I study for a test, I try to put together the information from class and from
the book.
24. When I do homework, I try to remember what the teacher said in class so I can
answer the questions correctly.
25. It is hard for me to decide what the main ideas are in what I read.
26. When I study I put important ideas into my own words.
27. I always try to understand what the teacher is saying even if it doesn’t make
sense.
28. When I study for a test I try to remember as many facts as I can.
29. When studying, I copy my notes over to help me remember material.
30. When I study for a test I practice saying the important facts over and over to
myself.
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31. I use what I have learned from old homework assignments and the textbook to do
new assignments.
32. When I am studying a topic, I try to make everything fit together.
33. When I read material for my classes, I say the words over and over to myself to
help me remember.
34. I outline the chapters in my book to help me study.
35. When reading, I try to connect the things I am reading about with what I already
know.
36. I ask myself questions to make sure I know the material I have been studying.
37. When work is hard I either give up or study only the easy parts.
38. I work on practice exercises and answer end of chapter questions even when I
don’t have to.
39. Even when study materials are dull and uninteresting, I keep working until I
finish.
40. Before I begin studying I think about the things I will need to do to learn.
41. I often find that I have been reading for class but don’t know what it is all about.
42. I find that when the teacher is talking I think of other things and don’t really listen
to what is being said.
43. When I’m reading I stop once in a while and go over what I have read.
44. I work hard to get a good grade even when I don't like a class.
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Appendix H – Attributional Complexity Scale
There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your own perceptions. Please
answer each question as honestly and accurately as you can, but don’t spend too much
time thinking about each answer. Select an answer option based on how much you agree
or disagree that statement applies to you. (-3 = Strongly Disagree, 0 = Neither Agree nor
Disagree, 3 = Strongly Agree)
1. I don’t usually bother to analyze and explain people’s behavior.
2. Once I have figured out a single cause for a person’s behavior I don’t usually go
any further.
3. I believe it is important to analyze and understand our own thinking processes.
4. I think a lot about the influence that I have on other people’s behavior.
5. I have found that relationships between a person’s attitudes, beliefs, and character
traits are usually simple and straightforward.
6. If I see people behaving in a really strange or unusual manner I usually put it
down to the fact that they are strange or unusual people and don’t bother to
explain it any further.
7. I have though a lot about the family background and personal history of people
who are close to me, in order to understand why they are the sort of people they
are.
8. I don’t enjoy getting into discussions where the causes for people’s behavior are
being talked over.
9. I have found that the causes for people’s behavior are usually complex rather than
simple.
10. I am very interested in understanding how my own thinking works when I make
judgments about people or attach causes to their behavior.
11. I think very little about the different ways that people influence each other.
12. To understand a person’s personality/behavior I have found it is important to
know how that person’s attitudes, beliefs, and character traits fit together.
13. When I try to explain other people’s behavior I concentrate on the person and
don’t worry too much about all the existing external factors that might be
affecting them.
14. I have often found that the basic cause for a person’s behavior is located far back
in time.
15. I really enjoy analyzing the reasons or causes for people’s behavior.
16. I usually find that complicated explanations for people’s behavior are confusing
rather than helpful.
17. I give little thought to how my thinking works in the process of understanding or
explaining people’s behavior.
18. I think very little about the influence that other people have on my behavior.
19. I have thought a lot about the way that different parts of my personality influence
other parts (e.g., beliefs affecting attitudes or attitudes affecting character traits).
20. I think a lot about the influence that society has on other people.
21. When I analyze a person’s behavior I often find the causes from a chain that foes
back in time, sometimes for years.
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22. I am not really curious about human behavior.
23. I prefer simple rather than complex explanations for people’s behavior.
24. When the reasons I give for my own behavior are different from someone else’s,
this often makes me think about the thinking processes that lead to my
explanations.
25. I belief that to understand a person you need to understand the people who that
person has close contact with.
26. I tend to take people’s behavior at face value and not worry about the inner causes
for their behavior (e.g. attitudes, beliefs, etc.).
27. I think a lot about the influence that society has on my behavior and personality.
28. I have thought very little about my own family background and personal history
in order to understand why I am the sort of person I am.
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Appendix I – Demographics Questionnaire
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.
1. What is your current age in years?
2. What is your gender?
a. Male
b. Female
3. Which ethnicity best describes you?
a. African-American/Black
b. Caucasian/White
c. Hispanic, Latino, or Mexican origin
d. Asian
e. American Indian/Alaskan Native
f. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
g. Other
4. What year are you currently in?
a. First Year
b. Sophomore
c. Junior
d. Senior
5. What was your ACT or SAT score?
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Appendix J – Informed Consent Form (Studies 3 & 4)
In this study, you will be asked to use a computer-based learning environment to learn
important critical thinking skills.
You will also complete a pretest, posttest, and a few questionnaires throughout this study.
We will record a video of your face, your speech, your computer screen, mouse
movements, and responses to the tutor. This data will only be used by the research team
and not shared with anyone without your expressed written consent.
The duration of the study is approximately 120 minutes. You will receive 2 hours of
research credit for taking part in the study.
Your participation is voluntary, and you are free to withdraw from the research at any
time. If you withdraw from the study, you will receive credit for the time you remained in
the study.
Participation in this study should not pose any risk.
By signing below, you agree to participate in the proposed study and confirm that you
have read and received a copy of this agreement. If you have any further questions
regarding your participation or any other study-related questions, please contact Blair
Lehman (balehman@memphis.edu). If you have any questions regarding your rights as a
subject in this study, you may contact the chair of the Institutional Review Board for the
Protection of Human Subjects at 678-2533.
_______________________
Your Signature
___________________
Your Printed Name
___________________
Your Email Address
__________________
Today's Date
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Appendix K – Data Release Agreement Form (Studies 3 & 4)
I agree to let my data (videos of face, audio, video of computer screen, mouse
movements, emotion measures, and knowledge measures) be used for presentation at
conferences, in journal publication, and book chapters. This information will only be
used as examples of data output.
I agree to let my data be used in future studies. This would involve a new set of
participants viewing parts of my data. These participants will sign a confidentiality
agreement prior to viewing my data.
I understand that my personal data will never be associated with my personal
identification information or test scores. I understand that agreement to this usage is
completely voluntary and I am able at any point to refuse my data be used in this way.
__________________
Your Signature
___________________
Your Printed Name
___________________
Today's Date
____________________
Experimenter Printed Name
__________________
Experimenter Signature
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Appendix L – Debriefing Form (Study 3)
The purpose of this study was to experiment with different tutorial interventions to help
you obtain a deep understanding of topics in critical thinking. We focused on critical
thinking because it is widely acknowledged that the level of science understanding in the
United States is unacceptably low, yet the advancement of scientific knowledge depends
on the application of skills needed for scientific inquiry. Our research aspires to fill this
gap by developing technological interventions to fortify citizens and aspiring scientists
with the skills needed for critical thinking, model-based reasoning, and problem solving
in science.
Decades of previous research, have revealed that students rarely acquire a deep
understanding of difficult conceptual information from reading the textbook or traditional
classroom instruction. Hence, we explored a different strategy to help you learn. In
particular, we tried to confuse you so that you would stop and think. This is because our
previous research indicates that a degree of confusion is essential for learning,
particularly at deeper levels of comprehension. So the tutor tried to confuse you by
providing misleading information and contradicting you in conjunction with the student
agent. Note that all misleading information was eventually corrected over the course of
the tutoring session. In addition to confusing you, the agent also attempted to regulate this
confusion as well through different types of interventions (i.e., construct a convincing
argument, read an explanatory text, construct a convincing argument with the aid of an
explanatory text, attempt to construct a convincing argument and then read an
explanatory text). You received one of these types of interventions to test whether this
could increase your level of learning.
You were asked to take a knowledge test before interacting with the tutor and another
knowledge test after interacting with the tutor. We will use the difference between your
pre and post test scores to calculate your learning gains. We will test to see if you learned
more when you were confused compared to when you were not confused.
We recorded a video of your face, a video of your computer screen, your responses to the
tutor’s questions, and your mouse movements. This data will be used to explore
connections between these various channels and your levels of confusion.
Your data will only be anonymously shared with credible researchers and all information
collected in this study will be kept confidential within the limits of law.
We thank you for your participation in this study. Your contribution was instrumental in
advancing our knowledge of how confusion impacts deep learning gains. The results of
this study will be used to engineer a computer tutor that promotes, tracks, and helps
regulate confusion during learning.
For more information on this project or if you have any questions or concerns, please
contact Blair Lehman (balehman@memphis.edu).
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Appendix M – Debriefing Form (Study 4)
The purpose of this study was to experiment with different tutorial interventions to help
you obtain a deep understanding of topics in critical thinking. We focused on critical
thinking because it is widely acknowledged that the level of science understanding in the
United States is unacceptably low, yet the advancement of scientific knowledge depends
on the application of skills needed for scientific inquiry. Our research aspires to fill this
gap by developing technological interventions to fortify citizens and aspiring scientists
with the skills needed for critical thinking, model-based reasoning, and problem solving.
Decades of previous research, have revealed that students rarely acquire a deep
understanding of difficult conceptual information from reading the textbook or traditional
classroom instruction. Hence, we explored a different strategy to help you learn. In
particular, we tried to confuse you so that you would stop and think. This is because our
previous research indicates that a degree of confusion is essential for learning,
particularly at deeper levels of comprehension. So the tutor tried to confuse you by
providing misleading information and contradicting you in conjunction with the student
agent. Note that all misleading information was eventually corrected over the course of
the experiment. In addition to confusing you, the agent also attempted to regulate this
confusion as well through different types of motivating interventions (i.e., general
motivational statement, attribute confusion to difficulty of the material with a
motivational statement, attribute confusion to tutor explanations with a motivational
statement, or reframe the confusion experience with a motivational statement). You
received one of these interventions to test whether this could increase your level of
learning.
You were asked to take a knowledge test before interacting with the tutor and another
knowledge test after interacting with the tutor. We will use the difference between your
pre and post test scores to calculate your learning gains. We will test to see if you learned
more when you were confused compared to when you were not confused.
We recorded a video of your face, a video of your computer screen, your responses to the
tutor’s questions, and your mouse movements. This data will be used to explore
connections between these various channels and your levels of confusion.
Your data will only be anonymously shared with credible researchers and all information
collected in this study will be kept confidential within the limits of law.
We thank you for your participation in this study. Your contribution was instrumental in
advancing our knowledge of how confusion impacts deep learning gains. The results of
this study will be used to engineer a computer tutor that promotes, tracks, and helps
regulate confusion during learning.
For more information on this project or if you have any questions or concerns, please
contact Blair Lehman (balehman@memphis.edu).
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Appendix N – Flaw-Identification Task Pretest (Studies 3 & 4)
Please read over the experiment carefully and take your time responding to each choice.
Click on those elements that you feel are a problem and leave blank those elements that
you think are not a problem. In each experiment there may be no problem, one problem,
or more than one problem.
___ Construct Validity
___ Control Group
___ Correlational Study
___ Experimenter Bias
___ Generalizability
___ Measurement Sensitivity
___ Random Assignment
___ Replication
___ No Problem
Many people claim that punishing children is bad parenting and can cause children to
behave worse in the future. A group of researchers tested this claim. They had parents
and their children come into a laboratory room with two-way mirrors. Parents were put
into either "punishment" (say whatever is necessary to reprimand the child) or "no
punishment" condition (say nothing). The researchers then created a situation in which
the child behaved badly. One researcher would call a parent over to the door for a quick
conversation, while a second researcher would give the child a permanent marker. The
child then draw on the wall (time 1). Parents and children came back a week later and
were put in the same situation (time 2), but the parents were allowed to chose whether or
not to punish their child. There were two measures: (1) parents' behavior (at both times)
and (2) whether or not the child drew on the wall. The researchers found that there was
no difference in the children's behavior at time 2 and that parents' punishment was not
severe at either time. So the researchers concluded that punishment is not detrimental to
children.
Half of the students in a learning disability class received the test-taking pro treatment
and half didn't. The treatment teaches students about breaking down test questions into
smaller, more manageable pieces. The researchers that developed the treatment worked
with these students. They wanted to see if the treatment really worked, so they ran a study
to evaluate test-taking skills. All of the students took a test and then reported how many
questions they thought they answered correctly. The researchers wanted to make sure
they had the same amount of data for each student, so the researchers stood nearby while
the students took the test to answer any questions that the students had. The researchers
looked at the data and found that the test-taking pro treatment did work.
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There's this new anti-depression pill called "Lighten Up" and people had a 20% reduction
in their depression level in the first two weeks of taking it. None of the participants had
therapy sessions or any other type of alternative treatment for depression, they just went
on with their usual routines. The results were compared to another group of people who
didn't take the pill. The group that didn't take Lighten Up had no reduction in their
depression level. So Lighten Up works a lot better than just dealing with depression
yourself.
A past study showed that people who drive sports cars are more reckless in their behavior
than people who drive other types of cars. A group of researchers were skeptical about
this finding, so they ran their own study to investigate this. So here's the study that they
ran. They took people who drove sports cars and other types of cars and had them fill out
a survey. The survey asked questions about drug use, since drug use itself is a reckless
behavior and can lead to other types of reckless behaviors, and what people do while on
drugs. All of the participants filled out this survey and did not know what the researchers
were investigating. The surveys were scored for amount and intensity of reckless
behavior. The researchers found that there were not significant differences in reckless
behavior between sports car drivers and people who drive other types of cars. So the
previous study must have been incorrect.
One school year a principal decided to figure out if student manuals actually helped
students to follow all of the school rules and avoid detentions and suspensions. The new
students to high school could choose to take biology the first or second semester their
freshman year. So the principal had the biology teacher go over the importance of the
student manual during the fall semester, but only said that the manual was optional in the
spring semester. The principal found that there were no differences in the amount of
behavioral problems between the two groups of students. So to save money she has
stopped printing the student manual.
A high school teacher wanted to see if just telling her students that they were drinking
caffeinated coffee, when they actually got decaf, would give them an energy boost like
actually drinking caffeinated coffee. And that's what happened! Here's how she did her
experiment, 50 students drank the decaf coffee and 50 drank the caffeinated coffee. She
found students felt the same, but she wasn't sure if she could trust her findings, so she ran
the experiment again with the same students the next semester. To make sure it really
worked and her students wouldn't catch on, she ran the experiment again the next
semester. She made sure to randomly assign the same 100 students to the two groups
(caffeinated or decaf coffee) each time. The decaf worked just as well again! So she
thinks you should just change the labels on the coffee beans.
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Appendix O – Near Transfer Task Posttest (Studies 3 & 4)
Please read over the experiment carefully and take your time responding to each choice.
Click on those elements that you feel are a problem and leave blank those elements that
you think are not a problem. In each experiment there may be no problem, one problem,
or more than one problem.
___ Construct Validity
___ Control Group
___ Correlational Study
___ Experimenter Bias
___ Generalizability
___ Measurement Sensitivity
___ Random Assignment
___ Replication
___ No Problem
One year when hiring new employees a boss decided to test if the training manuals were
really any help. So he told the employees who began work in April to not use the training
manuals and he told the employees who began work in June to use the training manuals.
After each group of employees had been working for six months, he evaluated their
overall job performance. He found that there weren't any differences between the
employees who were told to use the training manual and the employees who were told
not to use the training manual. So he concluded that it's a waste of company money to
make these training manuals and decided that everyone can just get on-the-job-training
and figure things out for themselves.
Does your child get really scared during thunder and lightning storms? Well now there’s
this great new meditation exercise that will help your child to feel calm and relaxed or
even go to sleep during these storms! Researchers did a study on the new meditation
exercise, “Fear-B-Gone”. These researchers found that after children performed this 10minute exercise they immediately reported reduced levels of fear during thunder and
lightning storms. The article said that all of the children in the study stopped using any
other strategies for coping with this fear when they started doing the “Fear-B-Gone”
meditation. They didn’t do anything besides the meditation. There was another group of
children who didn’t do the “Fear-B-Gone” meditation and continued with their normal
routines for dealing with their fear. The group that didn’t perform the “Fear-B-Gone”
meditation had no reduction in their fear during thunder and lightning storms. So “FearB-Gone” is a quick, new miracle solution for this fear!
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A kindergarten teacher realized that the biggest problem with her students was separation
anxiety. So she enrolled half her students in a program specializing in separation anxiety.
Only half the students were enrolled so she could see if the program actually helped. The
researchers in charge of the program were excited to have a teacher's full cooperation, so
they ran an experiment to see how effective the program really was. The researchers
spoke to students about how they felt being away from home and to rate their current
feelings. The researchers often had to prompt students to get more detailed responses
about how they were feeling. Students who had participated in the program behaved
significantly better in class and dealt with their feelings of separation anxiety much better
than the other students.
Recently a company has started selling energy cookies to give people an energy boost in
the form of a snack. A boss recently noticed that a lot of his employees were eating these
energy cookies, but these energy cookies are pretty expensive. So the boss gave half of
his employees the real energy cookies and the other half he gave regular cookies that
looked identical to the energy cookies, this way all of the employees thought they were
getting energy cookies. All of his employees felt an energy boost, even the ones who just
ate regular cookies! The boss wanted to make sure that he didn’t just pick a day where
everyone felt energized because of some other reason, like doing well at work. So he ran
the study again using all of his employees. He flipped a coin to decide which employees
got the energy cookies and which ones got the regular cookies in both studies. Then he
ran the exact same study again. The second study showed the exact same results as the
first study. So the boss decided that he’ll just bring in regular cookies every day but tell
his employees that they’re energy cookies. This way he’ll have more efficient employees
and save money!
About a decade ago, there was a study that looked at random acts of kindness. This study
found that children under the age of 12 were more likely to do random acts of kindness
than children between 13 and 18 years old. A researcher had doubts that this was really
true, so she designed a study to test this out. To test this, she videotaped children at recess
and other breaks during the school day (e.g., lunch, passing periods, etc.). She then had
another researcher code the videos for random acts of kindness. The researcher who did
the coding was told to count the number of times an individual child said please and
thank you to another child and teachers. After looking at videos from many schools in
different parts of the US, she found that children under the age of 12 did perform more
random acts of kindness than the older children. So she feels really confident that this
effect is real.
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A researcher in England investigated people's responses to sarcastic remarks. He had two
groups of participants that came into his research laboratory to participate in the study.
Another researcher acted as a confederate to say sarcastic remarks to the participants, but
the participants believed that this person was another participant. Participants were
divided into two groups, both groups were asked to respond as they naturally would to
the sarcastic remark. One group was given the additional task of responding with a
sarcastic remark and the other groups was told to respond with a remark that was not
sarcastic. The researcher took physiological measurements of the participants (e.g., skin
conductance, heart rate, etc.) along with recording the participants' responses (e.g.,
content, voice pitch, speaking rate, etc.). All of these measures were used to investigate if
it is more natural to respond to sarcasm with sarcasm, or with explicit language. The
researcher found that people who had to respond with a non-sarcastic remark showed
more signs of anxiety and other forms of distress. So if someone is sarcastic with you, be
sarcastic right back, it's healthier!
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Appendix P – Far Transfer Task Posttest (Studies 3 & 4)
Please read over the experiment carefully and take your time responding to each choice.
Click on those elements that you feel are a problem and leave blank those elements that
you think are not a problem. In each experiment there may be no problem, one problem,
or more than one problem.
___ Construct Validity
___ Control Group
___ Correlational Study
___ Experimenter Bias
___ Generalizability
___ Measurement Sensitivity
___ Random Assignment
___ Replication
___ No Problem
Have you ever used an automatic cleaner for your bathroom? Well now there's one for
your kitchen floor too! An independent research team tested the effectiveness of this
product. 10 researchers each found 6 dirty kitchens. They used the new product on 3
kitchens and used traditional cleaning products (i.e., a mop) on the other 3. The kitchens
were cleaned daily for one week, then researchers evaluated each one. The 30 kitchens
cleaned with the automatic cleaning product were rated as 50% cleaner by the researchers
via a visual examination of each floor. So the independent researchers concluded that the
automatic cleaning product was a really great cleaner. The company that made the
cleaner decided to try a second study where they compared their product to the top
competitor. The company recruited 60 people for the second study. The company decided
to let people choose whether to use their new product or their competitor’s cleaning
product so they could also get information about the “shelf appeal” of their product.
Luckily, it was a pretty even split (32 and 28, respectively). The new participants were
given instructions to do the same type of cleaning that the independent research team did
before. At the end of one week, the same researchers came and evaluated the cleanliness
of each kitchen in the same way as the first study. This second study found that the
automatic clear was superior to the top competitor’s product. So now the company feels
very confident that this product will be a huge success.
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A trainer developed a new program that will have your dog well behaved over night. In
past studies people have studied two training types: traditional and hypnosis. But no one
has tried combining the two training types until now. Here’s how the combined method
works. Dogs go through a session on basic commands (traditional training). Then while
the dogs sleep a tape is played that says the command, says the correct behavior, and
gives praise (hypnosis). The trainers tested this out by having three comparison groups:
new training (traditional + hypnosis), traditional, and do nothing. The dogs completed
each training type under the supervision of the lead trainer, who is often referred to as the
“Dog Whisperer” because he seems to have almost magical skills at getting dogs to
behave. At the completion of each training type the dogs were evaluated on their
behavior by trainers from a different kennel. The dogs that did the new program
(traditional + hypnosis) did the best and it took less than 24 hours! The trainer claims that
the hypnosis is what really makes the difference. So he is putting out a book and a video
that will teach you how to get your dog trained over night. Trainers at a few other kennels
heard about this program and decided to try it at their kennel. They all bought the book
and video and followed all of the instructions very carefully. The new program wored at
some kennels and didn't work as well at other kennels. The original trainer, the “Dog
Whisperer,” attributed these findings to some of the trainers not following the
instructions carefully enough. So it might not be perfect, but if you need your dog trained
this seems like the way to go!
Have you ever wanted to be funnier? Well the producers of a stand-up show have started
a comedy class. Before advertising on T.V., they ran an study with 50 volunteers from a
near by office building to participate in their study. Half of the people took their class for
1 week and half took a pottery class for 1 week. All of the participants attended class for
1 hour 3 times a week. All of the participants did 5-minutes of stand-up before and after
taking either the comedy or pottery class. The tapes were evaluated in two ways. The first
measure used was the number of jokes that the person told while on stage. Second, a
trained therapist watched the video and rated the person on the Colenwald Public
Speaking Anxiety Scale. The idea was that after the training the person should feel more
confident while on stage, and therefore show less anxiety. The researchers found that all
of the participants significantly improved in their stand-up abilities. To make sure that the
class really worked the researchers ran another study. In the second study they used
people who had auditioned for a spot in their stand-up show. These participants did
everything the same as in the first study; except instead of taking the class 3 times in one
week, they took the class once a week for 3 weeks. But this time they did not find that the
class worked. So the researchers concluded that the first results were just a fluke and the
class doesn't help people to be funnier.
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Appendix Q – Design-A-Study Task Posttest (Studies 3 & 4)
Claim: Teachers always tell their students that it is better to study a little bit of the course
material each day, rather than try to cram all of the studying into the night before the
exam.
Imagine that you are going to design a study to test this claim. The questions below will
address some of the important decisions that you will have to make when designing and
running your study (e.g., independent variables, dependent variables, etc.). For each
question, select the best answer choice. It is alright if you don’t know the correct answer,
try your best to answer each question.
1. There are lost of ways to measure the impact of students’ study habits on learning.
Which measure below has the greatest construct validity?
a. Number of correct responses on a test
b. Number of correct responses on a test and quality of study guide
completion
c. Rate of correct responses (number of correct answers divided by amount
of time to answer each question) on a test
d. Time taken to complete a test
2. In this study you are testing which type of study behavior is best for students.
When you run your study, which of the following groups would be best to
compare?
a. Cramming the night before, studying small amounts of the material
throughout the semester, and class attendance
b. Cramming the night before and studying small amounts of the material
throughout the semester
c. Cramming he night before, studying small amounts of the material
throughout the semester, and studying nothing at all
d. Cramming the night before, cramming two hours before, and studying
small amounts of the material throughout the semester
3. How would participants be put into the different conditions?
a. Ask participants which type of studying (cramming the night before or
studying small amounts throughout the semester) they do so the groups are
as realistic as possible
b. Use the order of participants walking in to the classroom on the first day
of classes (e.g., first half will cram the night before and second half will
study small amounts throughout the semester)
c. Divide participants based on prior test scores into high performing and
low performing groups
d. When participants walk into the classroom, flip a coin and if it is heads the
participant crams the night before and tails the participant will study small
amounts throughout the semester
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4. Let’s say that you disagree with teachers and believe that cramming the night
before a test is just as good as studying small amounts throughout the semester.
When designing your study, which would be the best way to make sure your
opinion did not bias the results?
a. Have a second person that is not involved with your study deliver
instructions to half of the participants and have a third person that is not
involved with your study deliver instructions to the other half
b. Have a second person that is not involved with your study deliver
instructions to all participants
c. Do not give participants any instructions, simply tell them to cram the
night before or study throughout the semester
d. Have a second person that believes the teachers’ claim is correct run half
of the participants and run half of the participants yourself
5. A past study tested this same claim about study habits with college students
learning about Newtonian physics. Which study listed below would be the best
replication study for your to conduct?
a. Use the same college students from the first study
b. Use the same college students from the first study, but make sure to assign
them to a different condition in the replication study
c. Use college students learning about English literature
d. Use college students at the same university learning about Newtonian
physics
6. Which of the following research settings will allow you the most confidence that
your results will generalize and have confidence in the accuracy of your findings?
a. Controlled research laboratory that removes other influential variables
during studying and test taking
b. Controlled research laboratory only for the testing portion of the study
c. Allow participants to study in an environment of their choosing and to
take the test in a similar environment (like a take home test)
d. Allow participants to chose if they want to come into the laboratory to
study and take the test or choose their own environment
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456

SAMPSON Appendix
AND CLARKR

– Zohar & Nemet (2002) Coding Scheme

TABLE 2
The Sample Argument Coded Using Zohar and Nemet’s Analytic Framework
Component of the Argument
I think. . . all objects in the same surroundings
become the same temperature even if an
object produces its own heat energy.
This is true because on the lab that we did all
the temperatures were in their 20s which
proves that the room temperature changes
the objects to the same as the room.
Therefore, even though they may feel different,
the objects are actually within a few degrees
of each other.

Scientific
Knowledge

Code
Claim

Not coded

Relevant justification

Correct
scientific
knowledge

Relevant justification

Incorrect
scientific
knowledge

*Table reprinted from Sampson & Clark (2008)
Application to the Sample Argument. Table 2 shows how Zohar and Nemet’s framework
would be applied to the sample argument. Rather than classifying the statement “on the
lab we did all the temperatures were in their 20s” as data and the statement “which proves
that the room temperature changes the objects to the same as the room” as a warrant,
Zohar and Nemet’s analytic framework treats these comments as a single justification. The
statement, “therefore, even though they may feel different, the objects are actually within
a few degrees of each other” is also classified as a justification because it is used as a way
to support the validity of the claim (instead of as a qualifier as per the Toulmin model).
From the perspective of Zohar and Nemet’s framework, this argument would be considered
strong; the claim is supported by two relevant justifications, one of which includes specific
and accurate scientific knowledge. The other justification, although it refers to a specific
piece of scientific knowledge, is inaccurate from a scientific perspective.
Synthesis in Terms of Structure, Justification, and Content. Zohar and Nemet’s framework focuses most heavily on the issues of justification and content. One of the potential
benefits of this approach is that the framework enables researchers to determine how often students use scientific knowledge to support an idea and under what conditions. For
example, Zohar and Nemet’s work suggests that most students (90% in their study) are able
to formulate a simple argument, consisting of a claim with a single relevant justification
without any formal training about “what counts” as a good argument in science. However,
very few of these students (16%) used correct, specific biological knowledge as part of
their justification. However, after explicitly teaching students about argument quality and
relevant scientific content, Zohar and Nemet observed an increase in both the quality of
students’ arguments (in terms of numbers of justification used to support a claim) and the
how often they used specific biological knowledge as part of their justification. This finding,
which mirrors the findings of Schwarz et al. (2003), suggests that students do not refer to
specific scientific content to justify their claims unless they have an adequate conceptual
understanding of the subject in question and they have an opportunity to rehearse constructing arguments for themselves. This indicates that content knowledge and argumentation
practices are intimately linked.
While Zohar and Nemet’s framework offers several affordances in terms of issues relating
to content and justification in arguments, the framework involves some limitations as well.
First, the content of the claim is not evaluated in this analytic framework. This is not an
Science Education
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Appendix T – Induction × Confusion × Intervention × Regulation Effort Interaction
Results from Study 3
Claim quality models were significant when participants were either not confused
and had low regulation effort or were confused and had high regulation effort. This
dichotomy of cases follows an expected pattern. If participants are not confused than
there is no need to put forth more effort during the confusion regulation task because
there is no confusion to resolve, whereas the opposite is true in the confused and high
regulation effort cases.
The findings from the not confused and low regulation effort cases suggest that
claim quality was most impacted by the combination of the Convince Only condition
with each induction condition. Specifically, participants in the Convince Only condition
were more likely to present a correct claim when in the False-True condition (B = 2.36)
but less likely in the True-False condition (B = 60.2) compared to the True-True
condition (χ2(2) = 10.3, p = .006). In addition, when participants were in the True-True
condition those in the Convince Only condition were less likely to present a correct claim
than both the Convince then Read (B = 10.6) and Convince while Read conditions (B =
4.42), with the Convince the Read condition also more likely to present a correct claim
than the Convince while Read condition (B = 6.22, χ2(2) = 7.59, p = .022). In contrast,
when in the False-True condition participants in the Convince Only condition were more
likely to present a correct claim than those in both the Convince then Read (B = 4.63) and
Convince while Read conditions (B = 4.38, χ2(2) = 6.62, p = .037).
It is interesting that the combination of False-True induction condition and
Convince Only intervention condition were likely to produce a correct claim when
learners were not confused and had low regulation effort. In previous experiments
participants have been found to generally agree with the tutor agent, who is incorrect in
the False-True condition (D’Mello et al., 2014; Lehman et al., 2013), and this would most
likely lead to an incorrect claim unless participants changed their opinion during the
argument construction process. In addition, the Convince Only condition does not
provide a resource to correct errors and misconceptions, which makes it seem unlikely
that participants would change to the correct opinion. This finding is then somewhat
anomalous.
The findings from the confused and high regulation effort cases were also
somewhat perplexing. Participants in the Convince while Read condition were more
likely to make a correct claim when in the no-contradiction control condition compared
to both experimental conditions (χ2(2) = 5.08, p = .079, True-False: B = 1.62, False-True:
B = 1.44). In addition, when participants were in the True-False condition, those in the
Convince Only (B = 1.61) and Convince then Read conditions (B = 1.30) were more
likely to present a correct claim than Convince while Read condition (χ2(2) = 5.08, p =
.079). These findings suggest that participants were less likely to present a correct claim
when they were successfully confused by the presentation of a contradiction, were asked
to construct an argument, were provided with a resource to successfully resolve the
contradicting opinions, and put forth more effort to resolve their confusion. In other
words, this pattern of findings was the opposite of the predictions based on cognitive
disequilibrium (Festinger, 1957; Graesser et al., 2005; Piaget, 1952) and impasse-driven
theories of learning (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn et al., 2003).
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A presence score of 1 represents an argument that contains either a claim or
evidence, but does not address the quality of the claim or evidence. The experimental
conditions performed differently when participants were not successfully confused, had
low regulation effort, and were in the Convince while Read condition (χ2(2) = 4.51, p =
.105). When in the False-True condition participants were more likely to have a presence
score of 1 than the True-True condition (B = 1.68), whereas the True-False condition was
less likely to have a score of 1 (B = 1.24). When participants were in the True-False
condition they were also less likely to have a presence score of 1 when they were
confused, had low regulation effort, and were in the Convince Only condition (χ2(2) =
5.74, p = .057, B = 1.31). This pattern suggests that the True-False condition constructed
arguments that were of an all or none nature. The arguments either contained both a claim
and evidence or neither. However, when participants were confused, had high regulation
effort, and were in the True-True condition those in the Convince Only (B = 1.65) and
Convince then Read conditions (B = 1.00) were more likely to have a presence score of 1
than the Convince while Read condition (χ2(2) = 4.76, p = .093). It does not appear then
that there is a simple pattern of events to explain a presence score of 1.
The semantic match score findings generally revealed that the False-True
condition had a lower semantic match score than the True-True condition, regardless of
the situation (i.e., case), whereas the intervention conditions greatly varied based on the
situation. Participants had a lower match score to the ideal response when in the FalseTrue condition compared to the True-True condition when they were not confused, had
low regulation effort, and were in the Convince Only condition (F(2,936) = 5.59, p =
.007, B = .295); were not confused, had high regulation effort, and were in the Convince
while Read condition (F(2,936) = 3.95, p = .028, B = .319); and were confused, had low
regulation effort, and were in the Convince while Read condition (F(2,936) = 3.40, p =
.041, B = .200). However, participants did have a higher match score when in the FalseTrue condition when they were confused, had high regulation effort, and were in the
Convince Only condition (F(2) = 3.02, p = .055, B = .113). Participants also had higher
match scores when in the True-False condition in this case (B = .170).
As mentioned previously, the intervention conditions performed differently in
terms of semantic match score based on the situation. However, it was the case that the
Convince Only condition generally had a higher match score than both the Convince then
Read and Convince while Read conditions. The Convince Only condition had higher
match scores than the Convince then Read condition when participants were confused,
had low regulation effort, and were in either the True-True (F(2,936) = 2.59, p = .084, B
= .232) or True-False conditions (F(2,936) = 2.49, p = .095, B = .185) and had higher
match scores than the Convince while Read condition when participants were confused,
had low regulation effort, and were in the False-True condition (F(2,936) = 2.34, p =
.103, B = .176). The Convince then Read condition had higher match scores than the
Convince while Read condition when participants were confused, had low regulation
effort, and were in the False-True condition as well (B = .185). In addition, the Convince
while Read condition had higher match scores than the Convince then Read condition
when participants were confused, had low regulation effort, and were in the True-False
condition (B = .149). The Convince while Read condition only had higher match scores
than both the Convince Only (B = .290) and Convince then Read conditions (B = .167)
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when participants were not confused, had high regulation effort, and were in the TrueTrue condition (F(2,936) = 4.61, p = .016).
These findings were surprising for two reasons. First, the task of constructing an
argument was identical in the Convince Only and Convince then Read conditions;
therefore, a difference between the two conditions was not expected. Second, participants
in the Convince Only condition were not provided with the explanatory text as a resource
during argument construction as those in the Convince while Read condition were. The
availability of the explanatory text was expected to aid in constructing an overall higher
quality argument. However, the current findings did not support this prediction.
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Appendix U – Induction Condition Differences for the Induction × Confusion ×
Intervention × Regulation Effort Interaction for the Far Transfer Task in Study 3
The induction condition differences for the induction × confusion × intervention ×
regulation effort interaction for the far transfer task revealed the circumstances under
which the experimental conditions outperformed the no-contradiction control. When
participants were confusion, had high regulation effort, and were in the Convince Only
condition they performed better when in both experimental conditions than the nocontradictions control condition (χ2(2) = 7.93, p = .019; True-False: B = 1.14, FalseTrue: B = 1.93). In addition, participants performed better when in the True-False
condition when they were confused, had low regulation effort, and were in the Read Only
condition (χ2(2) = 4.54, p = .104; B = 1.34), while they performed better when in the
False-True condition when they were not confused, had high regulation effort, and were
in the Convince then Read condition (χ2(2) = 11.3, p = .004; B = 8.13). These findings
provide information as to the most beneficial combinations of induction and intervention
conditions when participants were not in the overall most effective intervention condition
(Convince while Read). It appears that when only one regulation task is presented the
successful induction of confusion is needed for the contradicting information conditions
to be effective.
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Appendix V – Induction Condition Differences for the Induction × Confusion ×
Intervention × Regulation Interaction for the Near Transfer and Design-A-Study Tasks in
Study 4
There were three main findings when induction condition differences were
investigated for the near transfer task. The first finding was that participants did worse
when in the False-True condition compared to the True-True condition (B = 3.85) when
they were not confused, had high regulation effort, and were in the Confusion Specific
condition (χ2(2) = 8.74, p = .013). This finding is somewhat puzzling because although
the participants were not confused, they were somehow motivated to put in more effort
during the regulation task. Although there is ostensibly not an impasse to resolve, it
seems unlikely that the False-True condition would perform worse than the True-True
condition. In contrast, the second main finding revealed that participants did better when
in the True-False condition compared to the True-True condition when they had low
regulation effort and were in the Confusion Specific + Motivation condition, regardless
of whether confusion was successfully induced (χ2(2) = 4.67, p = .097, B = 1.18) or not
induced (χ2(2) = 15.5, p < .001, B = 12.2). This finding is also somewhat perplexing due
to the fact that the Confusion Specific + Motivation intervention did not successfully
motivate participants (low regulation effort), the participants were still able to perform
well on the near transfer task. The third main finding was the circumstances under which
participants performed worse when in the True-False condition compared to the TrueTrue condition. Participants did worse when in the True-False condition when they were
not confused, had low regulation effort, and were in the General Motivational Statement
(χ2(2) = 7.12, p = .028, B = 2.90) and were confused, had high regulation effort, and were
in the Tutor Attribute + Motivation condition (χ2(2) = 7.13, p = .028, B = 1.41). This
pattern suggests that a general motivational statement that does not address participants’
attributions does not motivate participants to put in more effort and learn the concept
more deeply.
The significant models for induction condition differences for the design-a-study
task generally revealed the conditions under which the experimental conditions
performed less well than the no-contradiction control condition, with one exception. As
in the near transfer task analyses, when participants were not confused, had low
regulation effort, and were in the General Motivational Statement condition, participants
performed less well when in the True-False condition than the True-True (χ2(2) = 6.30, p
= .043; B = 1.99) and the same pattern was found for the False-True condition in the
present analyses (B = 1.31). Participants also performed less well when in both
experimental conditions when they were not confused, had high regulation effort, and
were in the Confusion Specific + Motivation condition (χ2(2) = 6.95, p = .031; TrueFalse: B = 1.83, False-True: B = 3.31) and when they were confused, had high regulation
effort, and were in the Material Attribute + Motivation condition (χ2(2) = 11.7, p = .003;
True-False: B = 2.37, False-True: B = 1.56). This pattern generally suggests that the
contradictory information conditions were not beneficial to performance on the design-astudy task. There was one exception to this pattern. When participants were in the TrueFalse condition they performed better than the True-True condition when they were
confused, had high regulation effort, and were in the Tutor Attribute + Motivation
condition (χ2(2) = 3.90, p = .071, B = 1.30). This finding was the opposite of the pattern
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that emerged in the near transfer study. In this instance the finding is more intuitive.
Participants were successfully confused by the presentation of contradictory information
and were motivated to put in more effort during the confusion regulation task. It is not
clear why shifting the causal attribution of participants’ confusion to the tutor agent’s
explanation was particularly effective in this circumstance. In order to fully explain why
attributional shifts of different varieties and attributional retraining do and do not work in
certain circumstances may necessitate a more complete understanding of the participants’
attributions prior to the intervention.
!
!
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